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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
HAZARD MITIGATION ELEMENT QUALITY IN COASTAL COMPREHENSIVE 
PLANS IN A STATE WITH STRONG REQUIREMENTS FOR  
HAZARD MITIGATION PLAN ELEMENTS  
by 
Evelio Enrique Astray-Caneda III 
Florida International University, 2013 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Howard Frank, Major Professor 
This dissertation examines the quality of hazard mitigation elements in a coastal, 
hazard prone state. I answer two questions. First, in a state with a strong mandate for 
hazard mitigation elements in comprehensive plans, does plan quality differ among 
county governments? Second, if such variation exists, what drives this variation? My 
research focuses primarily on Florida’s 35 coastal counties, which are all at risk for 
hurricane and flood hazards, and all fall under Florida’s mandate to have a 
comprehensive plan that includes a hazard mitigation element. Research methods 
included document review to rate the hazard mitigation elements of all 35 coastal county 
plans and subsequent analysis against demographic and hazard history factors. Following 
this, I conducted an electronic, nationwide survey of planning professionals and 
academics, informed by interviews of planning leaders in Florida counties. 
I found that hazard mitigation element quality varied widely among the 35 Florida 
coastal counties, but were close to a normal distribution. No plans were of exceptionally 
high quality. Overall, historical hazard effects did not correlate with hazard mitigation 
vii 
 
element quality, but some demographic variables that are associated with urban 
populations did. 
The variance in hazard mitigation element quality indicates that while state law 
may mandate, and even prescribe, hazard mitigation in local comprehensive plans, not all 
plans will result in equal, or even adequate, protection for people. Furthermore, the mixed 
correlations with demographic variables representing social and disaster vulnerability 
shows that, at least at the county level, vulnerability to hazards does not have a strong 
effect on hazard mitigation element quality. 
From a theory perspective, my research is significant because it compares 
assumptions about vulnerability based on hazard history and demographics to plan 
quality. The only vulnerability-related variables that appeared to correlate, and at that 
mildly so, with hazard mitigation element quality, were those typically representing more 
urban areas. In terms of the theory of Neo-Institutionalism and theories related to learning 
organizations, my research shows that planning departments appear to have set norms 
and rules of operating that preclude both significant public involvement and learning 
from prior hazard events. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Policymakers and public administrators are increasingly being called upon to 
design and implement measures for natural hazard mitigation. While structural 
improvements, such as building dams and wind-resistant homes, have led to a reduction 
in deaths attributed to natural hazards, people continue to live in places prone to natural 
hazards. Consequently, hundreds of thousands of people perish in disaster events every 
year. For example, an earthquake struck Haiti on January 12, 2010, taking an estimated 
222,570 lives, injuring countless others in ways that will forever impair their ability to 
earn a living, and affecting an estimated 3.7 million people in total (Université 
Catholique de Louvain, 2010). The Indian Ocean tsunami of December 25, 2004, took 
the lives of 181,516 and displaced 1.6 million from their homes in countries including 
Indonesia, Thailand, and Sri Lanka (Jennings, 2005). 
Deaths attributed to natural hazards are neither limited to less developed countries 
nor the distant past. For example, in 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck the Louisiana coast 
in the United States; the disaster took the lives of 1,464 people (Knabb, Rhome, & 
Brown, 2006; Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, 2006). In fact, while more 
developed countries bear a lower proportion of disaster deaths, they tend to bear the most 
significant portion of disaster-related expenses. For example, examination of disasters 
with counts of more than 1,000 deaths and/or costs of US $1 billion from 1977 through 
1996 alone reveals that 12.6% of deaths occurred in the “developed world,” but 82% of 
damage costs were attributed to developed regions (Alexander, 1997). Further, damages 
and deaths from natural disasters are increasing, not so much because more hazards are 
occurring, but because populations in hazard areas are growing in number and size, and 
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value of property in the areas these populations occupy are increasing, as wealthier 
people seek homes in more “exotic” and “natural” locales (Comfort, 2006; Quarantelli, 
2003; Turner, 1979). Figure 1, below, shows the growth in worldwide damage costs as 
measured in U.S. Dollars over time (Université Catholique de Louvain, 2011). As 
population continues to increase in hazard zones, mitigation through structural and policy 
measures must be strengthened in order to prevent disasters and stem losses of life and 
property when they do occur (Kapucu, 2008; Pielke Jr., et al., 2008). 
 
Figure 1: Natural disaster damages in billions of U.S. Dollars (courtesy of EM-DAT) 
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Vulnerability of the Population of the Coastal United States 
In 2007, 53% of the U.S. population lived in coastal hazard zones, and the 
population in these areas continues to grow (Association of State Floodplain Managers, 
2007). As more people move toward desirable coastal regions, increasing numbers of 
people and amounts of property are exposed to hazards. Significantly, hazard 
vulnerability increases as more people move into areas at risk for disasters and modify 
the environment. Activities such as paving over permeable surfaces that can absorb 
floodwaters, and removing mangrove forests that can buffer coasts from storms, increases 
hazard vulnerability (Brody, Highfield, Ryu, & Spanel-Weber, 2007; Skertchly & 
Skertchley, 2001; Wahlstrom, 2007; Wisner, Blaikie, Cannon, & Davis, 2004). One of 
the first authors to remark on the conflict between development and nature was Gilbert 
White, who in 1937 noted that the effect of built structures such as “… bridges, 
highways, buildings, levees…” on existing stream channels was to increase floods. 
Concordant with the problem of growing population in coastal areas, homes near coasts 
tend to be of high value compared to others, and thus financial risk is increasing 
disproportionately to population. 
 
Flood and Hurricane Mitigation in the United States 
In order to prevent disasters, people engage in mitigation – both individually and 
in communities. Simply put, mitigation consists of policies and practices that reduce 
vulnerability to disaster and thus reduce disaster impacts on people and property (Gerber, 
2007; Henstra & McBean, 2005). Mitigation is a critical strategy to address natural 
hazards and significantly reduce disaster deaths and injuries; typically, for every $1.00 
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invested in mitigation, an estimated $7.00 of post-disaster spending is saved (Wahlstrom, 
2007; Zahran, Brody, Peacock, Vedlitz, & Grover, 2008). Mitigation, while historically 
utilized on a limited scale, is a relatively new idea for wide-scale application, especially 
at the local level. Until a few decades ago, the primary method of dealing with disasters 
was simply to respond, and then for insurers and governments to step in and help people 
to “recover” by rebuilding again in the path of a disaster. Today, the focus has changed to 
policies and practices that consider natural hazards, and try to bolster human settlement 
against them, or to move human settlement out of harm’s way (Henstra & McBean, 
2005). However, the extent to which individual communities practice mitigation is in 
question. This is one of the important elements for my research. 
While structural measures (engineering projects) have helped somewhat, they 
have generally failed to eliminate disasters (Vatsa, 2004), and can, in fact, worsen 
disasters (Quarantelli, 2003). Structural measures are critical to prevent disasters, but 
when a hazard exceeds the capacity of structural mitigation, the consequences may 
actually be worsened by those engineering measures. These measures connote safety and 
encourage people to live in dangerous areas, thereby causing more people to be 
vulnerable in the event of an engineering failure (Berke & Campanella, 2006; Brody S. 
D., et al., 2007; Burby R. J., 2006; Burby, et al., 1999; Burby & Dalton, 1994; Highfield 
& Brody, 2006; Nelson & French, 2002). For example, Hurricane Katrina showed that 
engineered structures thought to protect people can be completely overwhelmed by a 
disaster – and the consequences could be grave. 
The failure of structural mitigation to fully address natural hazards has led to a 
need to also pursue non-structural measures (Vatsa, 2004). Non-structural mitigation 
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addresses the threats of hazards through programs and policy, often complemented by 
structural mitigation (engineered measures). The National Flood Insurance Program 
(NFIP) is an example of non-structural mitigation (Brody S. D., et al., 2007). 
Communities in flood-prone areas receive a rating from the NFIP on the basis of their 
flood risk, and then citizens within those communities are offered flood insurance at a 
price commensurate with their risk level. Communities can earn higher ratings that lower 
insurance premiums by taking certain actions and implementing policies that reduce their 
exposure to flood hazards. Essentially, people are financially rewarded for taking 
mitigatory actions. 
Comprehensive planning, the research focus of this dissertation, can incorporate 
non-structural measures to both enhance and, in some cases, replace structural mitigation. 
Comprehensive planning provides a unique opportunity to make policies that protect 
people and property by a) applying building and land use codes appropriate to individual 
areas based on hazard exposure, b) prohibiting development in areas where structural and 
land use measures cannot sufficiently protect the population, and c) balancing the two 
scenarios through risk-based decision-making. 
While statistically rigorous studies are lacking, there appears to be a correlation 
between the use of comprehensive plans to mitigate hazards and a reduction in disaster 
losses. For example, recent research comparing flood insurance claims in Florida and 
Texas over 24 years (1978-2002) has shown that for every 1,000 persons, Florida had one 
insurance claim for flood damage, while in Texas the number was 21. In monetary terms, 
this translated to $71 per capita in Florida, but $325 in Texas (Burby R. J., 2006). 
Essentially, not only did Florida have fewer losses per resident, but the losses were of 
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lower cost. The difference between the two states is that Florida requires hazard 
mitigation elements in local comprehensive plans, while Texas does not. 
 
Research Questions and Methods 
Comprehensive planning offer communities many opportunities to mitigate 
against hazards – from addressing economic development, to bettering transit, improving 
education, strengthening against hazards, and employing other creative tools. My 
research examines the ability of comprehensive planning to improve hazard mitigation; I 
investigate how counties fare in terms of comprehensive planning for hazard mitigation 
under state laws requiring that these counties have such plans. While prior research has 
shown that states with these requirements have lower losses as a whole (all counties 
combined) to natural hazards, the unique contribution of my research is that it ascertains 
how individual counties within such a state fare in terms of hazard mitigation element 
quality. This research seeks to answer the following two questions: 
1. In a state with a strong mandate for hazard mitigation elements in comprehensive 
plans, does plan quality differ among county governments?  
2. If such variation exists, what drives this variation? 
 
Using a combination of methods, I collected data and answered the above 
questions. I selected the methods based on the formative nature of my research, and these 
methods will help pave the way for future work to study the effects of planning mandates 
regarding hazard mitigation. My research employed the following methods: 
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1. Document Review and Demographic and Historical Analysis – I reviewed the 
hazard mitigation elements of all 35 coastal Florida counties and rated each on a 
24 item scale (which was created based on the literature findings). I used data 
from this review to answer the question regarding variation in plan quality and to 
provide a dependent variable for some of the analyses regarding drivers of 
quality. I utilized U.S. Census data and historical hurricane strike data as 
independent variables in regression analyses to ascertain if they correlate with 
hazard mitigation element quality. 
2. Electronic Survey – I conducted an electronic survey of persons professionally 
involved with hazard mitigation and disasters. I used the survey to ascertain what 
factors these experts believe correspond to quality planning for hazard mitigation 
in comprehensive plans. I sent the survey to all of the planning staff in Florida 
counties, as well as to persons known to be involved in disaster practice and 
research. Additionally, responders could forward the survey link to others they 
knew might be interested in participating. I developed survey questions using 
extant literature, practice, and interviews of four comprehensive planning leaders 
in Florida county governments. I used the interviews to explore what these 
managers believe are good practices for incorporating hazard mitigation elements 
into local comprehensive plans, how they address the hazard mitigation element 
in their counties, and what they believe makes a quality hazard mitigation 
element.  
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Summary of Research Findings and Contribution to Literature 
Rating the plans of the 35 coastal counties revealed that there is a great degree of 
variation in the quality of hazard mitigation elements across counties, despite stringent 
state laws, regulations, and guidelines requiring and describing these elements. This 
variation in hazard mitigation element quality is, alone, an important research finding, 
because it indicates that even when a state is highly prescriptive in its instructions to local 
government to build hazard mitigation into local comprehensive plans, quality is not 
assured, and some localities will have better plans than others. This finding of variation 
provides a very important avenue for future research consideration. 
The question of what drives variation in plan quality is answered to a degree, but 
further research is also warranted. Hazard mitigation element quality was not correlated 
with historical hazard strikes, but was correlated mildly with some social vulnerability 
variables that also tend to correlate with urban areas. While demographic variables 
representing social vulnerability were not strong drivers of hazard mitigation element 
quality, their effects may be mediated by the urbanity and rurality of counties.  
The findings of my research are significant for state level policymakers because 
these findings indicate that state regulations designed to create quality hazard mitigation 
elements at the local level are not achieving the desired objectives in Florida, and 
potentially other states. My research also reveals that hazard mitigation element quality is 
tied neither to demographic factors (including wealth) nor hazard history. Finally, my 
research reveals what many professionals and researchers in the hazard mitigation and 
disasters fields believe contributes to higher hazard mitigation element quality. 
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Governments can use this information to further improve hazard mitigation elements in 
comprehensive plans. 
 
Dissertation Structure 
This dissertation is structured in such a way that it supports formative exploration 
of topics related to hazard mitigation in Comprehensive Planning. The dissertation begins 
with a literature review to help define the problem and questions and create research 
methods. Following that, the methods section presents the research methods, including a 
detailed list of concepts utilized in rating the hazard mitigation elements. The subsequent 
chapters discuss the results of the plan review and demographic analysis and the survey 
results. The dissertation concludes with the major findings, limitations of the study, and 
future research directions.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Introduction 
Comprehensive planning, amongst achieving other goals, is an effective means to 
prepare communities for natural hazards and to mitigate against those hazards. It provides 
an opportunity to bring together hazard information, physical information about the 
community, development planning, public input, and planner technical expertise and 
experience to address potential effects of natural hazards in communities. Ten states 
require that local governments prepare comprehensive plans addressing natural hazards. 
Extant research has shown that in states with such a requirement, losses due to natural 
hazards are lower than in states without them. However, few studies, and none recently, 
have examined what drives the quality of hazard mitigation elements at the local level in 
states with a requirement to address hazard mitigation in comprehensive plans. My 
research fills that gap. 
The research conducted for this dissertation is derived from theories of 
Vulnerability and Neo-Institutionalism. Under Vulnerability Theory, people are 
considered prone to varying levels of disaster on the basis of factors existing before a 
hazard strikes. To reduce disasters, these factors can be addressed to lessen hazard 
impacts. Neo-Institutionalism provides a framework to examine planning organizations. 
Under Neo-Institutionalism, planning institutions are considered to be constructed from 
the roles, rules, and norms that collectively influence the actions and behaviors of 
institutional members – in this case, planners. 
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Hazard mitigation: Preventing Disasters and Reducing Their Effects 
Mitigation, in terms of hazards and disasters, consists of collective policies and 
practices that reduce vulnerability to disasters and subsequent disaster impacts on people 
and property (Gerber, 2007; Henstra & McBean, 2005). So, for example, a county facing 
a frequent rain hazard might install a storm drainage system to allow rainwater to flow 
off more readily and thus mitigate the rain hazard by preventing water from accumulating 
and becoming a flood disaster. For a non-structural solution, the county might offer 
building incentives to construct homes in less hazard-exposed areas. Overall, mitigation 
is a critical strategy to significantly reduce disaster deaths and injuries; research findings 
indicate that for every $1.00 invested in mitigation an estimated $7.00 in post-disaster 
spending is saved (Wahlstrom, 2007; Zahran, et al., 2008).  
From the flood control mechanisms of the ancient Middle-East, to modern designs 
allowing buildings to sway in earthquakes, people have focused primarily on structural 
mitigation of natural hazards for millennia. Regrettably, while structural measures have 
helped somewhat, they have generally failed to eliminate disasters (Vatsa, 2004). 
Historically, structural mitigation has been problematic in the United States. While 
engineered structures can do well to protect an area from known disaster events, when a 
hazard exceeds the capacity of structural mitigation, complete catastrophe can ensue 
(Berke & Campanella, 2006; Burby, et al., 1999; Burby & Dalton, 1994; Burby R. J., 
2006; Highfield & Brody, 2006). The Hurricane Katrina example in New Orleans, 
discussed below, is an example of the failure of structural mitigation to prevent a disaster. 
One failure of structural mitigation is that it can encourage people to live in areas 
not truly safe for human habitation and thus increase human exposure to hazards that may 
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ensue when structural methods fail to prevent a disaster (Burby R. J., 2006; Brody S. D., 
et al., 2007; Wisner, et al., 2004). For example, Hurricane Katrina showed that, even in a 
post-industrial and technocratic society with strong capabilities in engineering, structural 
measures are not always effective. Since these structural means connote safety, 
populations increase in disaster-prone areas under a false sense of safety implied by the 
structural measures, and thus more people are put in the path of hazards. In the Katrina 
example, this problem started following the Mississippi River flood of 1927, when the 
U.S. government engaged in a massive program to control floods in zones around the 
Mississippi River (Austin, 2006). The flood protection structures were originally 
designed to keep the New Orleans area dry. Although they functioned well for many 
years, when Hurricane Katrina brought water levels exceeding design capacities, the 
structural system was overwhelmed, and areas previously thought to be safe because of 
structural measures were deluged with water. In what Burby (2006) terms the “Safe 
Development Paradox,” the federal government’s efforts to make the New Orleans area 
safer increased exposure to natural hazards by attracting people to the area. Although the 
city was safe under normal circumstances, it became a disaster-zone when flood waters 
exceeded capabilities of the structural mitigation measures. In summary, structural 
mitigation can make areas that would have otherwise remained undeveloped due to 
apparent risks, open to human habitation, but when these measures fail, disaster can 
ensue (Glavovic, Saunders, & Becker, 2010).  
Compounding the failures of engineering measures to actually keep people safe, 
and the aforementioned Safe Development Paradox presented by engineering measures 
that attract people to unsafe areas, there is the issue of “moral hazard.” Often, 
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governments (typically federal) provide financial assistance over and over to people who 
are victims of repeat disasters, without considering the more cost effective option of 
requiring those people to relocate (or deny more government aid following future 
disasters). The practice of providing aid to people who are victims of repeated losses, 
while not requiring them to leave hazard zones, is referred to as “moral hazard.” 
Comprehensive planning provides an opportunity to address moral hazard by a) reducing 
densities in hazard zones; b) requiring stronger building codes in hazard zones; and c) 
putting post-disaster analysis and planning into place that will help relocate people from 
zones where repeat losses are occurring, or at least identify these zones so that 
adjustments to insurance rates and government aid policies can be made. 
The failure of structural mitigation to fully address natural hazards has led to a 
need to also pursue non-structural measures (Vatsa, 2004). Non-structural mitigation 
addresses the threats of hazards without directly using engineering and built measures, 
but rather through programs and policy. The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) is 
an example of non-structural mitigation (Brody S. D., et al., 2007). Communities in 
flood-prone areas receive a rating from the NFIP based on their flood risk, and then 
citizens within those communities are offered flood insurance at a price based, in part, on 
the risk level. Communities can earn higher ratings which lower insurance premiums by 
taking certain actions and implementing policies that reduce their exposure to flood 
hazards. Essentially, people are financially rewarded for taking mitigatory actions. Note 
that non-structural mitigation might lead to structural measures (for example, incentive 
programs offering people lower insurance rates for bolstering homes against hurricanes, 
etc.) and can be used intentionally in conjunction with structural measures. 
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Comprehensive planning, the research focus of my dissertation, can incorporate 
non-structural measures to both enhance and replace structural mitigation. 
Comprehensive planning provides a unique opportunity to make policies that protect 
people and property by a) creating building and land use codes appropriate to individual 
areas based on hazard exposure, b) prohibiting development in areas where structural and 
land use measures cannot sufficiently protect the population, and c) balancing the two 
scenarios through risk-based decision-making. 
 
Comprehensive Planning for Hazard Mitigation: A Form of Non-Structural Mitigation 
Comprehensive planning, and the included component of land use planning, is an 
excellent means of reducing risk and vulnerability to natural hazards – especially 
hurricanes and floods, which can be modeled and predicted better than many other 
disasters, such as tornadoes and earthquakes (Burby, et al., 1999; Burby & Dalton, 1994; 
Henstra & McBean, 2005; Highfield & Brody, 2006; Quarantelli, 2003; Sengezer & Koc, 
2005; U.S. National Committee for the Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction, 1991). 
Comprehensive planning is an ideal setting for hazard mitigation elements in comparison 
to stand alone hazard mitigation plans because the comprehensive plan weaves together 
multiple elements (e.g., transportation, housing, education, economic development, etc.) 
to address community issues (Godschalk, Brody, & Burby, 2003). While it is a given that 
communities of today are faced with old, new, and changing risks, the challenge is to be 
aware of them and manage them to reduce vulnerability (Comfort, 2006). Comprehensive 
planning provides a mechanism to focus on this, and also gives the opportunity for 
experts (in this case, planners) to apply their knowledge to target people at risk and to 
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manipulate conditions in ways that support hazard mitigation (Hewitt, 1995). It can bring 
together non-structural information and techniques such as hazard information, data on 
capacity/resilience, evacuation information, and incentive programs, in concert with 
structural techniques, to reduce hazard exposure. 
The comprehensive plan (CP) serves not just planning needs, but is interrelated 
with local government activities across the disaster management cycle (Mitigation  
Preparedness  Response  Recovery). While the CP is often discussed in terms of 
mitigation, and more specifically mitigation related to land use, there are much broader 
implications in terms of both inputs into the plan and outputs from it. 
The CP should achieve certain mitigation objectives primarily related to land use, 
but it also must support other mitigation activities for the local government, and in turn 
cannot be an effective tool without input from government units outside of the Planning 
Department. Examples of the how the CP can help other government departments 
achieve their mitigation objectives include: regulating development so that nature is 
allowed to flourish as needed to protect against hazards (something that also might 
involve a local Department of Environmental Resources); establishing hazard zones and 
publishing maps of these zones, allowing Building and Zoning departments to set up and 
enforce effective building codes; and limiting development in hazard zones so that the 
Public Works department does not have to build infrastructure in risky places. 
Conversely, to effectively formulate the CP, the Planning Department relies on effective 
information from other departments. For example, planners might need to know from the 
Environmental Resources Department the density of a particular foliage required to 
prevent soil erosion, so that the Planning Department can effectively regulate housing 
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density in areas where that foliage is present. In another example, the Planning 
Department may need to know the maximum height a building can be safely built in a 
particular wind zone (from the Building Department), in order to zone for the maximum 
safe height in hazard areas. 
From a preparedness and response perspective, the CP must both serve the 
response needs of various departments, and in turn integrate information from them to 
meet preparedness and response goals specific to comprehensive planning. In designing 
the CP, planners must work with departments responsible for preparedness and response 
to ensure that density and transportation infrastructure are appropriately matched to the 
ability of these departments to evacuate people prior to the onset of a hazard (e.g., ensure 
that the number of people in a given area does not exceed its capacity to evacuate via 
planned roads prior to the onset of hurricane force winds). Matching density and 
transportation to abilities of preparedness and response departments requires working 
with response departments to discern their evacuation capacity and needs (e.g., when do 
they anticipate use of contra-flow lanes, what is their capacity to marshal evacuees, etc.). 
In turn, the CP should provide these departments with tools needed to effectively prepare 
and stage a response (density maps, infrastructure capacities, etc.). Similar give and take 
relationships related to preparedness and response may also be needed with local schools, 
environmental agencies, transportation departments, communications departments, and 
others in local government. 
Finally, in terms of recovery, the Planning Department must work closely with 
other departments to analyze what happened when a hazard event occurred and how to 
build CPs that will rebuild a stronger community. The analysis and planning for a new 
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community must often be done quickly after a disaster so that effective rebuilding can 
begin. 
Overall, intergovernmental coordination is critical both for the success of the CP, 
and the success of other government departments in their hazard mitigation endeavors. It 
involves all phases of the Disaster Management Cycle. That said, the CP is one of the 
most important ways to address vulnerability, because it bears the power to bring 
economic planning, iterative policymaking with public involvement, physical science 
(e.g., LIDAR data), history, and land use planning together to bear on the problem of 
reducing the impacts of natural hazards. 
A small body of research has looked at both the effectiveness of CPs to mitigate 
hazards, and the effectiveness of state mandates requiring CPs to address hazard 
mitigation. While the overall research has shown that both measures are effective, a gap 
exists in the literature in that a) no one has examined whether or not the quality of hazard 
mitigation elements varies within states that have a requirement to address hazard 
mitigation in comprehensive plans, and, if such variation exists, b) what drives the 
variation is unknown. The gaps in the literature are critical because states may be able to 
take additional measures to improve local level hazard mitigation elements, and, if so, 
greater understanding of weaknesses in hazard mitigation elements is needed. My 
research takes a step toward understanding how to develop/implement improvements in 
hazard mitigation element quality by identifying drivers of quality of those elements. 
Comprehensive planning is especially useful in the hazard mitigation context 
because it is an iterative method of policymaking with heavy public involvement; plans 
are generally updated in cycles and new information is considered and included every 
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few years (Brody S. D., 2003). This cycle of adaption and revision based on new 
information is an approach that has the potential to be a highly effective tool for 
policymaking in a democratic environment, and can be especially useful in the context of 
natural hazards, in which new information routinely becomes available to planners, and 
environmental changes can rapidly alter the conditions for which planners must prepare. 
Because plans are updated in routine cycles, planners have regular opportunities to 
integrate new information to better serve objectives of hazard mitigation. Furthermore, 
because hazards tend to strike repeatedly, planners have the opportunity to learn from 
them and incorporate that learning in plan updates.  
Comprehensive planning provides the opportunity to bring a constant focus on 
reduction of vulnerability to natural hazards, thus creating a routine policy-making cycle 
that can address natural hazards with a great deal of public input. Comprehensive 
planning (CP) is a tool that has the capability to bring together the characteristics of 
individuals, social groups, businesses, geography, hazards, and government in one place 
to make informed decisions that will reduce vulnerability. The people who suffer from 
disasters may not even be aware of hazards as a distinct concept, and may not be able to 
do anything on their own even if aware. However, a CP factoring in hazard mitigation 
brings risks to the forefront of attention, and helps to find workable solutions to reduce 
vulnerability by coordinating actions of all parties and blending their resources to take 
action to reduce hazard vulnerability. 
Comprehensive plans have gained status with policymakers and politicians as 
vehicles for participatory democracy and as important guides to policymaking – the topic 
of hazard mitigation is brought to further public focus by making it part of the CP 
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process. Comprehensive plans can both prevent development from occurring in hazard 
zones, and set standards for site usage and building codes to ensure that construction in 
non-hazard zones is more resilient to hazards. Furthermore, CPs can go beyond land use 
and building codes to address underlying social issues (e.g., poverty, race inequity, 
housing disparities, etc.) that can, if left unattended, increase people’s vulnerability to 
natural hazards (Davis, 2004). Issues can be addressed in an interdisciplinary, connected 
fashion, in concert with hazard information, and can be used for effective planning to 
mitigate against hazards. For example, in the case of the threats of coastal hurricanes and 
flooding, the CP can inform individuals and businesses of risk; prevent reduction of 
natural coastal resources that can act as hazard barriers by restricting development in 
coastal zones; open safer areas to development to satisfy business and housing needs; use 
planner expertise to define areas of risk and to set building standards based on geo-
physical risk; address social inequity (and thus contribute to increased resiliency) by 
improving transportation; improve economic standing of the community through an 
economic development element; create open space that can absorb some hazard effects, 
such as open parkland to absorb rainwater; and target resources to improve specific areas 
of the community (Burby, French, & Nelson, 1998). 
It is important to distinguish between land use plans and CPs in the context of my 
research. Land use plans are plans for how land is to be used in a community. They 
reflect current use, and a master plan for the community’s growth in the long-term. 
Because physical location plays a significant role in hazard vulnerability, the land use 
component of CPs is critical; however, it is just one of many aspects of CP that can 
reduce vulnerability to natural hazards (Greenberg, Lahr, & Mantell, 2007). 
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Comprehensive planning provides more opportunities for hazard mitigation than land use 
planning alone (Burby, et al., 1999; Burby R. J., 2005). It can integrate broad community 
goals, and can connect hazard mitigation to these goals to make it an integral part of a 
locality’s future. Furthermore, as a process, making a CP normally involves citizen 
engagement. The process of comprehensive planning provides governments with an 
opportunity to educate citizens about hazards threatening the community. Finally, 
comprehensive planning provides opportunities for citizen participation in planning, and 
may help to build community support for the plan as community members become 
stakeholders with a feeling of influence on the plan, and thus more likely to support 
implementation. 
 
State Requirements for Comprehensive Planning in the Natural Hazard Context 
Historically, the communities doing the most to reduce the vulnerability of their 
populations to natural hazards have been located in states which require local planning 
for hazard mitigation (Steinberg & Burby, 2002). The first state government to require 
that local CPs pay heed to natural hazards was California in 1973, following the 1971 San 
Fernando Earthquake (Burby R. J., 2005; Nelson & French, 2002; Olshansky, 2001). 
While the state initially applied this requirement only to planning for earthquakes, the 
requirement was later expanded in 1986 to cover other natural hazards (Burby R. J., 
2005). California’s hazard mitigation legislation requires consideration of the hazard in a 
seismic safety element that studies the hazard, and then a response to the hazard using the 
findings from that element to guide land use plans (Olshansky, 2001).  
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Since the 1970s, more states have added hazard mitigation planning to lists of 
required elements in land use plans. In 1998, the American Planning Association 
recommended that states require that local CPs address natural hazards. In 2002 the 
American Planning Association added hazard mitigation language for natural hazards to 
its model comprehensive plan. Currently, 26 states do not require that local governments 
prepare CPs, 14 require CPs but do not require a hazard mitigation element, and 10 
require both CPs and a hazard mitigation element; Florida, the state in which my research 
was conducted, is among the last group (Burby R. J., 2005). 
 
Effectiveness of Planning Mandates 
Prior research has shown that state requirements for hazard mitigation elements in 
local plans are effective at reducing disaster losses (Deyle & Smith, 1998). For example, 
Burby & Dalton (1994) found that local governments in states with both a mandate for 
land use planning, and state monitoring and enforcement of the mandate, tended to 
incorporate limitation of development in hazard zones into their plans (p < .10). Burby 
(2005) examined disaster losses from 1994 through 2000 in all U.S. states. He found that 
in the study period, mean losses per capita were $33.30 in states with no requirement for 
CPs, $26.16 in states requiring CPs, and $19.58 in states requiring CPs with hazard 
mitigation elements. Notably, the differences between the groups were statistically 
significant (p < .001).  
More recently, Burby compared flood insurance claims in Florida, where hazard 
mitigation planning is required at the local level, and Texas, where it is not. He found that 
for every 1,000 persons, Florida had one insurance claim for flood damage from 1978 
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through 2002, while in Texas the number was 21. In monetary terms, this translated to 
$71 per capita in Florida, but $325 in Texas (2006). Essentially, not only did Florida have 
fewer losses per resident, but the losses were of lower cost. 
Berke & French (1994) examined six U.S. states, three with mandates for CP with 
a hazard mitigation element and three without. Rather than looking at hazard impacts, 
they rated quality of the plans, mainly in hazard mitigation related areas. They found that 
having a fact base, goals, and policies for addressing natural hazards were all 
significantly stronger in hazard mitigation mandated states than in non-mandated states.  
 
Intrastate Implementation of Hazard Mitigation Requirements in Comprehensive Plans: 
A Gap in the Literature 
While a fair amount of research has been conducted which examines how states 
with planning mandates fare in comparison to those without, little has examined how 
planning mandates affect the quality of hazard mitigation elements at the local level 
(Deyle & Smith, 1998). The excellent research (Deyle & Smith, 1998) that does exist is 
now over a decade old, and an update is in order. The need to enhance this existing 
research gives rise to the following two questions, which my research answers: 
1. Is there variation in the quality of hazard mitigation elements of local land use 
plans? 
2. What are the factors that explain this variation?  
 
In the late 1990’s, Deyle and Smith (1998) examined hazard mitigation elements 
in 18 Florida coastal county and city CPs. They sought a more in-depth analysis of 
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individual plan quality than the analyses conducted in this dissertation, and thus limited 
their sample to municipalities selected based on history of hurricane strikes, development 
of coastal areas, and population. In their analysis, they examined 60 categories of 
compliance with state mandates for each plan, rating each as either in compliance or not 
in compliance. Each community’s “compliance score” consisted of the number of state 
planning mandates related to hazard mitigation that the community’s plan met, divided 
by the total number of these mandates (essentially, percent complied with). At most, the 
mean compliance rate on any individual issue was 76.92% with a standard deviation of 
22.65%, indicating wide variation in the level to which plans comply with state mandate. 
The standard deviation of compliance scores for each individual state mandate graded 
ranged from a low standard deviation for one measure of 18 to a high of 31 for the most 
variable measure. This variation indicates that some measures tended to have compliance 
scores across counties closer to the mean in general, while others varied far more – thus 
some measures were complied with by more counties than others were. However, while 
making the significant finding that variation existed, Deyle and Smith did not make a 
thorough examination of drivers of the variation. 
Other existing research has confirmed that even though the state planning 
mandate works well for Florida, there is significant variation in plan quality at the local 
level (Deyle & Smith, 1998; Nelson & French, 2002). No research, however, has 
examined what drives this variation. Theoretically, factors external to the state mandate 
may drive this variation. It is critical to examine what drives quality of hazard mitigation 
elements, or lack thereof, in order to ascertain what can be done to further improve 
comprehensive planning for hazard mitigation once state mandates have been put in 
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place. My research fills that gap by examining hazard mitigation elements of local CPs in 
one state. 
 
Theoretical Bases 
Two bodies of theory guide my work. For hazard and disaster researchers, it is 
critical to frame the question of how people and the environment interact, and how that 
interaction affects people and their built environment. In order to facilitate such framing, 
my research is constructed on the perspective of vulnerability – essentially, the idea that a 
disaster is the effect of a hazard (such as a hurricane) striking a human population which 
has a degree of susceptibility (a degree of vulnerability) to the hazard, as mitigated by 
capacity. I conceptualize comprehensive planning as a tool to reduce vulnerability 
through policy. 
Since this work deals primarily with planning institutions and their practices, a 
theoretical way to make sense of the information regarding these institutions is required. I 
chose the theory of Neo-Institutionalism, or New Institutionalism, for its recognition of 
the concept that institutions are growing, changing entities, which both respond to and 
shape the actors with whom they work. 
 
Vulnerability 
In the 1970s, 1980s, and primarily the 1990s, a new focus on human vulnerability 
to natural hazards emerged. The focus on vulnerability arose from researchers asking 
why people in different geographic locations suffered different effects from similar 
hazards (Alexander, 1997; St. Bernard, 2004; Furedi, 2007; Heijmans, 2004; Oliver-
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Smith, 1996; Turner, 1979; Wisner, et al., 2004; Zahran, et al., 2008). Disasters came to 
be perceived no longer as “Acts of God” or as events in which humans have no say, but 
rather, as human constructed situations. In these situations, the hazard may be an 
uncontrollable element, but various factors of human creation affect the severity of the 
disaster, including poverty, proximity to hazard-prone areas, and discrimination;  the 
disaster is what results from the hazard strike on a human population (Parasuraman & 
Acharya, 2000; Quarantelli, 2003; Turner, 1979). While this idea has gained wider 
acceptance only recently, it was first introduced by Gilbert White in 1937 when he wrote:  
Floods are natural phenomena; flood damages are products of human action. With 
few exceptions, major flood flows result from natural, hydrologic events; and 
with few exceptions the damages therefore are the price of man’s encroachment 
upon natural floodplains. 
 
Vulnerability is conceptualized as a set of both physical and social circumstances 
that interact with a naturally occurring hazard to determine the effect of that hazard on a 
person or group, and the severity of said effect.  The effect itself is the disaster, which is 
aptly measured by “…damage to private property, infrastructure, economic vitality, 
habitat, productive ecosystems… human death, and injury” (Zahran, et al., 2008). For a 
given hazard, higher vulnerability will generally result in a more severe disaster, and 
lower vulnerability, ceterus parabus, will contribute to a less severe disaster. 
In terms of natural hazards, vulnerability has been defined in a variety of ways. 
One simple definition is simply: “…vulnerability to environmental hazards means the 
potential for loss” (Cutter, Boruff, & Shirley, 2003). In that vein, Deyle, French, 
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Olshansky, and Paterson (1998) offer this broad definition of vulnerability: “…the 
susceptibility of human settlements to the harmful impacts of natural hazards.” Social 
vulnerability includes both “individual characteristics of people,” such as “…age, race, 
health, income, type of dwelling unit, employment,” and “place inequalities,” such as 
“…level of urbanization, growth rates, and economic vitality…” (Galea, Ahern, & 
Karpati, 2005). Today, research often defines vulnerability in terms of both social and 
environmental characteristics in concert (Kusenbach, Simms, & Tobin, 2010). Critically, 
researchers usually consider vulnerability in the context of a particular stimulus (e.g., 
disease, weather, terrorism, etc.) (Galea, et al., 2005). 
In the context of comprehensive planning, it is critical to remember that the 
wealthy and middle class, the majority groups of social systems, and others appearing 
well resourced, can, in fact, be vulnerable, especially as a consequence of “vulnerability 
of place” (Hutton & Haque, 2004; O'Hare & Rivas, 2005; Vatsa, 2004). For example, 
regardless of wealth, a person may lack knowledge of natural hazards and may choose to 
build inappropriate structures in a hazard zone. Typically, vulnerability is thought to be 
imposed on people, although people may also choose to partake in activities that increase 
their risk or may be pushed into riskier situations through factors related to vulnerability. 
So, for example, a poor family may be vulnerable because the family must live in a 
mountainside favela, or shanty town, as the family can afford no other housing. The 
location of the favela on a crowded mountainside increases the family’s risk of death in a 
mudslide and from diseases. In summary, it is critical to remember that all people are 
vulnerable to or are at risk from hazards to some extent; while some may require a greater 
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focus because of increased vulnerability and reduced capacity, everyone must be 
considered. 
Resiliency is also a critical concept in the understanding of hazards and disasters, 
and provides the counterbalance to vulnerability. Across the social and physical sciences, 
definitions of resiliency nearly unanimously incorporate “an ability to bounce back” in 
some form or another (Manyena, 2006). It is how individuals, communities, institutions, 
and systems restore normalcy or enhance themselves in the face of stressors – in the case 
of my research, the stressor is natural hazards. Resilience is the qualities of an individual 
or group that help to offset the effects of a hazard. In practical terminology, it is the 
“strengths” that individuals and groups have (Patterson, 2002). Resilience can often be 
identified by asking the question “Why did some people, given the same circumstances as 
others, fare better in the face of a particular hazard than did others?” The answers to this 
question are the clues to resilience. It is critical to go down this logical path when 
contemplating hazard mitigation, because the resiliency of people must be integrated into 
mitigation efforts if they are to be fully successful. 
Ultimately, social scientists conceptualize vulnerability as part of the “disaster 
equation.” While full discussion of this equation and its elements is beyond the scope of 
this dissertation, it is useful for the reader to be aware of it. The equation is as follows 
(Davis, 2004): 
Disaster	ൌ	 Hazard	×	VulnerabilityCapacity	[Resiliency]  
Essentially, the disaster is the effect of the mingling of a hazard and vulnerability, 
mitigated by the capacity of an affected individual or group (Glavovic, et al., 2010; 
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Henstra & McBean, 2005; Kusenbach, et al., 2010). Resiliency is included in the 
denominator. Increasing vulnerability or hazard severity, in the numerator, increases the 
severity of the disaster if the denominator is not increased as well. The disaster is not the 
hazard itself, but the effects that the human population suffers in terms of physical 
damage and disruption of routine functioning (Furedi, 2007; Hamza & Zetter, 1998; 
Kreps, 1984; Yahmed, 1994). Rather, the hazard is the natural or human created 
phenomenon that causes harm (O'Hare & Rivas, 2005). For example, a hurricane is, in 
and of itself, not a disaster, but rather a hazard. The following example illustrates this 
concept: A family may be vulnerable because of poverty and live in a home not built to 
proper building standards (vulnerability in both a social and physical sense). A hurricane 
strikes (hazard), and the family deals with it by using its social network to locate a person 
with a strong home in which the family can safely take shelter. While, thanks to the 
capacity the family had (i.e., ability to use its social network to find shelter), their lives 
are not lost, the family still loses its home and possessions – this loss is the disaster. 
Vulnerability, in the numerator, could have been reduced if, for example, the family had 
greater wealth and could have reinforced its home against hurricanes, which would have 
reduced the disaster. 
While anyone can have a degree of vulnerability, it is generally considered to be 
an affliction of people with less resources in a society – those with lower levels of 
education, less money, less social capital, lower levels of physical ability, and less 
emotional capacity, than the average person are more likely to be vulnerable (Cutter, et 
al., 2003; Heijmans, 2004; Hutton & Haque, 2004; O'Hare & Rivas, 2005; Parasuraman 
& Acharya, 2000; Vatsa, 2004; Wisner, et al., 2004). Having “less” in any of these areas 
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requires a balancing out of having more in another in order to maintain a given level of 
resilience to disasters. Quality comprehensive planning is an opportunity to help level the 
playing field – making up for increased vulnerability. For example, if a plan defines a 
coastal zone (in other words, indicates that an area is vulnerable to coastal hazards such 
as wind and flooding), and requires a stringent building code in that zone, it helps to 
reduce vulnerability by increasing resistance of structures in the area to hazards. By its 
very nature as being “comprehensive,” a comprehensive plan can also reach out to 
address underlying vulnerabilities. For example, Florida CPs have education and 
economic development elements which can be used to promote improvements in the 
economic situation of the community as a whole or people in targeted geographic areas 
and social groups. Over time, this can reduce vulnerability by creating more 
economically advantaged people with more knowledge – both of which can reduce 
vulnerability as these people can better prepare for and cope with hazards. 
Comprehensive planning, however, is not a panacea – it can only address some issues of 
vulnerability, and is only one piece of a larger puzzle of reducing vulnerability to natural 
hazards. Certainly, while planning can formally require that people invest in structural 
mitigation in hazard zones, it can only go so far. For example, in Florida, coastal zones 
tend to attract large populations of people working in service industry jobs; these people 
likely have few resources to take the mitigation actions listed in the plan. That is, they 
still need housing within a reasonable distance from their work, and they will still be in 
hazard zones when hazards strike, possibly in sub-standard housing (legal per plan 
mandates, or possibly not). Helping to reduce their vulnerability, for example, goes 
beyond just the economic development efforts of Comprehensive Plans. 
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A commonly cited example of vulnerability is that of Hurricane Katrina’s impact 
on New Orleans in 2005. While the effect of Katrina on New Orleans and the 
surrounding area provides only anecdotal evidence of the problems of vulnerability, it is a 
useful case study. As noted before, Hurricane Katrina caused the deaths of 1,464 people 
and displaced 15 million from their homes in Louisiana (Comfort, 2006; Louisiana 
Department of Health and Hospitals, 2006). New Orleans itself became a case study of 
physical vulnerability, and the Katrina disaster was anticipated well beforehand. While a 
broad swath of society, regardless of socio-economic situation in New Orleans 
experienced vulnerability by being in an area prone to hurricanes and living in a low-
lying area prone to flooding, the poor were even more vulnerable because of their lower 
ability to choose their living location, purchase/rent hazard-resilient homes, and pay to 
rebuild/recover after a hazard strike in comparison to wealthier people. The low lying, 
flood-prone geography of New Orleans also put limits on the effectiveness of 
comprehensive planning. In the context of New Orleans, the CP could require hazard 
mitigation to an extent, but could not relocate the entire city out of the way of hazards 
(and has not done so even following the Katrina disaster). Since the city will continue to 
exist in the flood-prone location it is in, there is now a situation in which people with 
more money will be better able to protect themselves and rebuild following a disaster, 
and those with less are less able to do so. Comprehensive planning is limited in how 
much it can, and should, equalize these inequities. 
The potential for catastrophe in New Orleans in the event of a hurricane was well 
known before Katrina (Gerber, 2007). For example, in 2003, in one of today’s seminal 
texts on natural hazards, Wisner, Blakie, Cannon, and Davis wrote this of New Orleans: 
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“Given its coastal situation and its location between a large lake and the Mississippi 
River, a direct hit on New Orleans would cost hundreds of billions of dollars and 
probably take thousands of lives.” Certainly, there were those who tried to act on this 
knowledge, such as Senator David Vitter (R-La.) who just two months prior to Katrina 
publicized a computer model of a Category 4 hurricane flooding New Orleans under 18 
feet of water and said “It’s not a question of if; it’s a question of when” (Grunwald & 
Glasser, 2005). The fact that so many people had knowledge that a disaster could occur 
only highlights the importance of a quality comprehensive planning process that involves 
all stakeholders, engenders their support, educates them about hazards, and creates 
workable solutions that can be supported by all. Had such a process been in place, and 
supported by politicians, administrators, and citizens for the last few decades, 
development in New Orleans could have been more effectively channeled to keep people 
out of areas of high flood risk. Housing in risk areas could have been mandated to be 
built to standards appropriate for the risk, and populations in risky areas could have been 
limited to maintain a size that could be manageably evacuated. 
 
Neo-Institutionalism 
Neo-Institutionalism, or New Institutionalism, is similar to Institutionalism. 
Institutionalism combines classic organizational ideas focusing on “informal” aspects of 
institutions, such as beliefs, events, norms, habits, world-views, paradigms, codes, 
cultures, and knowledge, with public sector needs for results, performance, and outcomes 
(Alexander, 2005; Frederickson & Smith, 2003). It also factors in management and 
leadership as possible components affecting outcomes of institutions. Institutions also 
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have formal aspects that shape them, such as laws, rules, and regulations (Alexander, 
2005). Institutionalism sees education and professions as factors affecting the behavior of 
institutional actors; my research pays heed to these facts, and specific questions are asked 
about professionalism and education in the surveys of planners. Finally, institutionalism 
holds that collective experience shapes people’s behavior in institutions. Similarly, prior 
work has shown that those who have experienced natural hazards in the past tend to take 
more actions for hazard mitigation than those who have not. My research accounts for 
hazard experience and its effect on planners both by factoring in an independent variable 
accounting for prior hurricane experience of each county, and by asking individual 
planners about their hazard experiences. 
Institutions themselves are built of the rules and human-created constraints that 
affect the behavior of participants. Examples of these are bounded rationality, 
information access, decision economics, and concepts such as fairness and justice (Ferris 
& Tang, 1993; Healey, 1999). Institutions affect action and interaction by controlling the 
information people have access to and their incentive structures. The interaction between 
institutions and their members is critical in the hazard mitigation context, as building CPs 
for hazard mitigation requires balancing stakeholder concerns regarding social, political, 
and economic concerns (Puszkin-Chevlin & Esnard, 2009) with technical knowledge 
while maintaining stakeholder support for political passage of plans and their subsequent 
implementation.  
Institutions grow from routines, which spawn from a need to cope with 
uncertainty. Over their life, however, institutions also grow and adapt, as they are human 
creations, and humans tend to grow and adapt in response to experiences 
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(Gopalakrishnan & Okada, 2007; Healey, 1999). As people face uncertain situations, they 
form routines to streamline and compartmentalize these situations in a way that they can 
cope with; these routines form the basis of institutions (Selznick, 1996). Similarly, 
organizations learn as they acquire knowledge and seek to interpret it (Kapucu, 2008). 
Institutionalism has a focus on the rules and norms that people use to structure their 
approach to the world (Alexander, 2005). For institutions that deal with natural hazards to 
function effectively, they must be adaptable and must learn from the community around 
them, especially in the context of natural hazards, as these institutions need to extract 
local knowledge, combine that with technical knowledge, and create culturally 
appropriate policies that the public will follow and support (Gopalakrishnan & Okada, 
2007).  
Actors in institutions are theorized to operate intentionally, but they may be 
unintentionally hampered or affected by lack of information, poor information, issues of 
perception, and transaction costs. The work of Peter Senge and his concept of the 
“learning organization” (1990), in part, frames my research. He theorizes that businesses 
(one can view the planning organization as a business) are bound by “…invisible fabrics 
of interrelated actions, which often take years to fully play out their effects on each 
other.” He argued that five key elements came together to make up a learning 
organization, three of are important to my research. 
First, Senge postulates that learning organizations engage in “Systems Thinking.” 
Senge uses an example of a rainstorm knocking leaves around, rain falling, and streams 
filling with water as an example of a system of interconnected parts having an effect on 
each other. Similar to Systems Thinking, planning for natural hazard mitigation does not 
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take place in a vacuum of individual communities. Because natural hazards know no 
political boundaries (except for a few that coincide with nature), and the actions of one 
community may have an effect on the hazard resilience of another, it is important that 
planning departments work beyond their individual borders, and collaborate with other 
communities in their “system.” Further, within any given government, mitigation in land 
use plans is just one part of the Disaster Management Cycle. Planning departments, to 
achieve their goals, must not only work with other departments working on 
complementary mitigation goals (e.g., environmental resource departments, school 
boards, etc.), but also agencies involved in other parts of the cycle, such as emergency 
management departments. My research examines both how planning departments interact 
with regional agencies dealing with hazards (such as water management districts), and 
how they interact with other internal departments of their own governments. 
Second, Senge contends that people who master their field are committed to 
lifelong learning in it, and the highest quality organizations will encourage that mastery 
and bring the mastery of their people together to benefit the organization. Based on 
Senge’s ideas about mastery in organizations, some of the questions asked of planning 
organizations are not only about the qualifications of their planners, but how they support 
planners in professional growth. 
Third, Senge states that organizations need a shared “picture of the future” that 
engenders genuine commitment and enrollment. Similarly, planning organizations are 
likely to have greater success if they do not just tell the citizens of their jurisdictions what 
rules to follow in land use, but develop a shared vision for their communities. Ultimately, 
land use planning is an iterative method of making policy, and the policies in a land use 
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plan must be approved by the local governing body. To get both the political and 
practical support of citizens, planning organizations, just like businesses with their 
customers, need a shared vision with the community members for whom they plan. Thus, 
my research examines, in part, how land use planning organizations involve the public in 
the planning process. 
Ostensibly, planning organizations are part of “democratic” institutions of 
government. In relation to “democratic” processes, Follett (1926) wrote of a difference 
between including people in “power” by simply taking votes and polls of opinions, versus 
creating a process by which people participate together to frame questions, research 
issues, and come up with options. Applying Follett’s ideas to government, it is not 
sufficient for organizations (in this case, planning departments) to simply present people 
with options and vote on them; rather, it is critical to involve the people in the process of 
forming solutions.  
Follett (1925) theorized that “…orders will not take the place of training.” When 
applied to planning, this concept supports the notion that planning departments and the 
legislatures backing them can make plans, but people are more likely to follow plans, and 
see sense in them, if they understand the rationale underlying the mandates in those plans. 
It is not sufficient to make expert recommendations. Rather, it is necessary to help make 
the people themselves experts. Ultimately, Follett (1927) realized that building effective 
organizations with buy-in from stakeholders (in her case, employees) requires not 
domination, and not compromise, but rather “integration.” She specifically cautioned 
against working groups of employers and employees (equating here to planning 
departments and citizens) quickly formulating a few alternatives and voting on them, but 
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rather believed it important to encourage a fuller form of participation in which both sides 
fully understand the issues and conceive together consensus-based solutions.  
Certainly, lessons from Follett’s views of organization make sense in the context 
of planning and the interactions between planning departments and citizens. Planners 
cannot hope to come up with enough adequate ideas to solve issues solely on their own – 
they need the information from the “people on the ground” who have experienced 
hazards, and maybe even developed their own forms of resiliency. Additionally, 
gathering this information engenders the approval of citizens, and can help to garner 
support for plans. Part of the research at hand is to examine how well planning 
organizations take advantage of collaboration with citizens, and if that appears to 
correlate to higher quality plans. 
Integrating the theories of learning organizations from Senge, and participation by 
workers from Follett, leads to the question of how these theories could affect planning 
institutions. Looking through the lens on organizations honed by Ostrom (1990), my 
research seeks to ascertain how planning departments organize as institutions to 
appropriate common resources (in this case, limited land for safe development) to reduce 
harm to the community. The planning department as an institution may extend beyond 
the boundaries of the departments themselves to include other divisions of the 
governments in which planning departments exists, as well as the general public swerved 
by these departments and external agencies they work with. Gopalkrishnan and Okada 
(2007) identify several critical elements that hazard related institutions specifically must 
possess to be effective. First, they must be aware of the hazards they face. Institutions 
also must be accountable for their work and for enforcement of their policies; this may be 
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a particular challenge to planning agencies because they generally can be overruled by 
local county commissions that can grant “variances” to established plans, thus 
delegitimizing the authority of the Planning Department. Finally, Gopalkrishnan and 
Okada contend that institutions should operate in an equitable fashion, especially in the 
hazards context, where it is often necessary to “level the playing field” and ensure that, 
despite economic differences, there is some level of equality in the protection from 
natural hazards for all members of a community. Yet, comprehensive planning is not a 
panacea and has its own limitations. As long as economic differences exist, some people 
will be able to live in safer areas than others, and will be able to better harden themselves 
against hazards. Comprehensive planning cannot give everyone the resources to protect 
themselves from hazards to the maximum extent possible. If comprehensive planning 
required such a level of protection, it would create communities in which only the 
wealthy could afford to live in. Thus, the forces of economics and markets will always 
have an influence on the vulnerability of people within any community. 
In planning, institutions can bring people from different networks together to 
solve problems and create plans that meet the needs of the entire community (Healey, 
1999). The planning institution provides an opportunity to create a community of 
discourse in which parties come together and collaborate in the interest of the future of 
their community, and in the case at hand in this research, specifically in the context of 
natural hazards. Critical to the hazards perspective, institutions can bring together society, 
nature and culture to bear on the problems of natural hazards and human vulnerability 
(Gopalakrishnan & Okada, 2007). 
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One of the critical functions of institutions, under the paradigm of Neo-
Institutionalism, is to align people to goals that may be lost in today’s world of 
increasingly impersonal exchanges (Nee & Ingram, 1998). In planning organizations, 
technical and legal requirements may provide achievable goals in the sense of “boxes to 
check” to meet planning mandates, and can contribute to quality plans, but these 
requirements also may make it easy to lose sight of overarching goals that go beyond 
technocratic elements. For example, a planning organization may be required to hold 
public hearings, but this requirement still may not, in reality, ensure access of 
disadvantaged groups to the planning process. Under the Neo-Institutional paradigm, the 
planning institution’s unwritten rules, practices, and norms could make up for this 
deficiency in formal rules, and lead the members of the institution to make special efforts 
to include less advantaged groups in the process. 
Critically, then, my research conceptualizes institutions as the framework which 
structures the information gathering systems used by planners, their decision making 
process, and ultimately the final plan. The aforementioned perspective guides the 
research as I explore how hazard mitigation planners obtain, process, and use 
information. In terms of my research, a well-functioning planning institution will help 
planners to gather information about natural hazards and mitigation from a variety of 
sources, combine the information with their experience and technical knowledge, and 
produce a plan that is high in quality when measured empirically against a defined set of 
goals. In a quality planning institution, as conceptualized in my research, the department 
will provide solid incentives for planners to engage in these activities effectively. 
Furthermore, since plans in Florida are also political documents that must be approved by 
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local county commissions, it is imperative that there is public support, and especially no 
significant opposition, so that professional planners can pass good quality technical plans 
and so that community issues can be effectively addressed (Quarantelli, 2003; Sengezer 
& Koc, 2005). However, given that plans are policy documents, developed by executive 
departments but considered and passed by local legislatures, there may also be political 
limitations. The politics of the day may ultimately temper true quality in plans. 
 
Conclusion 
Overall, comprehensive planning has proven to be an effective tool for preventing 
disasters via hazard mitigation. It provides planners and citizens the opportunity to come 
together and share information and build an implementable framework for a hazard 
resilient community. Research has shown that in states that require that local 
governments address hazard mitigation in comprehensive plans, there are less disaster 
losses in comparison to states without the requirement. While extensive research has been 
done on comparing states that have planning mandates with those that do not have 
mandates, there is little research on what drives plan quality within states that have 
planning mandates for hazard mitigation. Given a strong state requirement for 
incorporating hazard mitigation into comprehensive and/or land use plans at the local 
level, and prescriptive elements in this mandate that instruct the content of these 
elements, will the hazard mitigation elements vary in quality within that state, and if so, 
what drives this variation? My research fills these gaps. 
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III. METHODS 
My dissertation examines a relatively unexplored area. The methods used in the, 
existing research on land-use planning and comprehensive planning informed my 
research, but additional formative research was needed to fully understand the 
interconnected issues surrounding comprehensive planning for hazard mitigation. To 
merge the unique content with tried and true methods, I took a formative approach to 
formulating questions and gathering data, and fit the findings into research models 
typically used in similar research. Methods entailed a review of planning documents and 
analysis of demographic and hazard history factors; and a nationwide survey designed 
after an examination of relevant literature, practice, and interviews with comprehensive 
planning leaders in Florida counties. 
 
Review of Hazard Mitigation Elements and Demographic and Historical Analysis 
In order to compare hazard mitigation elements to each other, I needed to create 
an index to provide a repeatable way to measure the quality of each plan. The quality 
measure forms the dependent variable in the analysis. 
To construct an index to rate hazard mitigation elements, I reviewed methods 
from prior studies evaluating plans. These studies used a variety of scoring methods, 
including the additive index method presented here. I read one comprehensive plan 
(Miami-Dade County) in full to screen for relevant items outside of the state required 
Coastal Management Element (CME) of the plan, where most hazard mitigation items 
appear, and to become familiar with plan construction. 
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Little literature exists on the topic of rating the quality of land use plans and CPs 
(Baer, 1997; Berke & French, 1994). In order to rate hazard mitigation elements of 
comprehensive plans in the study area, I used features from the rating systems employed 
by several different authors to create a plan rating system that has been validated in both 
method (the 0, 1, 2 rating system) and content (items selected for rating). The resulting 
rating system emphasizes important characteristics of quality research, including lack of 
bias, explicit methods (versus intuition), and repeatability of measures (Baer, 1997). 
An explanation of each of the 24 items used to rate plans appears in the section on 
plan review results. I developed the list of items primarily using hazard mitigation and 
planning literature. Because this is formative research of hazard mitigation planning in 
the context of a state that requires hazard mitigation elements in CPs, I added novel 
elements that will aid in the exploration of plan quality. 
Content analysis was used to analyze the hazard mitigation elements of 
comprehensive plans – more specifically, conceptual analysis was used. In this form of 
content analysis, specific concepts are identified and then are examined in the text being 
reviewed. The concepts are the 24 elements of hazard mitigation element quality 
identified from the literature and practice. These were listed out, and a rubric created to 
record evaluation of each coastal county hazard mitigation element. Then the hazard 
mitigation section of each plan was reviewed, and a score of 0 entered for each item not 
present, 1 for each item present, or 2 for an item presented and addressed in exceptional 
detail. 
Only explicit terms were identified in this content analysis. Because the hazard 
mitigation elements are legal documents, implicit terms were not identified, as legal 
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document are positive and explicit (only what is written is law). That said, different 
variations of words and phrases were utilized in rating. For example, the plan would get a 
“1” for prohibiting development in hazard zones if it said, “Increases in density are 
prohibited in the Coastal High Hazard Area,” or if it said, “Increases in density are 
prohibited in the area that SLOSH model predicts will be flooded in a Category 1 
Hurricane.”  is because both terms (“Coastal High Hazard Area” and “area that SLOSH 
model predicts will be flooded in a Category 1 Hurricane”) mean the same thing. 
The measure of quality is not based on outcomes, but rather, the quantity of 
hazard mitigation related plan elements. The rating system I use largely excludes 
normative judgment, but ensures that more thorough plans are rated higher because they 
address more items and in greater detail. Researchers have used similar systems of rating 
in planning research, including Brody (2003), Burby (2005), Burby & Dalton (1994), 
Deyle & Smith (1998), and Berke and French (1994). Notably, researcher William Baer 
(1997) evaluated Burby and Dalton and Berke and French’s method of evaluating hazard 
mitigation elements, which is similar to the method I employ,  as “…an exemplar of 
research and professional evaluation.” Nelson and French (2002) used a system in which 
each included item counted for one point. In particular, the plan rating system designed 
for my research shares with these authors an ordinal scale of plan rating, which Baer 
points out, allows for statistical testing. That said, rating systems such as the one utilized 
in my research essentially substitute level of detail for a strong measure of outcomes 
based quality (Berke & French, 1994). Using simple numerical coding removes 
normative judgments about what makes a “good” plan by instead focusing the measure 
on how many components are addressed and in what level of detail. 
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One weakness of this rating system is that it does not account for plan outcomes 
and effectiveness (Baer, 1997; Deyle & Smith, 1998). Addressing this topic more 
precisely would require in-depth creation of an independent variable that can measure 
plan outcomes (based on limited data from historical disaster strikes) under various plan 
components – such an investigation is a research project of its own. In order to keep the 
focus on the independent variable – drivers of plan quality – my research follows the 
typical method used by other hazard researchers and examines quantity and depth of 
issues addressed and depth of each issue rather than quality in terms of outcomes and 
effectiveness. 
 
Review of Rating Index 
As part of my research, I interviewed four land use planning leaders employed in 
county governments in Florida to help identify important issues and potential variables 
related to hazard mitigation element quality. These planners all have management 
responsibility for hazard mitigation elements in their respective counties – see the section 
on Interviews for more information. As part of the interviews, I asked them to review the 
rating instrument. All of the planners reported that they would not add any elements to 
the rating index. While four opinions is not sufficient for full validation, the instrument 
appears to have face validity. 
I also asked interviewees what the three most important and least important plan 
rating elements on the list were. While three of the interviewees made it clear they would 
neither add nor remove any elements, they grouped the items as listed in Table 1 below. 
Some interviewees provided greater or fewer than three items to add and/or remove, 
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hence counts may not add up as expected. Interviewees often identified data analysis and 
gathering elements, such as SLOSH modeling, as important to rating the plans. Factors 
supporting collaboration and communication with the public also received more support 
than other factors. In regard to what is not important to determining quality of hazard 
mitigation elements, there was very little consensus. However, two interviewees 
identified tax abatements for hazard mitigation projects as an item that is not important in 
rating hazard mitigation element quality. Again, all four interviewees expressed that they 
would not actually remove any items, even though they rated their bottom three choices 
for rating hazard mitigation elements. 
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Rating Item 
Count of Interviewees Rating as a Top 
Three Item 
SLOSH or an Alternative Formal Model is Utilized to 
Model Flooding and Wind Hazards 2 
Hazard Education Component 1 
Public Participation in Planning is Codified in the Plan 1 
Exposure of Property and/or Population to Hazards 
Analyzed 2 
Identification of Hazards 1 
Other Governments, Government Agencies, Non-
Governmental Organizations, and/or Stakeholders Identified 
with at Least Some Intent to Collaborate Noted 2 
Maps Delineating Coastal High Hazard Areas (CHHA), 
Flood Zones, and/or Other Hazards 2 
Exposure of Public Infrastructure and/or Critical Facilities to 
Hazards Analyzed 1 
Development is Limited in Hazard Zones 2 
Development is Prohibited in Hazard Zones 1 
Building Codes are Mandated in Hazard Zones 1 
Rating Item 
Count of Interviewees Rating as a 
Bottom Three Item 
Tax Abatement for New Development Employing 
Mitigation, and/or for Retrofits that Mitigate Hazards 2 
Learning from Hazards is Incorporated Explicitly 1 
Interviews Conducted with Key Stakeholders 1 
Use of Nature as a Hazard Barrier is Explicit 1 
Disaster and Hazard History 1 
Table 1: Top three and bottom three plan rating factors as rated by professional planners 
 
Correlation with Hazard History 
To account for the history of hurricanes striking each county, I developed a 
unique index accounting for strength of hurricane strikes and time, with storms being 
assigned increasing weight as their landfall dates approach the present. To develop the 
index, I utilized National Hurricane Center data tracking all landfalls of tropical storms 
and hurricanes in Florida counties from 1978 through 2008. Data for each strike were 
taken from six hour interval measurements, from the last point along the storm’s path 
prior to making landfall in a given county through the time it left Florida or dissipated. 
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The data are arranged by county landfall, not storm, so if, for example, a storm cut across 
Florida from Miami to Naples, that storm would have two entries: one for Miami-Dade 
County and one for Collier County. Counting each county-level landfall ensures that each 
strike in each county is measured. For each landfall, the equation is as follows: 
(Observation Year in Series/30) × Storm Strength 
Observation Year in Series factors in the year a hurricane strikes, so for 1979 storms this 
figure is 1/30, as 1979 is the first year in the series, whereas for a 2008 storm it is 30/30 
(1). Thus, the greater the time since a hurricane strike, the smaller its value on the strike 
index. Storm Strength is the Saffir-Simpson category of the storm, with tropical storms 
assigned a value of .5. Once I computed the overall numbers for all strikes, I indexed the 
strike values from 0 through 1. Finally, I summed each county’s landfalls to arrive at a 
total number representing hazard experience, which weights more recent storms and more 
severe storms higher than storms farther in the past and/or that were weaker. 
 Notably, a weakness of this index is that it measures hazard strikes, but not 
effects. While the index accounts for differences in intensity of hazards, it does not 
account for monetary loses or losses of life. These may actually be what impacts 
perception of prior hazards. However, because monetary estimates of damage from 
hurricanes typically only include insured properties, there is no reliable and consistent 
measure to incorporate here. This limitation should be considered. 
 The index has the unique advantage of factoring in both time and strength 
of hurricanes and tropical storms. Thus, more recent storms that would be fresh in the 
minds of policymakers and the public are weighted more heavily. Storm strength is also 
factored in, as stronger storms may have left a more lasting impact on a community and 
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affected its policy apparatus for a longer period of time. My approach combines the effect 
of all storms which have struck each county over the last 30 years, thus providing a single 
“Storm Index” for the entire study period. 
 
Comparing Social Vulnerability and Hazard Mitigation Element Quality 
Vulnerability Theory posits that certain social factors, such as poverty, minority 
race, and lower income, will contribute to hazard vulnerability (Wisner, Blaikie, Cannon, 
& Davis, 2004). I tested for this by comparing social vulnerability (vulnerability to 
natural hazards based on socioeconomic factors that contribute to people being less able 
to mitigate hazards) at the county level to hazard mitigation element scores. Several 
measures are used to account for social vulnerability, and I completed comparisons using 
Spearman’s Rho correlation because of the small size of the data set. The variables 
utilized are listed in the results section dealing with hazard mitigation element quality. 
 
Summary: Assessment of Hazard Mitigation Elements and Correlation to Demographic 
and Hazard History Variables 
To answer the question of whether or not hazard mitigation element quality varies among 
counties, I reviewed the hazard mitigation elements of all 35 Florida coastal counties. I 
rated each element on a 24 item index, using additive scoring. I selected index items 
based on hazard, disaster, and planning research. To ascertain if the variation correlates 
with social vulnerability, I selected several variables typically reflecting social 
vulnerability and tested them against plan ratings for potential correlation. Further, to see 
if hazard mitigation element quality correlates with history of hazard strikes, which 
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should theoretically improve mitigation efforts, I developed a custom index of historical 
hazard strikes over the last 30 years and tested results for each county for correlation with 
hazard mitigation element quality. 
 
Survey of Planning Professionals and Academics 
Finally, to provide further context on the findings from the interviews and 
document reviews, and learn about the normative standards the disaster and hazards 
community imbues upon hazard mitigation elements in CPs, I conducted a survey of 
professionals and academics involved with hazards and disasters. I constructed the survey 
on the basis of the literature reviewed, findings from plan reviews and the subsequent 
historical and demographic correlation analysis, and interview findings.  
To help guide the survey design, I interviewed managers responsible for hazard 
mitigation elements in planning departments in four of the Florida coastal counties 
studied. Initially, the goal was to interview five planning leaders, in an effort to represent 
each of the five coastal regions of the state. However, many planning leaders refused to 
be interviewed, or ignored the interview request, and after a certain number in a given 
area refused, someone from another geographic region already represented would have 
had to be selected, thus over-representing that area.  
I identified planning leaders by calling comprehensive planning departments in 
targeted counties and asking administrative staff to direct me to the manager responsible 
for the hazard mitigation element (also sometimes identified as the Coastal Management 
Element) of the plan. Before scheduling the interview, I verified with the interviewee that 
he had management responsibility for the hazard mitigation element. I interviewed 
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planners with management authority and responsibility, rather than the planners actually 
responsible for writing hazard mitigation elements, in order to learn not only about the 
written components of the plans, but about the strategies and goals involved with each 
department’s hazard mitigation element. 
Using the telephone numbers provided, I called interviewees; I connected via 
Skype to facilitate recording. All interviews were audio recorded. I scheduled interviews 
at the convenience of the interviewees and they typically were 60-90 minutes. Following 
the interviews, I entered responses into a copy of the structured interview instrument 
assigned to each interviewee. However, interviews were not transcribed verbatim. I 
reviewed interview audio recordings and loaded answers to questions into a structured 
instrument to track answers by respondent. I qualitatively evaluated the interviews for 
patterns and unique ideas, and this information guided preparation of the survey 
instrument. 
Using information from the interviews, results of the literature review, and ideas 
from practice, I designed a survey for professionals involved with comprehensive 
planning, disasters, and hazards. I loaded the 30 question survey into the Qualtrics 
electronic survey tool. I e-mailed potential survey respondents a letter, approved by the 
university’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) on university letterhead. The letter was 
signed by me (the principal investigator), my major professor, and a professor who works 
in the hazards and disaster academic community. I sent a follow-up e-mail to those that 
did not complete the survey. After survey completion, I sent the survey respondent a 
thank you letter with a link to the survey and asked the respondent to pass the survey 
along to other interested persons. Because the survey collects information about 
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employment, I was able to filter out any surveys from people whom did not work in 
fields related to comprehensive planning, hazards, or disasters. The survey was 
completely confidential. I completed survey analysis using SPSS and my own review of 
qualitative responses.  
 
Conclusion 
I used several approaches to understand the relatively unexplored drivers of 
quality behind hazard mitigation elements in CPs. To analyze Florida coastal county 
hazard mitigation elements, I employed document review and conducted a subsequent 
analysis of plan scores compared to hazard history and various demographic variables. 
To inform creation of a survey instrument, I interviewed four planning leaders in Florida 
coastal counties to learn more about what drives quality of hazard mitigation elements 
and how their counties create the elements. Last, I deployed a nationwide survey to 
inform my research about how planners and academics in the planning field believe 
hazard mitigation elements in CPs should be addressed. 
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IV. QUALITY OF HAZARD-MITIGATION ELEMENTS 
 
Introduction 
The first question my research resolves is whether or not there is variation in the 
quality of hazard mitigation elements in Florida coastal county Comprehensive Plans.  I 
reviewed the hazard mitigation elements of all 35 Florida coastal counties against a 24 
measure scoring index to determine to what degree each plan addresses various critical 
elements of hazard mitigation for floods and hurricanes, as well as natural hazards in 
general. Overall, there was a great deal of variation in quality of hazard mitigation 
elements, with scores ranging from 5 to 25 (out of a possible total score of 48), with a 
normal distribution centered around a mean of 14. 
 
Comprehensive Plan Conceptualization 
Comprehensive plans can be conceptualized in several different ways, including 
as visionary documents, blueprints, land use guides, remedies, administrative 
requirements for federal funding, processes, pragmatic actions, and responses to planning 
mandates (Baer, 1997). How researchers conceptualize plans colors how they evaluate 
them. Critically, to mitigate effectively against natural hazards, plans should address both 
social and physical issues (Hamza & Zetter, 1998). In Florida, CPs must account for 
multiple factors (e.g., land use, economic development, infrastructure, etc.), must plan 
over a ten-year horizon, and are required by state law. On the basis of these requirements, 
and the requirement for hazard mitigation (discussed below), comprehensive plans of 
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Florida counties are conceptualized under the following paradigms from Baer’s list of 
plan conceptualizations: 
• Visionary Documents – Florida plans must, by law, plan for at least a 10 
year horizon, and the hazard mitigation element requirements of state law 
require that plans minimize human and infrastructure vulnerability to 
natural hazards. Further, it engages the public in planning for stronger, less 
vulnerable communities. These are clearly visionary, future oriented 
requirements. 
• Land Use Guides – Florida plans are required to plan for future land use. 
• Processes – In Florida, planning is done at the local level where citizens 
can engage government, plans are passed by local governing bodies, and 
the state reviews plans. It is a process that allows both direct participation 
and political representation to shape the plans, while also bringing in 
technical expertise via planner involvement and the state review process. 
• Pragmatic Actions – Local comprehensive plans in Florida have a 
pragmatic component. Plans in Florida are integrative documents bringing 
together multiple elements to achieve larger societal goals. By state 
requirements, they must be financially feasible as well. 
• Responses to State Mandates – Considering state law in Florida, the local 
plan is clearly a response to state mandates. 
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Individual Index Items 
The individual attributes used to rate plans are listed below. Each of the 24 
elements includes a brief justification for its inclusion. 
 
Identification of Hazards 
The identification of hazards directly informs a community of the hazards it must 
prepare for and mitigate against. Hazard identification explicitly defines the hazards so 
that they can be effectively treated in the plan. Because CPs can serve as repositories of 
factual information about hazards, the identification of hazards also fulfills an important 
planning function of informing other hazard mitigation and emergency planning activities 
outside of the planning function (Burby, et al., 1999; Burby & Dalton, 1994). Hazard 
identification not only informs government, but also can serve to tell the public about 
hazards. For example, hazard information can help people purchasing homes in a coastal 
area to weigh potential costs of purchasing closer to the coast, and to determine the risks 
posed by different home sites. It is critical, therefore, that plans explicitly cite hazards 
that threaten a particular community so that planners are aware of them, government 
officials can prepare for them, and homeowners can take mitigation into their own hands. 
Notably, planning professionals recognize the importance of hazard identification by 
itself as one of the most common forms of hazard assessment. 
 
Disaster and Hazard History 
A history of hazards and disasters is helpful on several fronts. Primarily, it helps 
to form an accurate picture of risk to a community based on the reality of past 
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experiences (Tierney, 1999). Second, it brings color, life, and reality to a plan – it can be 
a key element in engendering public support of the plan because it sends a message that 
the threats planned for are real. Having a hazard history encourages higher quality 
planning for natural hazards (Brody S. D., 2003). There is clear value in providing a 
history of hazards both to show the value of the plan and its elements, and to inform the 
technical writing of the plan. For example, providing a history of hurricanes that have 
struck an area will help plan users to see that the measures (and sometimes sacrifices) 
taken in the plan are necessary to address a problem, and are justified; such a history will 
also help to identify vulnerabilities that must be addressed. Nelson and French (2002) 
also employed disaster and hazard history as a measure in their rating system. 
 
Identification of Hazard Mitigation as a Goal 
Comprehensive plans function in terms of broad goals, which lead to objectives, 
which are then backed by policies. Prior researchers have found that explicitly specifying 
hazard mitigation as a goal in plans directly correlates to better strategies for mitigation 
(Burby R. J., 2005). In fact, Brody, French, and Nelson (1998) found a significant (p < 
.10) correlation between the number of hazard mitigation elements incorporated in local 
plans and reduction in damages from the Northridge earthquake. While some, such as 
Brody (Brody S. D., 2003), Berke and French (1994), and Nelson and French (2002), 
have broken hazard mitigation goals out into multiple categories of individual goal types, 
my research utilizes one broad category for overall identification of hazard mitigation as 
a goal. 
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Maps Delineating Coastal High Hazard Areas (CHHA), Flood Zones, and/or Other 
Hazards  
Maps delineating hazards serve several critical functions in plans, and the 
research community considers them an important feature of quality hazard mitigation 
elements (Berke & French, 1994; Davis, 2004; Nelson & French, 2002). They are a 
primary form of vulnerability analysis and they can help planners in making and 
supporting decisions regarding trade-offs of sacrificing economically valuable land uses 
to instead designate areas for typically less valuable uses (such as parkland or low density 
areas) which reduce vulnerability (Deyle, et al., 1998; Nelson & French, 2002). Maps 
show the location, and potential magnitude, of hazards, simplifying communication of 
hazards to the public and to professional plan users. These help the public to see hazards 
and make informed decisions, and engender support for the plan by clearly showing 
potential dangers (Deyle, et al., 1998; Hung & Chen, 2007). Engendering support is 
critical because CPs may limit development in desirable areas, and also reduce potential 
tax collections through such limitations – the public has to know what the dangers are in 
order to support mitigation initiatives that may come with an economic cost. For 
example, a map based on hazard history and flood models might show the historical and 
potential effects of hurricanes on individual areas, and visually display the need to restrict 
certain types of development and land use. Maps are also useful tools for sharing hazard 
information and locations with other government departments (Olshansky, 2001). Finally, 
planning professionals also believe that maps are an important element to hazard 
mitigation planning; in a national survey of planners, respondents ranked maps as an 
important element of hazard mitigation elements (Steinberg & Burby, 2002). 
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Forecasted Hazards and Magnitudes Presented 
In order to plan for hazards, their potential impacts must be known. Thus, it is 
important to present forecasted hazards and magnitudes (Deyle, et al., 1998; Olshansky, 
2001; Quarantelli, 2003; U.S. National Committee for the Decade for Natural Disaster 
Reduction, 1991). Knowing the magnitude of hazards is critical to planning in a manner 
that exploits resiliency, mitigates geophysical risks, and uses a logical assessment of level 
of risk (e.g., planning for a 100-year versus 500-year flood risk). Assessing hazards helps 
planners to understand the costs and benefits of different land use ideas. Further, 
presenting hazard magnitudes communicates level of risk to the public. Prior researchers, 
including Berke and French (1994) and Nelson and French (2002), include presentation 
of forecasted hazards and magnitudes as a measure of plan quality. 
 
Learning from Hazards is Incorporated Specifically 
History can be one of the best teachers; while modeling hazards and trying to 
predict their impacts can be beneficial, learning from the effects of prior hazards can be 
one of the most important aspects of planning.1 Notably, Berke and French (1994) 
include several rating factors requiring learning from prior hazards in the Recovery phase 
of the disaster cycle. 
                                                 
1 Peter Senge (1990) conceptualized learning organizations as those that not only adapt, but use experiences 
to grow their capacity. In the context of the planning organization working on hazards, a learning 
organization would, theoretically, take information from prior hazards, and apply it in future policymaking 
not only to make better policies, but to expand the organization’s capacity to actually make hazard-related 
policies. 
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The Hurricane Katrina disaster provides an anecdotal example of what can 
happen when planning does not account for disasters of the past. For example, under the 
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), which insures properties at high flood risk, 
repeated loss properties are tracked. Repeated loss properties are those for which the 
program has paid out multiple claims on the same property over time. The Orleans and 
Jefferson parishes of the New Orleans metro area ranked first and second for repeated 
loss claims under NFIP from 1978 through 1995, representing 20% of American repeat 
loss properties in that time period (Brookings Institution, 2005). Had stronger measures 
to learn from prior losses been implemented and followed, some of these repetitive loss 
properties could have possibly been built to more flood-proof standards during recovery, 
or people living on them resettled to less risky areas. This likely would have been 
politically unfeasible, as people in the repeat loss areas would oppose forcible relocation, 
and others might oppose the high public cost of subsidizing better construction and/or 
buying out homeowners in hazard-prone areas and relocating them. Thus, the New 
Orleans area became a perfect example of moral hazard – governments “bail out” people 
living in a hazardous area over and over, when, in reality, the more fiscally and 
scientifically sound option is to consider a program of relocation.  
 
Explicit Use of the Vulnerability Concept 
Social vulnerability has only recently come to recognition as a critical element in 
planning. In part, this may be because of the bias of the planning profession toward the 
physical sciences rather than social science, as well as the difficulty of incorporating the 
rather new concept of social vulnerability (Davis, 2004). Social Vulnerability 
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components should address the economic and social aspects of vulnerability, in concert 
with geophysical vulnerability. Comprehensive planning is an ideal vehicle to address 
social vulnerability, because the CP goes beyond land use planning to cover issues 
including economics, infrastructure, and education, all of which play into social 
vulnerability. Comprehensive planning provides a vast opportunity to tie together the 
physical science of hazards with social issues and to use both physical and social means 
in concert to mitigate risk. 
 
Encouraging Public Participation in Planning is Codified in the Plan 
Community participation in hazard planning is critical, and requires extensive 
discussion. The public has information to contribute to planning for hazard mitigation, 
and should be involved in policy-making to build plans for hazard-resilient communities 
(Berke & Campanella, 2006; Burningham, et al., 2008; Comfort, 2006; Gopalakrishnan 
& Okada, 2007; Heijmans, 2004). Often, people on the ground have experienced hazards, 
and are aware of their vulnerability and resilience capabilities. They have a wealth of 
knowledge that can help to mitigate future disasters (Wisner, et al., 2004).  
Further, while people in a certain geographic area may appear obviously 
vulnerable to outsiders, other locally-known factors may come into play that are not 
known to outsiders (such as behaviors of individuals or groups during an evacuation 
order). Finally, public participation in policymaking is considered to be an important 
element of creating sustainable, just, effective policies (St. Bernard, 2004; Kapucu, 2008) 
and some planners consider it an important aspect of building a quality hazard mitigation 
element (Steinberg & Burby, 2002). Overall, as Tewdwr-Jones (2002) points out, there is 
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a broad spectrum of planners, including those “…bent on using strategic action to reach a 
desired pre-determined ends,” and those who “…possess no clear idea of where they 
want particular decisions or plans to lead to.” Likely, the right blend of balancing 
technical knowledge with public input, is somewhere in between, It may also help 
planners to use public input if they identify themselves as a part of the public whom the 
plan benefits (Harrison, 2002). Yet, as Tewdwr-Jones also points out, planners are in a 
somewhat difficult position because, while their professional training is very useful for 
technical planning, they must balance the value of their training with public input and 
knowledge.  
Garnering public participation can be difficult (Kapucu, 2008), and thus requires 
intentional efforts from planning agencies. Further, factors may come into play that local 
people know about that are not known to outsiders, and planners may not even be aware 
of these factors at the micro level in their own communities. In the context of planning 
for natural hazards mitigation, public input can be extremely valuable, and can be 
gathered through a discourse in which planners educate the public about hazards affecting 
them, and the public provides information, values, and interests to planners for 
incorporation (Brody S. D., 2003).   
Citizens often do not take the opportunity to be involved in hazard mitigation 
planning. For example, in studying public comment letters expressing opposition to 
developments in seismically sensitive areas in California, Olshansky (2001) found that 
people rarely spoke of natural hazards, and were typically writing about other 
development issues. Often, the people least likely to give input in policymaking are also 
the most likely to suffer in a natural hazard event (Vatsa, 2004). This points to a need to 
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explicitly involve the public in hazard mitigation planning. Planners can engage in what 
Pelling (2003) refers to as “institutional modification” in which planning organizations 
create space in the policymaking and/or political process for citizens and organizations to 
participate. This is an intentional effort to bring the public into a system from which it 
might have, for whatever reason, been previously excluded. 
 
Interviews Conducted with Key Stakeholders 
While general input from the public is important, planners also can identify key 
stakeholders who may have highly relevant, and/or specific, information to provide in the 
planning process. These people can provide information about specific issues and 
communities that could inform the plan. For example, planners might speak to hospital 
directors and their staff to learn about needs of the medical community, especially in 
providing emergency care after a disaster. Also, planners might speak with 
representatives of various cultural groups to understand their connection to the land and 
their needs, and learn what they believe may help mitigate hazards. 
Comprehensive plans can involve many key stakeholders – people who have 
critical information for the plan and/or a stake in planning outcomes. Examples include 
groups representing builders and businesses; local non-profit organizations serving the 
homeless and other disadvantaged populations; the religious community; environmental 
groups; local autonomous governing districts such as school districts; and civic 
associations that can give a voice to specific groups in the community, such as ethnic 
groups, sexual-orientation minorities, and the disabled. Interviews with these 
stakeholders can help to reveal their vulnerabilities and resilient features they possess that 
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can possibly be shared with the community, and engender their support for the plan by 
letting them know that they are stakeholders. 
 
Exposure of Property and/or Population to Hazards Analyzed 
In order to reduce exposure to hazards, planners must be explicitly aware of that 
exposure – the problem should be understood so that decisions can be made between risk 
reduction and economics. An inventory of exposure to hazards also allows a community 
to assess its overall risk in the face of hazards. Finally, understanding severity of 
exposure also helps in making sound decisions that balance risk reduction with other 
benefits (Deyle, et al., 1998). Other authors who utilize this measure include Brody 
(2003) and Berke and French (1994). 
 
Exposure of Public Infrastructure and/or Critical Facilities to Hazards Analyzed 
For several reasons, analysis of exposure of public infrastructure and facilities to 
hazards is treated separately from overall analysis of general exposure of the population 
to hazards. Public infrastructure and critical facilities are needed for public services and 
may be required during and immediately after hazard onset – thus special attention 
should be paid to shoring up these facilities to mitigate against hazards, and plans should 
exhaustively list critical elements to give responders a framework to immediately restore 
critical functions (Deyle, et al., 1998). Secondarily, this element helps to provide an idea 
of the magnitude of a county’s exposure to hazards, and may help plan users to fully 
visualize hazard dangers. Previously, Berke and French (1994) included analysis of 
62 
 
infrastructure exposure as a plan quality element, and Deyle, French, Olshansky, and 
Paterson cite this as an important element in planning involving hazards (1998). 
 
Other Governments, Government Agencies, Non-Governmental Organizations, and/or 
Stakeholders Identified with at Least Some Intent to Collaborate Noted 
Coordination, or lack thereof, among government entities is frequently cited as 
one of the failures of modern disaster governance. While this is normally considered an 
issue in the Response phase, coordination in the Mitigation phase is critical. Planning 
agencies can improve plans by getting information from, and coordinating actions with, 
neighboring governments, autonomous districts (such as school districts), response 
agencies, and human service agencies. For example, planning agencies can acquire 
information about existing shelter capacity at local schools, and can in turn inform 
schools about changes in development patterns that may affect shelter utilization. 
A key problem in using CPs to effect hazard mitigation is that hazard boundaries 
and political boundaries do not always match. While some political boundaries match 
natural features, such as the U.S.-Mexico border along the Rio Grande River, political 
boundaries frequently do not match the boundaries of nature and hazards. Such is the 
case with floodplains: political boundaries are often drawn through watersheds and 
projects designed by political subdivisions could affect the entire watershed in which they 
lie, or vice versa (Association of State Floodplain Managers, 2007). A project 
implemented by a given county may redirect flooding to neighboring counties, could be 
negated by water coming from other neighboring counties, or could interfere with 
projects in neighboring counties. To mitigate this problem, counties can participate in 
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meetings of regional water management boards and planning councils, and directly 
coordinate with other jurisdictions in the watershed. This is just one example of potential 
coordination among governments. 
 
Sea, Lake, and Overland Surges from Hurricanes (SLOSH) or an Alternative Formal 
Model is Utilized to Model Flooding and/or Wind Hazards 
Scientifically grounded methods of modeling hazards is a critical component in 
aligning land use to the natural and built environment. While it is important to consider 
historical hazard impacts, history does not tell the entire picture for several reasons. 
Changing sea levels, whether human caused or a natural function of environmental 
cycles, have the potential to increase storm surge heights and penetration compared to 
prior storms, and decrease the potential for flood runoff to flow to coastal bodies of 
water. Changes in the built environment may also affect hazard performance compared to 
historical hazard strikes. For example, increases in impermeable surfaces (those which 
water cannot pass through) can increase flood runoff and channel water to other 
locations. Formal modeling can combine information from historical hazard strikes with 
information about the built environment and changes in underlying conditions to 
effectively predict future hazard strikes, severity, and coverage. 
While hazard history can provide information that informs planners of potential 
future hazard effects, it also can be lacking because a) the hazard may have not occurred 
historically in exactly the same way it will in the future and b) changing environmental 
conditions (e.g., sea level rise) may change hazard magnitudes and effects. Yet, to 
mitigate against losses, planners must know what hazard effects to expect and where. To 
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plan effectively for the future, we wanted to know if the plan requires formal modeling of 
potential hazards. 
 
Development is Limited in Hazard Zones 
Physical location is a strong determinant of vulnerability to natural hazards, 
furthermore, increasing urbanization often leads to increased vulnerability to natural 
hazards (Greenberg, et al., 2007; Hamza & Zetter, 1998). Limiting development in areas 
known to be prone to natural hazards limits exposure to hazards, channels development to 
less hazard-prone areas, and may help to protect natural features of those areas that may 
act as hazard barriers (Brody S. D., et al.; Burby & Dalton, 1994). States have been 
limiting development in flood zones since 1917, when New Jersey began to control 
building permits in order to prevent further encroachment of structures into floodplains 
(White, 1936). Limiting or prohibiting development in hazard zones, however, comes 
with an economic cost, as the land cannot be developed and taxed (Deyle, et al., 1998). 
Considering Florida’s hurricane and flood hazards, this problem is particularly acute for 
local governments, as beachfront property is highly desirable (and thus has high potential 
to bring tax revenue), but bears the greatest degree of exposure to hurricane risk. 
Similarly, but not to the same degree, waterfront property along canals and inland bodies 
of water is sought after in Florida, but comes with flood exposure risks. 
In addition to the aesthetic and recreational drivers pushing people toward coastal 
land, rapid urbanization is pushing people into coastal areas and creating large 
concentrations of people and property in these hazard zones (Skertchly & Skertchley, 
2001). Increasing development not only puts more people in the path of hazards, but also 
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can actually intensify hazard events. For example, adding impervious surfaces that cannot 
absorb water leaves less places for floodwater to go and can increase flood potential 
(Brody S. D., et al, 2007; Brody S. D., et al, 2008; Highfield & Brody, 2006; Skertchly & 
Skertchley, 2001). Recent research has shown that in Texas, where it should be noted that 
land use controls are less strict than in the study area of Florida, a 1% increase in 
impervious surfaces has been found to increase risk of death in a flood by 6% (Zahran, et 
al., 2008).  
Prior research has shown that in states with requirements for land use planning, 
local communities are more likely to adopt measures limiting development in hazard 
zones (Burby & Dalton, 1994). For example, Burby and Dalton used linear regression 
modeling to examine the correlation between several policy and demographic factors, and 
found a statistically significant correlation (p < .10) between the number of development 
limitation measures adopted in hazard areas and state requirements for hazard mitigation 
planning. Notably, Brody (Brody S. D., 2003), and Nelson and French (2002) also use 
limitation of development as a measure of plan quality. 
 
Development is Prohibited in Hazard Zones 
Local governments can make the very conservative choice to entirely prohibit 
development in hazard zones (Burby & Dalton, 1994). While I assumed this to be 
unlikely due to the economic benefits foregone (as discussed above in regard to limiting 
development), it was included in the plan assessment matrix. 
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Evacuation Feasibility Analyzed 
It is critical to be aware of evacuation times and feasibility in planning, so that 
densities can be limited to those which can be safely evacuated, or infrastructure 
improved to match increasing density and thus increase evacuation capacity. Hurricanes 
provide a unique opportunity compared to other hazards, because their location and 
severity can usually be ascertained before they strike, and thus evacuation is an effective 
option. Thus, it is valuable to monitor evacuation times and feasibility and incorporate 
this information into comprehensive planning. Brody (2003) also used addressing 
evacuation as a measure of plan quality. 
While some authors include evacuation alone as an element for evaluation (1994), 
this element is broken into “Evacuation Times and/or Feasibility” and “Evacuation 
Routes Mapped” (see below). In the Florida context it is important to give weight to these 
elements individually, as the most risk prone areas are coastal barrier islands, which both 
tend to have high population densities and limited access to mainland road networks 
because the mainland is usually reached by bridges, which can become traffic bottlenecks 
in an evacuation. Thus it is critical to consider the location of evacuation routes in 
relation to population density, as well as to separately consider times and feasibility in 
order to guide development decisions to match increasing density.  
 
Evacuation Routes Mapped 
Similar to considering evacuation feasibility, it is important to map evacuation 
routes. Mapping these routes provides visual information in the policymaking process 
that helps to align densities and infrastructure with evacuation realities. 
67 
 
 
Evacuation Shelter Capacity Inventoried 
As a community plans for growth, it is critical that evacuation shelter capacity 
corresponds to that growth. While there are no standards or best practices, other than 
ensuring that evacuation over bridges is complete before the arrival of tropical storm 
force wind gusts, it is important for communities to carefully analyze their individual 
needs. This is especially important in Florida, where southern counties face evacuation 
hurdles due to limited highways to evacuate north. It is critical that evacuation 
capabilities be considered in concert with potential hazards to determine where shelters 
should be located and what their capacities should be. To maintain the proper balance 
between evacuation and sheltering, counties should be aware of existing capacity within 
their borders, and possibly in neighboring counties (Berke & French, 1994). 
 
Mitigation Required from Developments that Increase Evacuation Time 
Especially in a coastal state, new development will occur in areas that may have 
to be evacuated in the face of a hazard event.  One way to ensure that effective 
evacuation capacity exists, and to help people make rational economic decisions when 
choosing to live in risky areas, is to place the cost burden of additional evacuation needs 
in hazard zones on developers. 
Increasing development in a given area can burden existing evacuation routes and 
shelters. It is critical to expand capacity of either or both in order to preserve evacuation 
abilities, and such expansion requires funding. If projects to increase evacuation capacity 
are not funded, and funded rapidly following population increases in hazard zones, 
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evacuation capabilities could fall behind. In order to maintain effective evacuation 
abilities, developments contributing to reductions in evacuation capability can be 
assessed mitigation fees to fund requisite improvements. This is similar to using impact 
fees assessed on new development, which has been associated with increased public 
capital growth (Jung, Roh, & Kang, 2009). 
 
Specific Rule that Public Funding will not Improve Infrastructure Beyond Current Level 
of Service in Hazard Zones 
Improving or adding public infrastructure in a hazard zone not only attracts more 
people to that area, but also puts public resources at risk. However, to be fair to existing 
residents, it is not appropriate to reduce service levels.  
Infrastructure improvements in hazard zones carry both a direct and indirect risk. 
From a direct standpoint, adding infrastructure in hazard zones exposes local government 
to loss because the infrastructure could be damaged in a hazard strike. However, new 
infrastructure may be required if development is allowed in hazard zones; in this 
circumstance, rather than using public funding to construct the infrastructure at risk, 
private funds from those moving into the hazard area can be utilized. 
Improving infrastructure in hazard zones carries an indirect risk of attracting 
development to hazard zones. While infrastructure can be maintained at existing levels of 
service, improvements can attract new development, when in fact counties should be 
discouraging development. For example, building parks in a hazard zone might 
inadvertently make the area more attractive to homeowners, or adding water lines 
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through a hazard area might reduce the need for impact fees to fund infrastructure and 
make the area more attractive to development. 
 
Use of Nature as a Hazard Barrier is Explicit 
Nature can be a powerful hazard barrier. For example, mangrove swamps 
(common in coastal Florida) may help to buffer the shore from wave action in storms, 
and mangrove roots may help to hold the coast together, preventing erosion in storms and 
over time. Natural areas also provide flood protection by providing low-lying areas that 
can be allowed to flood and thus alleviate flooding in developed areas by absorbing 
floodwaters (Brody S. D., et al., 2007). 
Conversely, destruction and reduction of the natural environment has been 
correlated with increased disaster severity. In a study of wetland alteration and flood 
events from 1997 through 2001, it was estimated that for every wetland eliminated in 
Florida, the average cost of each flood rose by $989.62 (Brody S. D., et al., 2007). 
Highfield and Brody (2006) found over the same period that each permit issued for 
wetland alteration had a statistically significant impact on the monetary cost of county-
level flood damages (p < 0.001). Another study of 423 flood events from 1997 through 
2001 found that wetland alteration was the most significant of all functions of the built 
environment contributing to increased property loss in floods (Brody S. D., et al., 2008).  
Natural features can help to protect against hazards. Planners can take 
opportunities to integrate natural features for this use, and can take explicit actions to 
protect natural features so that they thrive and can be features of resiliency. Therefore, 
my research includes explicit use of natural features as hazard barriers as a rating item. 
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Hazard Education Component 
Education about hazards can empower people at risk (Heijmans, 2004; 
Quarantelli, 2003; U.S. National Committee for the Decade for Natural Disaster 
Reduction, 1991). Educating citizens with hazard information can equip them to 
participate in the plan making process and to apply their knowledge to take vulnerability 
reduction into their own hands (Nelson & French, 2002).  
A comprehensive plan is, in reality, an evolving document that embodies, in 
writing, an ongoing process of community visioning. Through the process of creating and 
updating a comprehensive plan, the public can become educated about many aspects 
relevant to the plan, including hazards (Brody S. D., 2003). Further, CPs are seen as a 
method of communicating hazard information to the public (Burby, et al., 1998; Inam, 
1999). Communication of hazard information is critical outside of the planning arena as 
well, as people must be aware of the danger posed by a hazard. Hopefully, when 
informed of the risk, people are more likely to take hazard warnings seriously and 
support governmental hazard mitigation initiatives (Glavovic, et al., 2010; Perry & 
Green, 1982). In fact, prior research by Burby, French, and Nelson (1998) showed a very 
significant and strong correlation (p < .01) between the number of public awareness 
policies and reductions in damage from the Northridge earthquake.  
Those more aware of their risks are more likely to take mitigatory actions; 
following this line of reasoning, if people are educated about risks facing their 
community, they will be more apt to support policies to reduce risk. Thus, hazard 
education is even more valuable in instances when members of the public may be asked 
to make trade-offs in order to build a quality hazard mitigation element, such as forgoing 
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coastal development in order to leave open space on the coast. In fact, if public risk 
perception differs from the perceptions of risk planners (e.g., public perceives low risk 
but planner prepare for high risk), the public may not see the plan as a sensible document 
and may even hamper plan passage and implementation (Peacock, et al., 2004). Other 
authors who embrace hazard education as a component in plan ratings include Brody 
(2003), Berke and French (1994), and Nelson and French (2002). 
 
Building Codes are Mandated in Hazard Zones 
While some authors look for building codes in the overall plan (Berke & French, 
1994), the evaluation rubric I use in this research looks for building codes specific to 
hazard zones. Building codes can compensate for construction of structures in hazardous 
areas by requiring that those structures be sited and built in such a way that makes them 
hazard resistant (Olshansky, 2001; Burby, et al, 1998). From a social perspective, 
however, this effectively could exclude the poor from hazardous zones. In the Florida 
case, these zones are often desirable locations such as beachfronts, and stringent building 
codes could restrict these areas only to the wealthy who can afford to meet stringent code 
requirements. Exclusion by price is a market force, not a policy one – in this case, the 
policy (building code) sets forth the bare minimum to safely build in an area, and the 
market provides housing that meets that minimum at a certain price, meeting demand for 
it. Since few people need to live in dangerous coastal areas, the market is able to charge a 
premium for construction of homes meeting these more stringent building codes.  
Since my research focuses on the hazard mitigation element, and under Florida 
law certain geographic areas of each county are defined as Coastal Hazard Zones (thus 
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giving counties a way to delineate between hazard and non-hazard areas), plans are 
evaluated for the presence of building codes in hazard zones only. Brody (2003) also 
includes “Building standards” as one of his measures of plan quality. 
 
Tax Abatement for New Development Employing Mitigation, and/or for Retrofits that 
Mitigate Hazards 
Often, lack of money is a barrier to hazard mitigation, and funds are needed to 
take mitigatory actions. Similar to other authors (Berke & French, 1994), my evaluation 
looks for incentives/support from government for hazard mitigation. Especially because 
of the economic development aspects of CPs, these documents are a good place to create 
programs to help pay for hazard mitigation retrofits of existing buildings. Such retrofits 
are one of the most critical aspects of mitigation in communities in hazard zones that are 
already built-out, and thus density cannot be lowered quickly (Godschalk, et al., 2003). 
Brody (2003) includes “Retrofitting of private structures” as a measure of plan quality; 
while this is not the same as the measure I selected, both Brody’s measurement and the 
indicator used in my research evidence a government concern for retrofitting structures 
and a willingness to expend resources on such. 
 
Summary of Rating Index 
The index constructed covers 24 attributes that may appear in a hazard mitigation 
element, taken from the literature on planning and hazards/disasters, as well as from 
practice. In Table 2, below, the attributes are categorized by their importance to both 
planners and those focused on hazard mitigation. 
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Attribute 
Planner 
Perspective 
Hazard Mitigation 
Perspective 
Identification of Hazards Fact Base Hazard Assessment 
Disaster and Hazard History Fact Base Hazard Assessment 
Identification of Hazard Mitigation as a Goal Goal Mitigation 
Maps Delineating Coastal High Hazard Areas (CHHA), 
Flood Zones, and/or Other Hazards Fact Base Hazard Assessment 
Forecasted Hazards and Magnitudes Presented Fact Base Hazard Assessment 
Learning from Hazards is Incorporated Explicitly Policy Resiliency 
Explicit Use of the Vulnerability Concept Policy Vulnerability 
Public Participation in Planning is Codified in the Plan Objective/Policy Resiliency 
Interviews Conducted with Key Stakeholders N/A Resiliency 
Exposure of Property and/or Population to Hazards 
Analyzed Fact Base Hazard Assessment 
Exposure of Public Infrastructure and/or Critical 
Facilities to Hazards Analyzed Fact Base Hazard Assessment 
Other Governments, Government Agencies, Non-
Governmental Organizations, and/or Stakeholders 
Identified with at Least Some Intent to Collaborate 
Noted Objective/Policy Collaboration 
SLOSH or an alternative formal model is utilized to 
model flooding and wind hazards. Fact Base Hazard Assessment 
Development is Limited in Hazard Zones Policy Vulnerability 
Development is Prohibited in Hazard Zones Policy Vulnerability 
Evacuation Times and/or Feasibility Policy Preparedness 
Evacuation Routes Mapped Policy Preparedness 
Evacuation Shelter Capacity Inventoried Fact Base Hazard Assessment 
Mitigation Required from Developments that Increase 
Evacuation Time Policy Resiliency 
Specific Rule that Public Funding will not Improve 
Infrastructure Beyond Current Level of Service in 
Hazard Zones Policy Vulnerability 
Use of Nature as a Hazard Barrier is Explicit Objective/Policy Resiliency 
Hazard Education Component Objective/Policy Vulnerability/Resiliency 
Building Codes are Mandated in Hazard Zones Policy Resiliency 
Tax Abatement for New Development Employing 
Mitigation, and/or for Retrofits that Mitigate Hazards Policy Resiliency 
Table 2: Plan rating attributes 
 
Sample 
Florida has a strong prescriptive mandate for hazard mitigation elements to be 
included in local land use plans (Burby R. J., 2005; Deyle & Smith, 1998), and was one 
of the first states to implement such (Puszkin-Chevlin & Esnard, 2009). In Florida, 
counties and lower-order governments prepare comprehensive development master plans 
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(CDMPs), which address zoning and land use regulations, among other growth and 
development topics such as infrastructure, economic development, and education. The 
state mandates specific elements required in these plans; for coastal communities 
specifically, a Coastal Management Element, which must address coastal hazards, is one 
of the requirements. The state reviews all plans and advises as to whether or not they pass 
the state’s requirements. The state can levy fines for plans not in compliance, although 
such action is rare. By using such a system, the state ensures that critical elements are 
addressed, but still leaves planning to the local level where local knowledge, values, and 
public input can be utilized in the planning process. Generally, local planning and zoning 
departments draft their sections of CDMPs (including the Coastal Management Element 
and its hazard mitigation components), then submit these drafts to the local government 
for legislative approval. Once approved, the local government transmits the plan to the 
state for review. At this point, state agencies formally submit comments and their advice 
as to whether or not the plan meets the state required elements – it is then up to the local 
government to act on comments and then pass the plan as a form of local ordinances. 
Florida statutes require that CPs in coastal communities have a Coastal 
Management Element (Required and optional elements of comprehensive plan; studies 
and surveys, Florida Statutes, 163.3177, 2008). The Coastal Management Element must, 
per statute, provide for the “…balanced utilization and preservation…” of “…all non-
living and non-living coastal zone resources.” The aforementioned legal language, and 
how it is interpreted, is critical because natural resources, such as mangrove forests, may 
be able to buffer hazard impacts. The coastal management element must also limit public 
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expenditures subsidizing development in hazard areas and must maintain or reduce 
hurricane evacuation times (Deyle, et al., 1998). 
In addition to statutes, Florida sets forth other legally binding requirements related 
to hazard mitigation in the Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C.). Critically, CPs must 
contain goal statements reflecting legislative intent that the enacting government will “… 
protect human life and limit public expenditures in areas subject to destruction by natural 
disasters” (F.A.C. 9J-05.012). In line with this, local CPs must direct population 
concentrations away from hazard areas and maintain or reduce evacuation times. 
However, this language is clearly open to broad interpretation. Finally, development must 
be limited in coastal hazard areas. Analysis of proposed development or redevelopment 
of flood prone areas must include consideration of flood insurance rate maps, flood 
hazard maps, and hazard mitigation reports (F.A.C. 9J-5.006). Coastal area population 
densities must be coordinated with hurricane evacuation plans, and coastal hazard zones 
must be indicated on plan maps. Per F.A.C. 9J-5.012, CPs must comprehensively 
examine hurricane evacuation; the code sets forth several issues that must be addressed 
and requires that the local government consider measures to reduce or maintain 
evacuation times. The requirement to examine evacuation specifies that counties shall 
inventory infrastructure in the coastal hazard area evaluate the potential for relocating 
infrastructure at risk. 
In addition to the requirement to have a hazard mitigation element, Florida has 
used statutory requirements to institutionalize strong planning overall – not just from a 
hazard perspective (in fact, hazard mitigation is only a small part of the CP). Florida law 
requires that the plan elements be consistent with each other and financially feasible 
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(Required and optional elements of comprehensive plan; studies and surveys, Florida 
Statutes, 163.3177, 2008). The statute also mandates that local government plans have 
both a five and ten year planning horizon. Consideration of conservation of natural 
resources (including estuarine resources) is required; notably, while this is not the stated 
intent of this requirement, such an element may aid in preserving natural resources that 
can absorb hazard effects. 
Florida was selected as the study state for several reasons. As the purpose of my 
research is to ascertain what factors drive quality of hazard mitigation elements in local 
CPs in a state with requirements for hazard mitigation elements in CPs, it was desirable 
to select a state with a high-quality requirement with enforcement mechanisms. 
Essentially, a goal of my research is to ascertain if local governments make quality 
hazard mitigation elements when the state government has made a fairly strong effort to 
ensure this quality. Florida has a strong mandate and disincentives for non-compliance, 
and provides a supporting mechanism to craft quality hazard mitigation elements (Burby 
& Dalton, 1994). 
Florida also faces two significant hazards representing the majority of natural 
threats. The fact that Florida faces just two hazards, which in some ways are 
complementary in that both involve flooding, helps to reduce “noise” in the research data; 
otherwise, the planning approaches for various hazard types could produce “noise” that 
would have to be controlled for. Clearly, Florida is a hurricane prone state. Florida also 
faces flood hazards, both from coastal storms and wetland overflows. In fact, a recent 
estimate is that from 1990 through 2003, Florida suffered nearly $2.5 billion in flood 
losses (Brody S. D., et al., 2007).  
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Despite Florida’s vulnerability to natural hazards, mitigation measures that could 
help to improve hazard mitigation planning have been reduced in recent years. Primarily, 
the Department of Community Affairs, which is responsible for regulating development 
of land and reviewed hazard mitigation elements in Florida county CPs, was largely 
dismantled in 2011 and integrated with the Department of Economic Opportunity 
(Pittman, 2011). The Florida legislature’s action followed comments from newly elected 
Governor Rick Scott indicating that he believed the Department of Community Affairs 
was killing jobs and raising bureaucratic barriers to development (Pittman, 2011). 
Arguably, the move to consolidate a division charged with regulating development into 
one charged with promoting it could weaken the power of the regulating entity. 
 
Overall Summary 
The rating index is composed of 24 total items scored 0, 1, or 2, meaning that the 
minimum score for a given hazard mitigation element is 0 and the maximum score is 48. 
Overall, ratings revealed significant variation in the quality of hazard mitigation elements 
of Florida coastal county CPs. Plan scores were normally distributed with a range of 5 to 
25. There was no noticeable correlation between geography and quality. The lowest rated 
plan was that of Jefferson County with a rating of 5, and the highest was Pinellas County 
with a rating of 25. Ratings averaged 14.06, with the median at 14 and a standard 
deviation of 4.759. With a skewness of .456 and a kurtosis of -.159, the distribution of 
scores is relatively normal, as shown in Figure 2, below.  
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Figure 2: Distribution of ratings of hazard mitigation components of comprehensive plans in Florida 
coastal counties 
In the interviews of land use planning leaders, referenced above and further 
explained below, I asked interviewees if they found the ratings assigned to the 35 coastal 
counties to be surprising. While no one rating came as a surprise to any of the 
interviewees, one interviewee did note that he would have expected the ratings to be 
more uniform and not as varied as they are.  
Table 3, below, is a matrix showing how many plans received each of the three 
score levels for each element. In particular, a few elements stand out and bear discussion. 
While it is possible to infer the hazards of concern by reading the plans, most plans (20) 
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do not directly identify the hazards their respective communities face. Also notable, 29 
plans do not contain a historical account of hazards and disasters affecting the 
community. While it certainly can be argued that the most effective planning departments 
should also be learning organizations that use past occurrences to shape future policies, 
my evaluation clearly reflects that local governments are not taking the opportunity to 
learn about hazards and disasters. Only two plans discuss forecasted hazards and 
magnitudes, which should be critical elements in hazard mitigation planning as local 
governments must know what they face in order to plan for it. Only approximately half of 
the plans mandate a public hazard education component. 
On a stronger note, 31 plans directly identified hazard mitigation as a goal; this is 
critical as Florida CPs are built out in a structure in which goals are assigned objectives 
which the plan achieves through policies. Collaboration was a strong theme, with 32 
plans identifying other units of government or agencies with which the local government 
would coordinate. All of the plans limited development in hazard zones, and 10 outright 
prohibited it. A total of 24 plans take advantage of the power of nature as a barrier to 
hazards. 
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Rating Item 
Count of Plans by Rating 
0  
Not 
Present 
1 
Present 
2 
Discussed 
in Detail 
Identification of Hazards 20 11 4 
Disaster and Hazard History 29 6 0 
Identification of Hazard Mitigation as a Goal 2 31 2 
Maps Delineating Coastal High Hazard Areas (CHHA), 
Flood Zones, and/or Other Hazards 11 16 8 
Forecasted Hazards and Magnitudes Presented 33 2 0 
Learning from Hazards is Incorporated Explicitly 4 29 2 
Explicit Use of the Vulnerability Concept 34 1 0 
Public Participation in Planning is Codified in the Plan 24 3 8 
Interviews Conducted with Key Stakeholders 35 0 0 
Exposure of Property and/or Population to Hazards 
Analyzed 28 5 2 
Exposure of Public Infrastructure and/or Critical Facilities to 
Hazards Analyzed 27 8 0 
Other Governments, Government Agencies, Non-
Governmental Organizations, and/or Stakeholders Identified 
with at Least Some Intent to Collaborate Noted 3 13 19 
SLOSH or an alternative formal model is utilized to model 
flooding and wind hazards. 21 11 3 
Development is Limited in Hazard Zones 0 27 8 
Development is Prohibited in Hazard Zones 25 9 1 
Evacuation Times and/or Feasibility 23 4 8 
Evacuation Routes Mapped 14 15 6 
Evacuation Shelter Capacity Inventoried 24 5 5 
Mitigation Required from Developments that Increase 
Evacuation Time 19 11 5 
Specific Rule that Public Funding will not Improve 
Infrastructure Beyond Current Level of Service in Hazard 
Zones 1 26 8 
Use of Nature as a Hazard Barrier is Explicit 11 15 9 
Hazard Education Component 18 13 4 
Building Codes are Mandated in Hazard Zones 10 23 2 
Tax Abatement for New Development Employing 
Mitigation, and/or for Retrofits that Mitigate Hazards 35 0 0 
Table 3: Scoring elements and results. 
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In the sections below, the ratings are dissected based on several independent 
variables that could potentially influence each one. I tested the ratings for differences by 
geography, hazard history, and significant demographic factors. 
 
Geographic Differences 
There are several reasons why plans might differ based on geography. Primarily, 
different geographies have different hurricane exposures. Secondarily, different 
geographies in Florida contain different population groups and political influences. In 
order to test for geographic differences, I divided the state into the regions shown in 
Table 4, below. 
Region Counties 
Panhandle Jefferson, Taylor, Walton, Gulf, Wakulla, Okaloosa, Franklin, Santa Rosa, Bay, 
Escambia, Hillsborough 
North Gulf Dixie, Hernando, Levy, Pasco, Citrus, Pinellas 
South Gulf Lee, Manatee, Monroe, Collier, Sarasota, Charlotte 
South Atlantic Palm Beach, Martin, St. Lucie, Broward, Miami-Dade, Indian River 
North Atlantic Nassau, Volusia, Brevard, Flagler, St. John’s, Duval 
Table 4: Regions and counties used in this study 
In this analysis, I used ANOVA testing to compare the variation within and 
between plan rating scores in each region. With a result of p=.148, there is no statistically 
significant difference in scores when divided by regions. As shown in Table 5, below, the 
Panhandle and North Gulf Regions had the most variation in county level scores within 
them. Note that, while the 35 counties used in these tests represent the entire universe of 
counties in this study, this small set of cases should be kept in mind when interpreting 
results. 
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Region Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Score Maximum Score Range 
Panhandle 11.27 4.606 5 22 17
North Gulf 15.33 6.947 9 25 16
South Gulf 16.83 3.371 14 22 8
South Atlantic 15.33 3.266 11 20 9
North Atlantic 13.83 3.312 9 19 10
Table 5: Plan scores by region 
 
Correlation with Hazard History 
No correlation of statistical significance appears to exist between each county’s 
Storm Index score (representing number of storm strikes, recency of strikes, and strength 
of storms) and plan quality (Spearman’s Rho (Ρ) = 0.188, p = .288). The relationship, or 
lack thereof, is shown in Figure 3, below.  
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Figure 3: County plan ratings compared to historical storm exposure 
 
Analysis of Vulnerability-Related Variables Against Plan Quality 
Theories related to vulnerability to natural hazards generally posit that people of 
lower socio-economic standing, absent factors making them more resilient, will be more 
prone to disasters than those of higher socio-economic standing. To test this, I considered 
the socioeconomic variables below to measure vulnerability of the populations. 
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Median Household Income 
One of the major foci of the vulnerability paradigm is wealth, and the poor are 
generally considered more vulnerable to hazards than the wealthy (Cutter, et al., 2003; 
O'Hare & Rivas, 2005; Parasuraman & Acharya, 2000; Vatsa, 2004; Wisner, et al., 
2004). The poor tend to suffer more in disasters for various reasons (Turner, 1979; Vatsa, 
2004), and when experiencing a disaster, they have insufficient resources to fully recover 
and become resilient to the next hazard (Wahlstrom, 2007; Wisner, et al., 2004). While 
the wealthy can often buy protection from hazards by fortifying their homes, living in 
safe locales, diversifying their income sources, and buying insurance, the poor tend to 
lack insurance, have fewer resources for coping with hazards, have less diversity in 
income (a hazard can disrupt income earning activities), and live in more vulnerable 
structures in more vulnerable locations (Winchester, 2000). Often, hazardous areas, such 
as coastal zones and volcano slopes, are attractive locations for the poor to engage in 
economic activities (Wisner, et al., 2004). The ability to engage in economic activities 
may attract people to live in these areas, and at the very least exposes them to a hazard if 
they are working at the time of a hazard strike. Furthermore, if a hazard strikes in these 
areas, it eliminates or reduces income earning capacity, and cuts into the ability to 
resiliently recover and prepare for future hazards.  
In examining the vulnerability of 250 U.S. counties, Cutter, Boruff, and Shirley 
(2003) found that, among eleven factors, wealth alone accounted for 12.4% of the 
variation in vulnerability. The poor are generally found to be at greater vulnerability to 
natural hazards than the middle-class and wealthy for several reasons (Vatsa, 2004). In 
comparison to the upper and middle classes, the poor are less likely to have homes and 
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businesses that are structurally capable of withstanding hazards, are less likely to have 
places to evacuate to, and are less likely to evacuate because of the associated costs both 
from the evacuation and lost wages during the evacuation. The poor are also more likely 
to be relegated to living in dangerous places, such as flood zones and mountainsides. 
Finally, the poor often have less of an ability to “bounce back” after a disaster and return 
to normalcy; for the poor, each successive hazard can chip away at their resiliency and 
increase their vulnerability. 
Conversely, increased wealth increases resiliency (Cutter, et al., 2003) but can 
also increase the amount of property at risk. Wealth provides access to insurance, 
increased options to build structural mitigation measures, and the ability to leave income-
earning work to evacuate in the presence of hazards, and it increases ability to rebound 
from a disaster quickly and effectively – thus helping to close the disaster cycle.  
From a resource perspective, the wealth of a community may have a bearing on 
planning for hazard mitigation. Community wealth both can purchase access to quality 
planning (i.e., more educated planners, updated GIS maps, more detailed maps, LIDAR 
surveys), and can present the community with the option to forego tax revenues and not 
allow development in hazard zones (Burby & Dalton, 1994; Deyle, et al., 1998). 
 
Age 
Age is frequently cited as a characteristic of individual vulnerability (Cutter, et 
al., 2003; Kusenbach, et al., 2010). In my research, it serves, in aggregate, as a potential 
predictor of vulnerability. Age can have both positive and negative effects on 
vulnerability. In some situations, older people may be more vulnerable than young and 
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middle-aged people, as they may need to rely on others to build resilient homes, prepare 
for oncoming disasters, and evacuate. However, in other situations, older people could 
have increased financial resources, allowing them to purchase these services, services 
that their less economically able counterparts may not enjoy, and possibly even making 
them less vulnerable than younger populations with less wealth. Furthermore, older 
persons may have access to greater social support networks to assist them, more formal 
social services, and more time to prepare for hazards. Thus, the aged may actually have 
some resilient characteristics that younger groups lack (Kusenbach, et al., 2010). 
 
Race 
Because of the potential for inequality, race is often cited as a factor in individual 
vulnerability (Cutter, et al., 2003; Oliver-Smith, 1996). Race can be associated with many 
other vulnerability-inducing factors, including income inequality, discrimination in the 
offering of services (i.e., evacuation, post-disaster recovery), and spatial segregation in 
which those discriminated against are relegated to living in more dangerous places. 
In this analysis, race is captured as “White” or “Non-White” because of 
limitations in Census data. The U.S. Census data records people as having one race alone 
or a mixture of races. Because people reporting a mixture of White race and any other 
race category could potentially be treated socially and economically as either White or 
another race (depending on which culture the person identifies with, and how the 
community around the person perceives the person), people who are not reported as 
“White Alone” are treated as a minority in this analysis. 
 
87 
 
Ethnicity 
While race is often mentioned as a contributor to vulnerability, it is also important 
to examine ethnicity, especially in the Florida context (Cutter, et al., 2003; Oliver-Smith, 
1996). Race and ethnicity are nearly universally held to be correlated with vulnerability, 
and research has shown that these demographics affect perception of and thus mitigation 
actions for natural hazards (Fothergill, et al., 1999). While research has found that 
minority race and ethnicity often contribute to a population’s vulnerability (Kusenbach, et 
al., 2010), because they have a reduced access to resources (education, public services, 
economic resources, etc.), some authors have suggested that minority groups may utilize 
alternate, highly effective networks of communication (Peguero, 2006; Fothergill, et al., 
1999; Perry & Green, 1982). Certainly, race and ethnicity may also connect to 
vulnerability in terms of capacity for policymaking. Minority heavy communities may, 
under a traditional vulnerability paradigm, have fewer resources to devote to planning. 
Furthermore, while people of minority groups may be the most vulnerable to natural 
hazards, they also may be at significant risk for political and policymaking 
disenfranchisement.  
While it has become recognized that effective hazard mitigation requires planners 
to gather information from vulnerable populations, both to determine their vulnerability 
and to gather information to capitalize on their resiliency, minority status may be a 
barrier that keeps planners from getting information from the most vulnerable. It is 
critical to explore the relationships between race and ethnicity and hazard mitigation 
element quality.  
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My research only utilizes Hispanic and non-Hispanic ethnicity in the analysis. 
The only ethnicity recorded in U.S Census data is “Hispanic” and this is a limitation of 
the analysis. 
 
Education 
Level of education may have bearing on vulnerability (Hutton & Haque, 2004). A 
higher level of education is thought to decrease vulnerability, while lower levels of 
education are thought to increase vulnerability (Cutter, et al., 2003). Higher education has 
a tripartite effect. The more educated, especially in countries with higher levels of 
inequality, tend to have more resources to influence the political process; further, formal 
education could contribute to a person’s ability to understand hazards and potential 
solutions. Education may help people to gain access to, process, and use hazard 
information. Finally, with education may come increased economic abilities to take 
mitigatory actions, evacuate, and to rebuild in a resilient fashion; notably, the more 
educated are more likely to hold salaried jobs and jobs that, in today’s electronic world, 
can be done remotely, thus enabling them to evacuate and not report to work in a disaster 
zone without significant income disruption. 
 
Population Density and Growth 
Communities with less room for development are less likely than those with more 
room to restrict development in hazard areas (Burby & Dalton, 1994). Both population 
density and growth are oft-ignored components of “place inequalities” that contribute to 
vulnerability (Cutter, et al., 2003; Wisner, et al., 2004). Growth aside, higher population 
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density is associated with a higher risk of death in natural hazards, especially floods, as 
more dense populations tend to be associated with greater impervious surface cover, 
which in turn increases flood flow rates and amounts of runoff (Zahran, et al., & Grover, 
2008). While some research has indicated that population density itself does not correlate 
with plan compliance with state mandates (Deyle & Smith, 1998), other researchers have 
found that areas with more demand for development in hazard zones tend to have lower 
plan quality than areas with less demand for development (Brody S. D., 2003; Sengezer 
& Koc, 2005). Politically, it may be difficult to make hazard zones off- limits to 
development when other locations for development are already filled. Finally, in areas of 
rapid growth, social service networks and government services may not have caught up 
with the population, thus leaving people without essential networks to cope with 
disasters; similarly, planning for a rapidly growing area may tax planning departments, 
which could affect decision making and reduce the ability to make quality, well-
considered decisions.  
In their examination of vulnerability in 250 U.S. counties, Cutter, Boruff, and 
Shirley (2003) found that population density correlated with 11% of variation in 
vulnerability of the study counties. While a county-by-county examination of existing 
land use is beyond the scope of my research, I use population density as a proxy, 
hypothesizing that more densely populated counties will have fewer land options and will 
be less likely to create restrictions on land use that would make hazard zones unavailable 
for development.  
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Social Vulnerability Analysis Results 
While researchers have shown that social vulnerability affects the susceptibility of 
individuals and households to natural hazards (Zahran, et al., 2008; Burningham, et al., 
2008), it may also play a role in the ability of an entire community to prepare for and 
mitigate against natural hazards. Socially vulnerable populations are more prone to 
suffering from property damage, injury, and death in the face of hazards, and less able to 
recover in a resilient fashion that prepares them for the next hazard. Thus, their 
vulnerability tends to increase with each successive hazard passage.  
Prior research has shown a correlation between vulnerability to natural hazards 
and various social factors, such as minority status, age, wealth, and level of education. 
Factors including population, population density, and population growth may also affect 
hazard vulnerability. Because quality land use plans are one tool to reduce vulnerability, 
but also require a conscious decision to pursue and to devote resources to, it is 
hypothesized that these factors will correlate with plan quality.  
Table 6, below, displays results of Spearman’s Rho (Ρ) correlations for each of 
the demographic variables with plan quality in Florida coastal counties. I chose this 
statistical measure because the data set is relatively small and it required a non-
parametric measure. There was a fair degree of intercorrelation between the demographic 
variables, as well as several strong correlations between them and hazard mitigation 
element quality. These intercorrelations inform the discussion of correlations with hazard 
mitigation element quality. Keep in mind the limitation that while this represents the 
entire universe of counties in the study (Florida coastal counties), this is still a group of 
only 35 observations – a rather small number in terms of statistical testing.
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Pop. 
% w/ HS 
Diploma or +
% w/ BA/BS 
or + 
Med. H’hold 
Income 
Pop. Density 
per Sq/Mi 
Density 
Change: ’00-
‘10 % 62+ 
% Non-
White 
% Hispanic 
or Latino % Renting Plan Rating 
Pop. 1.000 .349* .544** .207 .946** -.144 -.008 .276 .702** .650** .597**
 .040 .001 .232 .000 .408 .962 .108 .000 .000 .000
% w/ HS Diploma .349* 1.000 .614** .584** .345* -.102 .133 -.301 .117 .263 .341*
.040 .000 .000 .042 .560 .447 .079 .502 .127 .045
% w/ BA/BS or + .544** .614** 1.000 .733** .489** -.076 .055 .013 .576** .566** .477**
.001 .000 . .000 .003 .666 .752 .939 .000 .000 .004
Med. H’hold 
Income 
.207 .584** .733** 1.000 .120 .084 -.199 -.034 .180 .317 .096
.232 .000 .000 .491 .631 .251 .846 .300 .063 .582
Density per Sq/Mi .946** .345* .489** .120 1.000 -.110 .071 .242 .667** .578** .667**
.000 .042 .003 .491 .528 .685 .160 .000 .000 .000
Pop. Density 
Change: ’00-‘10 
-.144 -.102 -.076 .084 -.110 1.000 .150 -.266 -.026 -.366* -.176
.408 .560 .666 .631 .528 .391 .123 .881 .031 .313
% 62+ -.008 .133 .055 -.199 .071 .150 1.000 -.553** .246 -.246 .256
.962 .447 .752 .251 .685 .391 .001 .154 .153 .138
% Pop. Non-White .276 -.301 .013 -.034 .242 -.266 -.553** 1.000 .166 .423* -.042
.108 .079 .939 .846 .160 .123 .001 .340 .011 .810
% Hispanic or 
Latino 
.702** .117 .576** .180 .667** -.026 .246 .166 1.000 .651** .497**
.000 .502 .000 .300 .000 .881 .154 .340 .000 .002
% Renting .650** .263 .566** .317 .578** -.366* -.246 .423* .651** 1.000 .439**
.000 .127 .000 .063 .000 .031 .153 .011 .000 .008
*=significant at p ≤ .05 **=significant at p ≤ .01 
Table 6: Correlations of demographic variables and hazard mitigation element ratings 
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Total population was positively correlated with hazard mitigation element quality 
at a moderate level (Ρ = 0.597, p ≤ 0.000). This correlation may be because larger 
counties have more resources to build larger planning departments with planners able to 
focus on the hazard mitigation element, attract a higher caliber of planner, have increased 
exposure (and receive increased attention from state reviewers), or for other reasons.  
Both the percentage of population over the age of 25 that at least graduated high 
school and the percent of population over age 25 with at least a bachelor’s degree were 
correlated with hazard mitigation element quality (Ρ  = 0.341, p = 0.045, and Ρ = 0.477, p 
= 0.004, respectively). The correlation between plan quality and education follows typical 
trends expected of hazard vulnerability, and could be related to the population having 
more resources to build better plans, or being more involved in the planning process. 
Education was also intercorrellated with population, median household income, and 
population density, all of which could be drivers of plan quality, and are discussed 
elsewhere in this section. 
Median household income was not correlated with plan quality at any level of 
statistical significance. Typically, other research has shown that higher income is 
associated with better hazard mitigation. However, it is possible that because of the 
stringent review that Florida’s state government holds plans to, income differences were 
somewhat marginalized as all plans had to meet the same level of quality. 
While population density was correlated with higher quality of hazard mitigation 
element (Ρ = 0.667, p ≤ 0.000), change in population density over the last ten years was 
not (Ρ = -0.176, p = 0.313). I expected that changes in population density would correlate 
with plan quality in some way – either decreasing quality as density increased and 
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government loosened rules to open avenues of development, or increasing it as 
governments saw a growing problem with people moving into the path of hazards and 
tightened rules to control land use. However, population density change was not 
correlated. Note also that population density was intercorrelated with education and 
population. 
Population aged 62 or over did not bear a statistically significant correlation with 
hazard mitigation element quality, and, in fact, the positive correlation of Ρ = 0.256 is not 
in the direction that traditional theories of vulnerability would suggest. Normally, age is 
considered to make persons more vulnerable; however, it is also known that the aged 
(and other groups considered to be “vulnerable”) may have useful adaptation strategies. 
Potentially, in this context, people over the age of 62 have been more involved in local 
government and/or hazard mitigation issues specifically. Still further speculation is not 
warranted as the correlation is negligible at Ρ = 0.256 and is not of statistical significance 
(p = 0.138). 
Because Census data groups people into many racial groups, I considered the 
proportion of the population that is not “White Alone” as a proxy to represent the 
“minority population” from a race perspective. Admittedly, this has two limitations. First, 
a person with even the smallest amount of any other race in his or her recent heritage 
would not be labeled “White Alone,” but effectively may appear and act as a White 
person in the community. Thus, while the person in this category is technically in the 
correct category for analysis based on race, from a realistic social and economic 
perspective, he or she is not a minority person. Second, while not being “White Alone” 
may classify a person as a “minority” from many perspectives, in any given community 
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cultural differences may enhance or diminish the effect of race. In other words, race may 
not always matter, and being of any given race could matter more in one community than 
another. While the minority race population did have a negative effect on plan quality, 
the affect was too slight at a correlation of Ρ = -0.042, and was not statistically significant 
(p = 0.810). 
I considered the Hispanic proportion of the population in the analysis. Not only 
does Hispanic population have a positive correlation with plan quality (Ρ = 0.497), but it 
is statistically significant at p = 0.002. The measurement of Hispanic population was 
included with some hesitancy as there are a myriad of potential ethnicities, but the U.S. 
Census only provides data on Hispanic ethnicity. It is of interest that race bore no 
significant correlation, but ethnicity did. On the basis of the data in this analysis, 
speculation as to why Hispanic population correlates with increased plan quality would 
not be appropriate, but, this warrants further research. Note that Hispanic ethnicity is 
intercorrelated with education and population density, both of which are positively 
correlated with hazard mitigation element quality. Thus it is possible that in the case of 
Florida, Hispanic populations do not bear qualities often associated with minority groups. 
Finally, the percent of population in renter occupied housing was correlated with 
hazard mitigation element quality (Ρ = 0.439, p = 0.008), but not in the anticipated 
negative direction. Typically a greater proportion of renter occupied housing would 
indicate that the population is poorer and has less resources to prepare for hazards, and 
would be expected to have a detrimental effect on hazard mitigation. Instead, the effect 
was positive. This could also be related to other factors with which the percent in renter 
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occupied housing was correlated, including, population, education, and population 
density.  
 
Comparison of the Best and Worst Plans 
In the text above, I examine all Florida coastal counties, regardless of plan 
quality. However, this leaves the question of what trends exist among the best and worst 
rated plans, and how these two groups differ. In this section, a brief comparison is 
conducted between the five lowest rated plans (ratings of 5-9) and the top five rated plans 
(ratings of 20-25). The comparative analysis of best and worst plans could be of use to 
planners trying to improve their hazard mitigation elements. 
Universally, the lowest rated plans did not identify hazards. However, all of the 
highly rated plans did, and three of these five were thorough enough to warrant a “2” 
rating for hazard identification. The difference in hazard identification is a key 
foundational element that planners could consider when building hazard mitigation 
elements. 
The inclusion of maps delineating hazard zones also proved to be a distinguishing 
feature between the highest and most poorly rated hazard mitigation elements. Only one 
of the five lowest rated plans had these maps, while all of the top five had them, and two 
of them scored a “2” for the thoroughness of their maps. Maps can be extremely useful in 
making policies, implementing them (especially in zoning decisions), and showing the 
public the hazards that threaten a community. 
Both the highest and lowest rated plans largely lacked either a history of hazards 
and disasters or a forecast of them. Two of the top five plans included these; three of the 
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top plans did not include a history or forecast and none of the bottom rated plans included 
them. While the history can help to understand hazards and better plan for those that may 
arise, it is even more puzzling that there is not a forecast of expected hazard magnitudes 
to inform preparation and planning.  
Two rating factors examine exposure to hazards: the first looks at population, the 
second public infrastructure. None of the lowest rated plans took stock of exposure to 
hazards in either regard, but all of the top rated plans did. Finally, four of the five lowest 
plans do not require use of a formal model for storm surge or other hazards, but four of 
the top five explicitly require such. 
Except for one plan, the lowest rated plans considered neither evacuation times 
and feasibility, nor evacuation routes, nor evacuation shelter capacity; whereas four of the 
five top rated plans considered all three. While evacuations are not directly the province 
of planning departments, evacuation is very much affected by policies dictated in CPs 
(e.g., higher density may require wider roads for faster evacuation). 
In summary, the lower rated plans generally do not incorporate potential sources 
for information that the higher rated plans do. Especially given that Florida has a 
significant and well documented hazard history that could inform planning in order to 
reduce hazards, this represents a significant loss of useful information that could benefit 
planning for hazards. 
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Conclusion 
The original research questions were: 
1. Is there variation in the quality hazard mitigation elements of land use plans in a 
state that has a strong, prescriptive mandate for local land use plans to address 
hazard mitigation? 
2. If so, what drives this variation? 
In this chapter, the first question is answered (is there variation?) and some 
consideration given to the second (what drives variation?). In short, there is variation in 
the quality of hazard mitigation elements of land use plans in Florida coastal counties, 
and that variation is somewhat correlated with socio-economic variables typically thought 
to drive vulnerability to natural hazards. 
My research employs a novel rating scale comprised of 24 factors to rate hazard 
mitigation elements of land use plans. Previous research utilized the majority of these 
index items, but some novel ones were added to my research. I scored each measure 
based on the level of detail presented (0 = Not Present, 1 = Present, 2 = Present in 
Exceptional Detail), and I summed scores for each plan, for a total possible score ranging 
from 0 through and including 48. Similar to prior research, this study did not judge the 
quality of each element alone, but rather the collective presence of elements to ascertain 
the thoroughness of plans.  
Plan ratings come in at a low of 5 and a high of 25, with a mean of 14.06, median 
of 14, and standard deviation of 4.759. ANOVA testing revealed that plan quality is not 
correlated with region.  
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I examined the effects of historical hurricane strikes on hazard mitigation element 
quality, using an index that measured time since hazard strike, strength of hazards, and 
quantity of hazards. Tests revealed no correlation between hazard history and quality of 
the hazard mitigation element in land use plans. This finding is contrary to traditionally 
accepted knowledge of hazard vulnerability and mitigation, which would hold that 
communities that have experienced hazards tend to be better equipped to deal with future 
hazards than those that have not. However, given the finding that most plans do not 
formally incorporate knowledge from prior hazards, it makes sense that the plans are not 
typically bettered by hazard experience. Still, this brings up more questions for future 
research. Foremost, if communities are experiencing hazards but not learning enough to 
incorporate historical reality in planning documents, are planners aware of the effects of 
prior hazards and just ignoring them? Even if planners are aware of prior hazard strikes, 
is it possible that communities do not want to acknowledge the hazards and incorporate 
this knowledge? Finally, are communities intentionally being myopic in their future 
views, and building plans based upon a reality that they prefer versus one constructed 
from past experiences? If so, why? 
Finally, I tested a spectrum of socio-economic variables typically thought to 
influence vulnerability to see if they correlate with hazard mitigation element quality. 
While researchers have not hypothesized that these variables directly influence quality of 
hazard mitigation elements in land use plans, they are known to affect vulnerability to 
natural hazards overall. Quality of hazard mitigation elements correlated directly with 
population, education, population density, Hispanic proportion of the population, and 
percent of population in rental housing. median household income, population density 
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change, age, and race bore no correlation with hazard mitigation element quality. It is 
also notable that population was intercorrellated with several other variables that could be 
drivers of hazard mitigation element quality, including education and population density, 
which I discuss in greater detail below. 
Taken collectively, these results are inconsistent, and cannot be taken to either 
support or refute the operation of Vulnerability Theory in the context of a developed, 
First-World state. It is notable that many of the socioeconomic variables correlated with 
vulnerability also are correlates to urbanity; these include population itself, education 
level, population density, and percent of population in renter occupied housing. This may 
indicate that while the individual variables are not strongly driving hazard mitigation 
element quality, urban areas fare better in terms of hazard mitigation element quality. 
This could be because of programs focused on increasing urban safety, increased 
attention to urban areas from the state planning review department, or simply a tendency 
of people to gather in locales more prone to hazards (and where growing populations 
increase hazard effects) that then results in greater care in hazard mitigation element 
design. The findings would have been more consistent had median household income 
shown a correlation with hazard mitigation element quality, as it could be theorized that 
some of these variables relate to higher wealth and thus abilities of a community to “buy” 
stronger planning organizations; however, such is not the case. Notably, also, all of the 
variables that correlated with hazard mitigation element quality also bear a statistically 
significant correlation with population. Possibly, these “large counties” get more 
attention from state plan reviewers, simply have more people at risk in coastal zones 
(which may weight the planning organization’s attention toward hazard mitigation in 
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comparison to areas with less coastal population), and/or have more resources to focus on 
individual plan elements due to sheer size of planning staff. This finding warrants further 
investigation in future research, and may prove important to helping improve state laws, 
rules, and procedures to ensure better hazard mitigation planning in “smaller” counties. 
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V. SURVEYS: EXPLAINING VARIATION IN QUALITY OF HAZARD 
MITIGATION ELEMENTS IN LOCAL COMPREHENSIVE PLANS 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I examine possible drivers of the quality of hazard mitigation 
elements in local land use plans. I have established that variation exists, even in Florida, 
where the state government has a strong, prescriptive mandate for local governments to 
include these elements. Essentially, the various local governments have, from distinct 
angles, approached the task of incorporating hazard mitigation into land use planning, 
rather than creating the uniform plans expected from stringent state regulation. 
To study the variation in hazard mitigation element quality, I conducted a survey 
of the land use planning community in Florida and beyond via an online tool. I expanded 
the survey beyond Florida for several reasons. Because the survey responses were not 
intended to be tied to individual counties, there was no need to limit the surveys to 
Florida; the low marginal cost of expanding the survey population to collect more varied 
data from practitioners nationwide was also attractive. Furthermore, the purpose of the 
survey was not only to learn about mitigation in Florida plans, but also learn what 
professionals in general think contributes to quality hazard mitigation elements.  
I based the survey questions and design on three significant sources of 
information: literature on planning, hazards, and disasters; practice; and the interviews of 
coastal county planning leaders (see the Appendix for the questions and topics covered 
and sources for each). I asked interviewees several questions in conversational interviews 
which were approximately 60 to 90 minutes in duration. Questions dealt with a) how the 
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interviewees’ counties were working to create high quality hazard mitigation elements, b) 
the nature of planning for hazard mitigation in CPs, c) what these planning leaders 
believe are important qualities of a good hazard mitigation element in a comprehensive 
plan, and d) how their Planning Departments coordinate within their own counties and 
with other governments. Further interview details can be found in the Appendix and the 
paragraphs below. 
All four interviewees were aware of the legal requirements for hazard mitigation 
elements in Florida coastal county plans, as well as administrative codes interpreting the 
statutory requirements. The planning leaders interviewed reported that plans in their 
counties exceeded state requirements in several ways, including expansion of the 
geographic coastal area in which the county must plan for coastal storms, additional taxes 
used to purchase lands prone to hazards, and several other specific policies aimed at 
hazard reduction.  
Interviewees listed several potential improvements for the hazard mitigation 
elements of their CPs, including lowering density in coastal zones, prohibiting mobile 
home development in these areas, and addressing sea level rise and climate change. 
Interviewees reported that the hazard mitigation element should guide policy 
implementation, address pre-disaster mitigation, and guide populations away from hazard 
zones. However, they had no consensus on what the most important components of a 
hazard mitigation element are.  
Interviewees listed several specific actions they take to create high quality hazard 
mitigation elements, including the following: working closely with municipalities; using 
interdepartmental groups to strengthen policies and coordinating with other county 
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departments; working with local environmental groups to make policy; working with a 
regional planning councils; completing plans in-house (versus contracting them out); and, 
actively working to maintain better ratings in FEMA’s Community Rating System (which 
rewards communities for taking mitigatory action). Planning leaders cited several sources 
of information they consult including: their Emergency Management Department, 
Sherriff’s Office, Fire Rescue Department, other local governments (both neighboring 
and within the county), civic associations, models (example: SLOSH), LIDAR 
[topographical] data, Flood Insurance Rate Maps, and Forest Service wild fire data.  
Planning leaders said that some of the hallmarks of a quality hazard mitigation 
element include going beyond natural hazards; having a strong link between emergency 
response plans (i.e., evacuation) and land use planning; a holistic approach to planning 
that creates a plan realistic to implement; public information and outreach; focus on 
preparing infrastructure to survive a disaster; and coordination with other departments.  
In terms of public interaction, interviewees said that, overall, the public is not 
very interested in providing input related to the hazard mitigation element unless there 
has been a recent disaster to draw attention to that element. Most public input comes from 
environmental groups, and some from business groups. While interviewees perceived 
public input as valuable for bringing people’s experiences to the table, generally, they 
reported leaving public communication (aside from required hearings) up to their local 
emergency management departments. 
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Sample 
 I directly invited a total of 581 people to participate in the survey. Additionally, I 
asked survey respondents who completed the survey to invite others who might be 
interested (snowball sample). Finally, I sent a mass survey invitation to the members of 
the Section on Emergency and Crisis Management (SECM) of the American Society for 
Public Administration. The survey was confidential. 
 The initial group of 581 people consisted of personnel involved with planning 
and/or natural hazards and disasters. The group composition was a) people who attended 
a natural hazards and disasters convention, and b) land use planners in all Florida 
counties. To obtain the latter list, I reviewed websites for each Florida county to obtain e-
mail addresses of all planners, and if they were not listed online, I contacted departments 
via e-mail, with two follow-up telephone calls, to obtain the list. I (the principal 
investigator) and sponsoring faculty sent direct invitations to the survey group via email 
on electronic university letterhead. I sent a reminder e-mail to non-respondents to request 
participation. I provided each participant with an individual link to the survey to track 
participation and conduct follow-up. 
 I e-mailed a link to the survey via the Section on Emergency and Crisis 
Management (SECM) of the American Society for Public Administration. The SECM is 
a subsection of the American Society for Public Administration for members with an 
interest in emergency and crisis management. 
 Additionally, I employed snowball sampling. After invited participants completed 
the survey, I emailed them to express gratitude for their participation. The “thank-you e-
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mail” contained a link to the survey and asked participants to forward the link to other 
persons who might be interested in participating.  
 Table 7, below, summarizes usable responses to the survey. A usable response is 
any one in which the respondent answered all survey questions for the primary survey 
section regarding plan quality. 
Group Invitations Sent Complete Responses Response Rate 
Planners and 
Hazard/Disaster 
Professionals (Original 
List) 581 97 16.70% 
Snowball Sample Unknown 24 Unknown 
SECM Unknown 7 Unknown 
Total  128  
Table 7: Survey responses by contact group 
In order to check for response bias, I examined the organizations represented by 
respondents. Table 8, below, details the number of invited people from each type of 
organization and how many responded.  
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Organization Type Persons Surveyed Responses Received Response Rate 
Association 6 2 33.33% 
Consultant 24 6 25.00% 
Federal Government 43 7 16.28% 
Finance 1 0 0.00% 
Insurance 1 0 0.00% 
Legislative 3 0 0.00% 
Local Government 230 35 15.22% 
Media 3 0 0.00% 
Medical 1 0 0.00% 
NGO 2 0 0.00% 
Other/Unknown 5 1 20.00% 
Regional Planning 
Council 48 3 6.25% 
Science/Think Tank 18 5 27.78% 
State Government 20 7 35.00% 
University/Academic 166 29 17.47% 
Voluntary Organizations 8 1 12.50% 
Water Management 
Districts 2 0 0.00% 
Table 8: Survey responses by organization 
Clearly, response rates varied greatly by organization type; however, it is notable 
that for some of the organization types surveyed, there were very few people in the initial 
survey group. Thus, even one or two non-responses significantly affect the response 
percentage. Notably, while federal and local government responded at a similar rate, 16% 
and 15%, respectively, state government responded at a rate of 35%. However, because 
the number of people surveyed in the state and federal groups was so small, this number 
is easily affected. 
To learn about the respondents, the survey included a free form, fill-in-the-blank 
box that recorded position and level. Although I received sufficient data to analyze 
positions, the information on level reflected a great degree of subjectivity and variation in 
responses (e.g., some people entered “senior” while others gave a career history) that 
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precluded it from analysis. Table 9, below, shows the breakdown of respondents. Note 
that some respondents either did not give a position, or entered a vague one. For them, I 
consulted the original survey contact list to find their position, or if they were part of the 
snowball or SECM sample, I used their e-mail address, if provided, to research the type 
of organization they worked for. 
Job Category Count Percent 
Planning 44 34% 
Research/Academic 39 30% 
Unknown 14 11% 
Hazard mitigation 11 9% 
Disaster Response 8 6% 
Science 5 4% 
Consulting 3 2% 
Disaster Recovery 2 2% 
Advocacy 1 1% 
Law 1 1% 
Table 9: Respondents and professions 
About one-third of respondents were from the planning field, and approximately 
another third were researchers or academicians. Of the 128 respondents with complete 
responses, 22 did not indicate their state or county. Table 10, below, shows, of the 
remaining 106, any states which accounted for 5% or greater of the complete responses. 
State Respondents Percent 
Florida 40 38% 
California 9 8% 
Colorado 7 7% 
Washington 5 5% 
Georgia 5 5% 
Louisiana 5 5% 
Table 10: Respondents by State (over 5%) 
 
  
108 
 
Results and Analysis 
Below, I present findings from each question in the survey. On the basis of data 
collected, I examine differences in how professionals from each category responded. I 
used ANOVA testing; however, because some professions are represented by such a 
small number of respondents, I excluded respondents from any profession that 
represented less than 5% of the sample and all respondents with an unknown profession. 
The exclusion of respondents that did not represent more than 5% by profession means 
that I only included respondents in the professions of Planning, Research/Academic, 
Hazard Mitigation, and Disaster Response in the ANOVA tests. It is important to note 
that, with 128 respondents and four professional groups, sometimes the ANOVA test 
showed statistically significant differences between responses by professional group, but 
that in practical terms, the average responses given by the groups differed little. Note that 
the percentages presented in Columns 2-5 include all respondents.  
 
Elements of a Quality Hazard Mitigation Element in a Comprehensive Plan 
One of the primary research questions was what constitutes a quality hazard 
mitigation element in a comprehensive plan. To help ascertain what represents a quality 
hazard mitigation element, the survey asked respondents to rate several potential 
elements on a scale from 1 (Strongly Disagree with Including the Item as a Measure of 
Quality) to 5 (Strongly Agree with Including the Item as a Measure of Quality). Table 11, 
below, presents the percentage of respondents who selected each response, followed by 
the ANOVA results for the test for differences between the four largest professional 
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groups represented in the sample groups. If ANOVA testing revealed significant results, 
the question is marked with an “*” for further examination, below. 
 
Percent of Respondents Selecting Each Option 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree/ 
Do Not 
Include 
in Rating 2 
3 
Neutral 4 
5 
Strongly 
Agree/ 
Include 
in Rating 
Planners interview key hazard 
mitigation stakeholders (e.g., 
community leaders other than elected 
officials)* 1.56% 1.56% 10.94% 32.03% 53.91% 
The plan uses Sea, Lake and Overland 
Surges from Hurricanes (SLOSH) or 
an alternative formal model* 3.13% 3.13% 24.22% 30.47% 39.06% 
Development limited in hazard zones* 3.13% 4.69% 6.25% 25.78% 60.16% 
Development prohibited in hazard 
zones 6.25% 21.88% 14.06% 33.59% 24.22% 
No additions or improvements to 
public infrastructure in hazard zones 12.50% 22.66% 16.41% 23.44% 25.00% 
Mitigation required from 
developments that increase evacuation 
times 3.91% 3.13% 17.19% 42.19% 33.59% 
Nature used as a barrier against 
natural hazards (e.g., mangrove 
protection to maintain coastline) 2.34% 0.78% 12.50% 25.00% 59.38% 
The Planning Department is mandated 
to hold public meetings throughout the 
planning process 0.78% 6.25% 7.81% 32.03% 53.13% 
Required consultation with special 
districts and local governments in 
county (e.g., school boards, 
municipalities, etc.) 0.78% 3.13% 9.38% 37.50% 49.22% 
Building codes employed in hazard 
zones* 1.56% 0.00% 2.34% 16.41% 79.69% 
*Significant difference (p<.10) between top four professional groups represented in the survey 
Table 11: Value of various components of hazard mitigation elements in comprehensive plans 
Overall, respondents agreed (responses of “Strongly Agree” or “Agree”) that it is 
important that hazard mitigation elements should incorporate interviews of stakeholders, 
SLOSH or other formal models, limitation or prohibition of development in hazard zones, 
mitigation from developments that increase evacuation times, use of nature as a hazard 
barrier, public meetings, and building codes. 
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Outright prohibition of development in hazard zones was not as supported as 
limitation of development. The lack of support for prohibition of development may be 
related to the fact that development brings with it income for local governments – an 
especially salient issue, given that economic climate present at the time of this survey 
(e.g., declining budgets, significant cutbacks).  
Over three quarters of respondents were in favor of using nature as a hazard 
barrier. Because it is relatively unique, I expected the notion of nature as a hazard barrier 
to be less supported, but there is clear support for the use of nature to mitigate hazards. 
In four areas, there were significant differences in how people from the fields of 
Planning, Research/Academic, Hazard Mitigation, and Disaster Response responded. 
Table 12, below, shows the results of ANOVA testing examining how these groups 
responded to the question of how important certain plan elements are, as well as the mean 
response for each group by element. Higher numbers in the right four columns indicate 
that the group found the element to be more important, while lower numbers indicate the 
converse. Notably, while the differences between groups are statistically significant, the 
average responses differ little in practice.  
111 
 
 ANOVA Average Importance by Profession 
 
P F Planning 
Research/ 
Academic 
Hazard 
Mitigation 
Disaster 
Response 
Planners interview key 
hazard mitigation 
stakeholders (e.g., 
community leaders other 
than elected officials) 0.013 3.750 4.05 4.51 4.73 4.75 
The plan uses Sea, Lake and 
Overland Surges from 
Hurricanes (SLOSH) or an 
alternative formal model 0.039 2.899 4.25 3.64 3.82 4.25 
Development limited in 
hazard zones 0.094 2.187 4.55 4.25 3.73 4.50 
Building codes employed in 
hazard zones 0.022 3.341 4.80 4.74 4.82 4.00 
Table 12: Differences between groups on importance of specific components in hazard mitigation 
elements 
While planning is typically considered an iterative method of making policy, with 
collaboration throughout, when asked about the necessity of interviewing key 
stakeholders, planners actually were the group that found this least important, with an 
average importance of 4.05. Similarly, but not quite so profoundly, Researchers and 
Academics rated it a 4.51, which was the second lowest. This score is clearly in the 
“strongly agree” range indicating that respondents from both professions see value in 
talking with key stakeholders; but, this does show significantly lower support for 
conducting  interviews with key stakeholders than other professional groups (Hazard 
Mitigation and Disaster Response) gave. One possible reason is that Planners and 
Researchers and Academics see interviewing stakeholders as a time consuming activity 
that is not accompanied by a payoff worth the amount of time it takes, whereas Hazard 
Mitigation and Disaster Response professionals saw this as a good idea, but do not 
understand the cost/benefit calculus involved in interviewing stakeholders. Planning 
professionals and Researchers/Academics may also have a salient understanding that 
interviewing just a few stakeholders could provide an unrepresentative sample, which for 
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planners could be especially problematic if the public was to perceive this as poor data 
gathering, or worse, favoritism toward a particular interest. Another explanation is that 
these groups may be realists, or at least so in their own perception, about the facts of 
public participation, and may see it as required by law, but not very useful. The 
difference in responses by professional group could be fueled by the fact that, as 
interviewees for my research noted, the public is often not interested in hazard mitigation 
in comprehensive planning, but rather leans toward more prominent issues of zoning and 
land use. 
Hazard Mitigation practitioners gave the concept of limiting development in 
hazard zones the lowest rating of any group, at 3.73; however, Planners gave an average 
importance of 4.55. This reflects a possible difference between the two groups in that 
Hazard Mitigation professionals may be more focused on accommodating development 
by mitigating, while planners see limitation of development as a stronger option. 
 
Use of the Vulnerability Concept in Hazard Mitigation Elements of Comprehensive Plans 
The survey defined the concept of vulnerability as “Vulnerability, in this context, 
is the idea that ‘disadvantaged’ groups (the poor, minorities, etc.) are more prone to 
experiencing a disaster than others, and less able to prepare for and mitigate against 
disasters.” The survey prompted “Generally speaking, Comprehensive Plans should 
incorporate the concept of vulnerability,” and provided respondents with the same 1 
(Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree) rating scale used in the rest of the survey. 
Table 13, below, shows these results. 
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Percent of Respondents Selecting Each Option 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree 2 
3 
Neutral 4 
5 
Strongly 
Agree 
Generally speaking, comprehensive 
plans should incorporate the concept 
of vulnerability* 1.56% 0.78% 14.84% 26.56% 56.25% 
*Significant difference (p<.10) between top four professional groups represented in the survey 
Table 13: Importance of using the vulnerability concept 
With 82.81% of respondents rating use of vulnerability in plans as something they 
agree with, including over 50% indicating “Strongly Agree,” there is strong support for 
incorporation of vulnerability in planning for hazards. It would be interesting to further 
explore, in future research, if respondents were aware of and/or applying the vulnerability 
concept prior to hearing of it in the survey. Being able to see how many respondents were 
already employing the concept, versus how many saw it as a novel, but useful concept, 
would shed interesting light on applications of vulnerability in a First World setting.  
Notably, there was a difference in responses from people from the fields of 
Planning, Research/Academic, Hazard Mitigation, and Disaster Response. Table 14, 
below shows each group’s average response, with higher values indicating a greater 
agreement with the idea of employing the vulnerability concept in planning. While the 
differences were statistically significant, the average responses were not very different in 
practice. 
 ANOVA Average Importance by Profession 
 
P F Planning 
Research/ 
Academic 
Hazard 
Mitigation 
Disaster 
Response 
Generally speaking, 
comprehensive plans should 
incorporate the concept of 
vulnerability. 0.056 2.604 4.11 4.56 4.18 4.75 
Table 14: Differences between groups on use of the vulnerability concept in planning 
The survey also asked planners an open-ended question related to addressing 
vulnerability. The question was discrete in that it did not call out the term “vulnerability” 
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specifically, and reads: “Thinking of areas composed of minority and/or low-income 
populations, what do you believe are specific actions that could be undertaken to improve 
hazard mitigation elements in Comprehensive Plans in these areas?” Table 15, below, 
summarizes relevant responses. 
Improvement Action for Minority and/or Low Income Areas 
Count of 
Respondents 
Suggesting 
Financial support (such as low-interest loans) to improve individual structures 12 
Seek external funding  to help these areas 2 
Reach out through communications not reliant on computer and internet access 1 
Increased focus on incorporating these populations in the planning and/or hazard 
mitigation process 16 
Adjust focus from “classic” issues (crime, poverty, etc.) in these areas and 
emphasize hazard mitigation 1 
Don’t just make mitigation about a cost//benefit analysis 1 
Increased public education and outreach relating to hazard mitigation 20 
Help communities with low-cost mitigation measures (e.g., emergency kits, moving 
heavy items off shelves to prevent earthquake hazards, etc.) 3 
Provide financial incentives for developers to build mitigation into their projects 1 
Planners should be aware of disproportionate distributions of risk 3 
Improve affordable housing options in areas with vulnerable housing stock and high 
risk [exposure to hazards] 1 
Strong relocation incentives 3 
Hold landlords more accountable for code violations 1 
Provide more explicit disclosure of hazards affecting properties, especially in the 
purchase process 1 
Planners need to understand minority and low-income communities better in order to 
serve them 1 
Relocation to less hazard-prone areas 5 
Table 15: Ideas for improving hazard mitigation planning for vulnerable populations 
One respondent offered a very interesting perspective on the need for external 
funding. He advised that getting external funding will help avoid “shorting” minority and 
low-income populations in the municipal budget process. The statement about external 
funding brings to light a possible way to offset the fact that often, minority and low-
income groups are not as well represented in local government decision making, and thus 
in this case, may not get adequate local funds for hazard mitigation. 
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In regard to education and community involvement, respondents offered the 
perspective that low-income and minority populations may require expanded efforts to 
reach them. Respondents stressed using methods that fit in the cultural contexts of these 
communities. 
 
Other Important Characteristics of Hazard Mitigation Elements 
Finally, the survey asked an open-ended question to learn what respondents think 
is an important characteristic in hazard mitigation elements of land use plans, in addition 
to those listed in the more direct questions. Table 16, below, summarizes these 
characteristics and counts how many respondents mentioned them. 
Characteristics 
Count of 
Respondents 
Suggesting 
Facilities serving vulnerable populations should not be in hazard zones 1 
Take an all hazards approach 2 
Coordinate between plans related to hazards and disasters (e.g., national mitigation 
plans, response plans, etc.) 5 
Identify repetitive loss areas and target them for mitigation 1 
Include measurable components and make the plan a performance-based document 1 
Assess a community’s capacity, both from a government standpoint and that of 
community organizations, to mitigate and deal with hazards 2 
Link the Comprehensive and Capital Improvement Plans 1 
Inventory all buildings in a hazard zone, especially to learn about vulnerability that 
may pre-date modern codes and planning 1 
Integrate plans with local transportation providers 1 
Table 16: Additional characteristics respondents said are in important in hazard mitigation elements 
of land use plans 
Five respondents suggested increased coordination, both laterally (within the 
same geographic area) and vertically (hierarchically with governments above and below). 
Certainly, coordination presents a significant opportunity. Coordination can ensure the 
most effective use of resources, both in the planning process and in implementing plans. 
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Coordination would help by reducing redundant work in the planning process, and 
leveraging resources in implementation. 
 
Professional Qualities of Planners Working on the Hazard Mitigation Element 
To learn what respondents think are important qualities in the planner assigned to 
the Hazard Mitigation Element, they were asked to rate the importance of certain subjects 
planners could have studied in school, certain experiences planners could have had on the 
job, and certain professional activities. Respondents rated these qualities from 1 (Less 
Important) to 5 (Essential), or Not Applicable. The percent of respondents assigning each 
rating, and the ANOVA test results for differences between the top four professional 
groups responding, appear in Table 17, below. 
 Percent of Respondents Selecting Each Option 
 1 
Less 
Important 2 
3 
Somewhat 
Important 4 
5 
Essential 
Education in Environmental 
Sciences 0.99% 2.97% 12.87% 58.42% 24.75% 
Education in Natural Sciences 1.00% 3.00% 22.00% 57.00% 17.00% 
Experience in Environmental 
Conservation and Resources 0.00% 5.32% 13.83% 58.51% 22.34% 
Experience in Natural Science 0.00% 4.30% 19.35% 52.69% 23.66% 
Experienced a Disaster Firsthand 7.78% 15.56% 27.78% 32.22% 16.67% 
Attends at least one conference 
annually, focusing on 
hazards/disasters, the 
environment, planning, public 
administration, or a related topic 2.94% 7.84% 13.73% 41.18% 34.31% 
*Significant difference (p<.10) between top four professional groups represented in the survey 
Table 17: Importance of professional qualifications and activities 
There was no statistically significant difference between the responses from the 
top four professional groups (Planning, Research/Academic, Hazard Mitigation, and 
Disaster Response). 
117 
 
In terms of education and experience for planners, respondents showed the most 
preference for planners with education in the environmental sciences (83.17% rated this a 
4 or 5) and experience in environmental conservation and resources (80.85% rated this a 
4 or 5). Education or experience in natural science was a close second, with 74.00% and 
76.34%, respectively, of respondents giving a rating of 4 or 5 for importance. Just above 
three-quarters of respondents (76.67%) rated experiencing a disaster firsthand as 
“Somewhat Important” (3) or above.  
Finally, 89.22% of respondents rated annual attendance of a conference in one of 
the fields related to natural disasters and planning as important. The importance placed on 
conference attendance reflects significant support for the notion that it is important to 
keep practitioners abreast of the latest developments in their fields. 
 
Making Better Plans: Factors That Affect Plan Quality and Ways to Create Better Plans 
Governments cannot conduct comprehensive planning in a vacuum devoid of 
information exchanges. The importance of information exchange is especially salient for 
hazard mitigation, because hazards tend to go beyond political boundaries. Especially 
when dealing with water issues and flooding, governments must coordinate to operate 
together to achieve meaningful change; they must think beyond the boundaries of 
political divisions and instead consider environmental boundaries. Further, especially in 
the case of floodwaters, what one government does may affect the welfare of another 
political subdivision. Table 18, below, presents answers to questions about coordination. 
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 Percent of Respondents Selecting Each Option 
1 
Less 
Important 2 
3 
Somewhat 
Important 4 
5 
Essential 
Coordination between Planning 
Departments and  local water 
management districts 0.00% 2.80% 6.54% 38.32% 52.34% 
Coordination between Planning 
Departments and local Emergency 
Management Departments 0.00% 0.00% 4.50% 19.82% 75.68% 
*Significant difference (p<.10) between top four professional groups represented in the survey 
Table 18: How coordination is perceived to effect hazard mitigation element quality 
While respondents were strongly in favor of coordination with both water 
management districts and emergency management departments, the greatest importance 
was placed on emergency management departments. The greater importance placed on 
coordination with emergency management departments is congruent with the results of 
the interviews, in which interviewees consistently stated that planning departments 
coordinate with emergency management departments, while coordination with water 
management districts was not as strongly stressed. 
Socio-economic factors usually relate to hazard vulnerability; factors such as 
education levels, race, and wealth typically influence vulnerability to natural hazards. In 
this case, it is important to consider that a community’s wealth may be able to buy better 
planning services. Table 19, below, presents practitioner opinions on the potential 
correlation between several demographic variables and hazard mitigation element quality. 
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  Percent of Respondents Selecting Each Option 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree 2 
3 
Neutral 4 
5 
Strongly 
Agree 
Communities with a wealthier 
population base are more likely to 
have higher quality hazard mitigation 
elements in comprehensive plans 3.31% 16.53% 30.58% 36.36% 13.22% 
Communities with a higher percentage 
of minority residents are more likely 
to have lower quality of hazard 
mitigation elements in comprehensive 
plans 3.33% 24.17% 32.50% 28.33% 11.67% 
Communities that have experienced 
disasters are more likely to have 
higher quality hazard mitigation 
elements in comprehensive plans 1.65% 1.65% 10.74% 51.24% 34.71% 
*Significant difference (p<.10) between top four professional groups represented in the survey 
Table 19: Relationship between socio-economic factors and plan quality 
Similar to the views observed above on vulnerability of populations being related 
to plan quality, respondents overall did not express support for the idea that community 
wealth or minority status would affect plan quality. In fact, respondents indicated that 
minority status has even less of an effect than wealth of a community.2 Respondents 
varied by profession in their response to the question regarding correlation between 
minority population and hazard mitigation element quality, as reflected in Table 20, 
below. 
Nearly universally, respondents agreed that having experienced a disaster is likely 
to correlate with a community having a higher quality hazard mitigation element. The 
response regarding disaster experience correlating with hazard mitigation element quality 
contrasts, however, findings from plan reviews, which reflect that CPs do not require 
                                                 
2 Note that in the analysis above comparing plan quality to various demographic factors, median household 
income and race had no significant effect on plan quality, and percent of Hispanic persons in the 
community was directly correlated with hazard mitigation element quality 
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historical analysis, do not review prior hazards, and rarely have components requiring 
learning from hazards in future plans. It also contrasts the fact that analysis of plan 
quality compared to historical hazard strikes showed no correlation. Thus, while survey 
respondents make a normative response that historical hazard strikes will result in 
learning for future hazards, neither the effort nor the reality of such appear in Florida 
coastal county hazard mitigation elements. 
 ANOVA Average Importance by Profession 
 
P F Planning 
Research/ 
Academic 
Hazard 
Mitigation 
Disaster 
Response 
Communities with a 
wealthier population base 
are more likely to have 
higher quality hazard 
mitigation elements in 
comprehensive plans 0.005 4.591 3.000 3.684 3.000 3.875 
Communities with a higher 
percentage of minority 
residents are more likely to 
have lower quality of hazard 
mitigation elements in 
comprehensive plans 0.008 4.210 2.744 3.459 3.100 3.625 
Communities that have 
experienced disasters are 
more likely to have higher 
quality hazard mitigation 
elements in comprehensive 
plans 0.022 3.345 4.302 4.211 3.900 3.375 
Table 20: Average importance of socio-economic factors by profession 
The responses of the four major professional groups to questions about socio-
economic effects on hazard mitigation element quality varied. Researchers/Academics 
and Disaster Responders were much more supportive of the notion that wealth and 
minority status of a community are correlated with quality of hazard mitigation elements 
than were professionals engaged in Planning and Hazard Mitigation. However, disaster 
responders saw far less of an effect of prior disasters on hazard mitigation element quality 
than did the other three groups. Perhaps professional responders and academics have a 
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broad view from seeing many disasters, and are keenly aware of the reality of the impact 
that wealth can have on helping to mitigate disasters. Conversely, Planners and Hazard 
Mitigation specialists may be more involved in their own communities and not see 
comparative effects between communities – or they may hold an ideal that a quality plan 
can exist regardless of social circumstances. On the question of whether or not prior 
hazard strikes correlate with plan quality, Planners, Researchers/Academics, and Hazard 
Mitigation professionals universally agreed that prior disasters correlate with higher 
quality hazard mitigation elements. These groups all have the opportunity to see the 
longitudinal effect of disasters and incorporate their observations into the work and study 
of planning, potentially influencing their answers more than responders, whom may have 
a shorter horizon.  
Planning departments have multiple stakeholders, including state and federal 
governments that regulate their plans, citizens, businesses, and other groups. Ultimately, 
planning departments are part of governments headed by elected officials. The survey 
asked planners how support of elected officials, who must be responsive to the public, 
affects plan quality. Table 21, below, presents responses to two related questions. 
 Percent of Respondents Selecting Each Option 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree 2 
3 
Neutral 4 
5 
Strongly 
Agree 
Hazard mitigation elements in 
comprehensive plans will be improved 
if elected officials are actively 
involved with writing these elements* 6.61% 16.53% 26.45% 28.10% 22.31% 
Hazard mitigation elements in 
comprehensive plans will be improved 
if elected officials are engaged in 
oversight of implementing new hazard 
mitigation measures* 5.79% 10.74% 17.36% 42.15% 23.97% 
*Significant difference (p<.10) between top four professional groups represented in the survey 
Table 21: Relationship between support of elected officials and plan quality 
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Respondents saw some value in having elected officials involved in writing 
hazard mitigation elements, but saw even greater value in having them involved in 
implementation. The dichotomy in results is not surprising, as planning is a highly 
technical job, and elected officials may not be qualified to take on roles in planning 
(although their input may be of value). The four professional groups differed in their 
responses to these questions, as shown in Table 22, below. 
 ANOVA Average Importance by Profession 
 
P F Planning 
Research/ 
Academic 
Hazard 
Mitigation 
Disaster 
Response 
Hazard mitigation elements 
in comprehensive plans will 
be improved if elected 
officials are actively 
involved with writing these 
elements 0.001 5.560 2.953 3.763 4.200 3.125 
Hazard mitigation elements 
in comprehensive plans will 
be improved if elected 
officials are engaged in 
oversight of implementing 
new hazard mitigation 
measures 0.083 2.288 3.395 3.605 4.300 4.125 
Table 22: Average importance of elected official involvement by profession 
Planners and Disaster Responders saw the least value in elected officials 
participating in writing of hazard mitigation elements. The gap was broad between them 
and Researchers/Academics and those working in hazard mitigation, with the latter group 
almost universally rating this participation as important. Possibly, these groups, again, 
have a broader viewpoint on the subject, and recognize that elected official involvement 
early on helps to not only gain their buy-in, but to incorporate the public’s perspective – 
which will be important to both writing a quality plan and implementing it successfully. 
It is also possible that Planners and Disaster Responders, who likely already work in 
government, perceive that elected officials either cannot contribute to the hazard 
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mitigation element, or are biased toward development in ways that would hinder their 
ability to contribute to a quality hazard mitigation element. 
Comprehensive planning involving topics such as land use, economic 
development, infrastructure, hazard mitigation, and beyond, is typically seen as an 
iterative method of making public policy. It is one in which public input is typically 
required at some base level (through public hearings at least); however, this input must be 
blended with the technical knowledge of planners, as well as policy mandates and 
incentives from higher governments. Sometimes these three inputs (public desires, 
technical knowledge, and government mandates) are contradictory and must be balanced. 
The survey asked Planners about the value of community participation in the planning 
process; there responses are reported in Table 23, below. 
 Percent of Respondents Selecting Each Option 
1 
Less 
Important 2 
3 
Somewhat 
Important 4 
5 
Essential 
Community participation 
throughout the planning process 0.00% 1.79% 6.25% 40.18% 51.79% 
*Significant difference (p<.10) between top four professional groups represented in the survey 
Table 23: Importance of community participation in hazard mitigation planning 
Respondents strongly supported the importance of community involvement in the 
process of creating hazard mitigation elements of land use plans – this is the expected 
response from planners, given the level of public involvement typically incorporated into 
comprehensive planning. Of all responses in the entire survey, it is notable that this is the 
only time not one person chose the bottom level of importance. Over 90% of respondents 
ranked community involvement at a 4 or 5, with over half reporting it as “essential.” 
There was no statistically significant difference in the response among the top four 
professional groups. However, the lack of difference in responses by professional group 
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does not corroborate well with other findings in my research. Note that interviewees, 
even from counties with highly rated hazard mitigation elements, reported that public 
participation is a struggle, and review of planning documents revealed no special efforts 
to encourage public participation. In the examination of plans, there was little reference 
to formally working to solicit community participation; in fact, only about one-third of 
hazard mitigation elements reviewed explicitly mentioned community participation. 
The concept of “moral hazard” reflects that governments often subsidize people’s 
choices to do business in or live in hazard-prone areas by providing insurance and aid 
that essentially offsets the true cost of living in these areas. For example, in Florida, the 
state subsidizes a windstorm insurance corporation to provide rates lower than the private 
insurance market will bear in areas heavily prone to windstorm risk. In theory, people 
might find it more palatable to take stronger mitigatory action, potentially through 
stronger hazard mitigation elements, if the personal risk of non-mitigation was higher 
than it presently is. Table 24, below, presents responses to a question about how changes 
in windstorm insurance pricing would affect hazard mitigation element quality. 
 Percent of Respondents Selecting Each Option 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree 2 
3 
Neutral 4 
5 
Strongly 
Agree 
If the state windstorm insurer, 
Citizens, charged market rates for 
its product, hazard mitigation 
elements in comprehensive plans 
would be improved 10.26% 11.11% 34.19% 31.62% 12.82% 
*Significant difference (p<.10) between top four professional groups represented in the survey 
Table 24: Perceived effect of state windstorm rates on quality of hazard mitigation elements 
 While many respondents expressed agreement that allowing market rates to filter 
through to consumers would improve quality of hazard mitigation elements, about 10% 
of respondents expressed strong disagreement with this idea. Certainly, the question 
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about market rates alone could bear more research to explore a) why people who felt 
strongly either way did so, and b) what happens to hazard mitigation quality as state 
insurance subsidies change. The top four professional groups differed on this response, 
and their average agreement with this statement, is shown in Table 25, below. Note that 
while the differences between groups are statistically significant, in practice these 
differences are small. 
 ANOVA Average Importance by Profession 
 
P F Planning 
Research/ 
Academic 
Hazard 
Mitigation 
Disaster 
Response 
Communities with a 
wealthier population base 
are more likely to have 
higher quality hazard 
mitigation elements in 
comprehensive plans 0.029 2.723 2.810 3.541 3.300 3.143 
Table 25: Average importance of socio-economic factors by profession 
Finally, to capture elements the survey questions may have missed, the survey 
asked, “As a practitioner or academic with experience in planning, please tell us what you 
believe contributes to quality of hazard mitigation elements in Comprehensive Plans?” 
Responses are summarized in Table 26, below. 
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Characteristics 
Count of 
Respondents 
Suggesting 
Planners have knowledge of the communities they plan for an appropriate mitigation 
options for those communities 4 
Community buy-in for plans and/or projects 5 
Community participation in planning 13 
Informing people of risk in real terms (e.g., Dollars) 1 
Coordination beyond the political subdivision 4 
Holistic planning involving broad stakeholders 7 
Multi-disciplinary input into the plan 4 
Planners must know how to identify hazards and vulnerabilities 4 
Setting deadlines and providing evaluation criteria for mitigation strategies 4 
Funding mitigation strategies 6 
Make elected officials accountable for mitigation/Elected official support 7 
Coordination among key parties 3 
Coordination with technical people to set goals 1 
Planning with implementation in mind 1 
Experts need practical experience 1 
Use of nature as a hazard buffer/barrier 2 
Community has experienced a disaster 4 
Use of science-based maps of vulnerable areas 2 
Input from higher-order governments 2 
Cost/benefit analysis of mitigation plans 3 
Learning from and/or benchmarking against similar communities 2 
Planners attend related conferences 1 
Planners attend relevant FEMA courses 1 
State requirements 1 
Community Support 2 
Incorporate resilience 1 
Clear identification of goals 1 
Including a hazard history 1 
Collaboration with property owners 2 
Preparing for diverse populations 1 
Keeping mitigation measures cost reasonable 1 
Table 26: Additional characteristics respondents report contribute to quality of hazard mitigation 
elements in comprehensive plans. 
Benchmarking 
Benchmarking provides distinct advantages in that it makes those involved in an 
activity compare their work with that of others. While the end product is a comparison, 
the act of benchmarking can help planners see where individual areas of their plans could 
be improved as compared to other plans. Table 27, below, shows respondent opinions on 
benchmarking. 
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 Percent of Respondents Selecting Each Option 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree 2 
3  
Neutral 4 
5 
Strongly 
Agree 
Communities should benchmark 
their hazard mitigation elements 
in comprehensive plans against 
communities of similar size and/or 
hazard exposure. 1.65% 9.09% 27.27% 47.11% 14.88% 
Communities should benchmark 
their hazard mitigation elements 
in comprehensive plans against a 
model hazard mitigation element. 0.83% 4.13% 28.93% 47.93% 18.18% 
County Planning Departments 
have the time and resources to 
benchmark their plans. 20.66% 35.54% 25.62% 10.74% 7.44% 
*Significant difference (p<.10) between top four professional groups represented in the survey 
Table 27: Perceived effect of benchmarking hazard mitigation elements 
Benchmarking the hazard mitigation element, both against others and a model, 
received a good measure of support across all four professional fields. However, 
respondents clearly said that the resources to perform such benchmarking are not readily 
available. The divergence in what respondents believe should be done (benchmark) and 
what they believe can be done is important. Benchmarking is an important way to add an 
objective measure of quality to planning, yet respondents are saying that they do not have 
the resources to do so. Benchmarking may be one of many good practices falling to the 
wayside in a time of fiscal austerity, but, possibly creative solutions could be employed to 
benchmark inexpensively at least at some level. 
 
Miscellaneous Observations from Respondents 
Speaking to the regional nature of hazards and disasters (vs. following political 
boundaries), one respondent pointed out that there is no system in place to incentivize 
jurisdictions to engage in mitigation if a hazard or disaster occurs in a neighboring 
jurisdiction. 
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In the entire Disaster Management Cycle (Mitigation  Preparedness  
Response  Recovery) the federal system is very prevalent in the fact that responsibility 
starts locally, then is assumed by the states, and then the federal government. The 
“tripwire system” can sometimes be inefficient, as each jurisdiction needs to seek out its 
own capabilities to address the parts of the cycle. One respondent noted, in this vein, that 
the risk assessments used by communities for planning are of varying quality and may 
overlap. 
 
Summary 
Overall, large groups of respondents favored most survey answers, reflecting 
consensus on most answers. From the 581 surveys sent out, 97 people responded; 
additionally, 31 responses were gleaned from snowball sampling and a mailing to the 
American Society for Public Administration’s Section on Emergency and Crisis 
Management (SECM), resulting in 128 usable responses. Planning professionals and 
researchers and academicians made up 64% of respondents. 
Respondents strongly favored methods of getting more information for the hazard 
mitigation element. The survey recorded strong, favorable responses for conducting 
interviews of stakeholders, public involvement through the planning process, and 
consultation with the public, other agencies, and governments. Additionally, in free-form 
text responses to a question asking what contributes to quality hazard mitigation 
elements, respondents reported frequently that community participation in planning is 
important. This support for community involvement and intergovernmental coordination 
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is not consistent with planning department actions recorded in the interviews of planning 
leaders and is discussed further below.  
Measures to either slow or mitigate development in hazard zones also found high 
support, as did using nature as a hazard barrier; this indicates potential for future planning 
efforts that aim for a balance between reasonable development in hazard zones while 
preserving the natural features of areas that may absorb hazard impacts. The support for 
slowing development and using nature as a hazard barrier also was not consistent with the 
action of planning departments, and is inconsistent with Florida government choices to 
dismantle the state land use regulation body. 
Respondents also supported using the concept of social vulnerability in 
comprehensive planning related to natural hazards. Given the overall support of 
development controls, communication with the public, and employing nature as a means 
of hazard mitigation, this indicates a strong potential for support from planners for a 
planning process that takes a holistic view that includes other measures in addition to 
technocratic and structural measures. In fact, in their free form text responses, 
respondents often cited increased public outreach and communication as ways to help 
mitigate hazards for socially vulnerable populations. However, these findings must be 
tempered by the fact that respondents may not fully support (while they appear to 
understand) the concept of social vulnerability. There was weak support for the notion 
that wealthier communities were likely to have better hazard mitigation elements, and 
minority communities to have lower quality ones. 
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VI. FINDINGS, LIMITATIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
My research set out to answer the following two questions in the context of a U.S. 
state with stringent (compared to most states) rules for hazard mitigation planning in 
comprehensive plans:  
1. Is there variation in the quality of hazard mitigation elements of local land 
use plans? 
2. If so, what are the factors that explain this variation? 
The objectives of these questions are: to examine the effect of state mandates for 
including hazard mitigation elements in local land use plans, and to consider how the 
mandates could be improved. Consideration of improving the use of hazard-mitigation 
mandates is important to consider because land use planning for natural hazards is just 
one way that states may engage in mitigation to prevent natural hazards from becoming 
disasters that harm their populations. Further, every $1 of mitigation spending is expected 
to save $7 on post-disaster spending – a significant number that provides a powerful 
argument for increased investments in effective mitigation measures. 
Florida, a state with stringent, prescribed requirements for coastal jurisdictions to 
include in their CPs a Coastal Management Element that addresses natural hazards, was 
selected as the study area for this research. The state provides, in its administrative codes, 
specific guidelines as to what the Coastal Management Element must address. The state 
enforces these rules, through its review process for local plans. 
Florida was selected because of the fact that it is considered to be a state with 
stronger requirements for hazard mitigation elements in CPs; it is one of only 10 states 
requiring hazard mitigation elements in comprehensive or land use plans. Florida also 
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was an attractive choice because a) it faces hazards routinely, and b) it only faces two 
significant hazards (hurricanes and floods). Having only two disaster types reduces 
“noise” in the data that could come from having more disaster types, and might have 
clouded the results (e.g., the effects of mitigating against multiple disaster types could be 
difficult to separate from other issues covered in my research). Finally, Florida uses 
comprehensive planning instead of simple land use planning. This provides more 
mitigation opportunities as comprehensive planning requires holistic plans that 
incorporate land use, economic development, growth management, environmental 
concerns, and other features. It is an iterative policymaking method that involves the 
public in policymaking and provides excellent mitigation opportunities. 
 
Major Findings 
A central question of my research is whether or not hazard mitigation elements 
vary in quality in a state which has a strong mandate for hazard mitigation to be 
addressed in CPs. The answer, derived from a review of 35 Florida coastal county plans, 
is that yes, there is a clear variation in quality. I reviewed plans using 24 separate 
elements related to quality of hazard mitigation elements, and based scoring on the 
presence or absence of each element, with additional weight given if the element included 
a description with greater detail (vs. a simple mention of the element). The 35 plans 
scored from 5 to 25 with an average rating of 14.06 and a median of 14. 
To further explore potential drivers of variation in hazard mitigation element 
quality, I conducted analyses considering geography, hazard experience, and various 
demographic factors with the hazard mitigation element quality scores as the dependent 
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variable. Neither geography nor experience with prior hazards was correlated with quality 
of hazard mitigation elements. Median Household Income, Population Density Change, 
Percent of Population Over Age 62, and Percent of Population Non-White, were not 
correlated with hazard mitigation element quality. Population, Education, Population 
Density, Percent of Population Hispanic, and Percent of Population Renting, all directly 
correlated with hazard mitigation element quality. Typically, an indirect correlation 
would have been expected given that Vulnerability Theory postulates that poorer people 
and minorities are more at risk from natural hazards. That said, many of the variables that 
correlate with higher quality of hazard mitigation elements also typically correlate with 
higher urbanity – and urban areas tend to be less vulnerable to disasters. Thus, the results 
based on demographic analysis are mixed. 
To get a broad perspective on issues related to the hazard mitigation element, I 
conducted a survey of land use planners, professionals, and academics. I sent the survey 
to all land use planners in Florida county governments, to a list of practitioners and 
academics involved with hazards and disasters work, and to the members of the 
American Society for Public Administration Section on Emergency and Crisis 
Management.  
While the explanation of survey results appears in more detail above, certain 
aspects stood out. Respondents heavily favored conducting interviews with key 
stakeholders, with just over 85% seeing this as important in hazard mitigation elements. 
In fact, more thought this was important than using models, such as SLOSH, in planning, 
which only garnered about 69% of respondents’ support. 
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While 85% of respondents support limiting development in hazard zones, 57% 
support an outright prohibition. The latter number seems small in comparison, but it 
shows a remarkable level of support given that prohibition of development could have 
economic consequences by reducing taxable development on valuable coastal land. The 
57% of respondents willing to prohibit development in hazard zones also may recognize 
that there is a limit to how much mitigation can do to make a population safer. 
Eighty-four percent of respondents supported using nature as a hazard barrier. 
Approximately 90% of respondents supported coordination with Water Management 
Districts and local emergency management departments. 
About 83% of respondents indicated support for incorporating the concept of 
vulnerability in hazard mitigation elements, and, when asked if communities with prior 
hazard experience would have higher quality hazard mitigation elements, 85% of 
respondents thought these would be correlated. However, less than 50% of respondents 
support the notion that communities with lower wealth or higher minority populations 
would have lower quality hazard mitigation elements. 
 
Comparisons of Interest 
The analyses and surveys revealed several key contrasts of interest. Some of these 
may challenge the beliefs of planners and academics in the field, and may warrant a 
subsequent change in approaches to planning for hazard mitigation in CPs, or additional 
research to explore these issues. 
Traditional theories of Vulnerability hold that when people experience hazards or 
disasters, they learn from them and can better mitigate for the future. Survey respondents 
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also generally expressed a belief that prior hazard or disaster experience would result in 
improved hazard mitigation elements. This did not prove true in the analysis of plans, 
which showed that hazard mitigation element quality was not correlated with prior hazard 
and disaster experience and historical analysis of hazards and disasters was not required 
by planning documents. This finding is symptomatic of organizations that do not learn. 
Certainly planners said they value learning from the past, but no evidence of such 
learning was found in the organizations’ behaviors as exemplified in the product they 
produce (comprehensive plans). This may indicate a need to do a better job of 
incorporating knowledge gained from prior hazard strikes into the comprehensive 
planning process. 
Neither wealth, nor race/ethnicity was inversely correlated with hazard mitigation 
element quality. In fact, the percent of Hispanic population was directly correlated with 
hazard mitigation element quality. This, by itself, is incongruent with traditional ideas of 
vulnerability, which would predict that higher poverty, and higher minority presence, 
would be correlated with lower quality of hazard mitigation. Notably, however, the 
individual elements that did correlate with vulnerability (education, density, population, 
and population in rental housing) also correlate with urbanity. It is possible that these 
more urban areas, by their nature of being urban, have better opportunities for strong 
planning mechanisms.  
Survey respondents strongly favored efforts to include the public in planning for 
hazard mitigation. However, neither planning documents nor survey responses reflected 
special efforts to educate the public on hazard mitigation elements or draw the public into 
this part of the planning process. This presents a distinct dichotomy. While planning 
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practitioners and researchers say that inclusion of the public is important in designing 
hazard mitigation elements, in practice, it appears that efforts are not made to a great 
degree to do this, and that the public is not especially interested in the matter. One 
possible reason, raised by one interviewee, is that hazard mitigation issues are not nearly 
as important to most members of the public as are traditional land use issues. 
Finally, comparing what people say should happen (normative statements) to 
what happens in practice, it is notable that while survey respondents strongly favored 
development controls, over the last two years, Florida has nearly dismantled the agency 
charged with growth management. This reflects a clear disconnect between what 
professionals believe is the best practice, and what is implemented by elected government 
(at least, in Florida). 
 
Research Questions and Answers 
 
Question 1: Is there variation in the quality of hazard mitigation elements of local land 
use plans? 
Prior research has shown that, even with Florida’s prescriptive planning 
mandates, there is broad variation in plan quality. For example, in the late 1990s, Deyle 
and Smith (1998) examined the CPs of 18 Florida counties for compliance with state 
planning regulations across 60 categories. At very best, average compliance with any 
category was 76.92%, with a standard deviation of 22.65% - this indicates a high level of 
variation in compliance with state planning regulations. No research prior to this 
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dissertation, however, has examined if hazard mitigation elements specifically vary in 
quality. 
In order to study the question of whether or not there is variation in quality under 
a regime of specific laws and rules dictating hazard mitigation requirements, I reviewed 
all 35 Florida coastal county CPs and graded them on an index of 24 items. Ratings for 
each item were on a scale of 0 (item not mentioned), 1 (item mentioned), or 2 (item 
mentioned and discussed in detail). Therefore, a plan could score from 0 (which 
technically is not even in compliance with state law) through 48 (which would rate as 
perfect in terms of the index). This rating methodology has been used by several prior 
researchers and is well regarded. However, it does not examine outcomes of the plans. 
Rather, it investigates how thoroughly plans address individual topics of concern. 
To get outside opinions on the rating tool, I asked the four planners interviewed to 
review the tool and rank the top three and bottom three items in terms of importance. All 
four interviewees stated that the index appeared valid as presented. They also rated their 
top and bottom three items. The only item that more than one rater ranked as a “Bottom 
Three” item, indicating possibly that practitioners might not find this item important, was 
if plans require tax abatements for construction that employs mitigation measures – two 
raters saw this as one of their “Bottom Three” items. Still, because this was not 
universally agreed on, it was left in the index. 
The distribution of plan scores across the 35 plans was normal, and, overall, there 
was a high degree of variation in the quality of plan elements, as evidenced by the spread 
in scores. Scores ranged from a low of 5 to a high of 25, with a standard deviation of 
4.759. The variation was correlated neither with geography nor history of hazard strikes. 
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Notably, while the index had a maximum score of 48, no plan achieved a rating over 25; 
thus, while some plans were better than others, none were of exceptionally high quality 
based on this scale. 
In the context of a state with strict planning mandates, where there is a reasonable 
expectation that local governments would create relatively uniform hazard mitigation 
elements, this degree of variation shows a “double-edged sword.” On one hand, it is clear 
that local governments were able to exercise local control in the planning process – 
including what they saw as important and leaving out what they did not. On the other 
hand, this approach appears to have resulted in very differential quality of hazard 
mitigation elements among counties. This finding is significant because it shows that 
while state policymakers are trying to make Florida a “resilient” place in terms of 
hazards, this is not happening statewide. The policies for resiliency are there, but they are 
neither routinely followed nor enforced. This begs the question “What’s stopping 
enforcement?” Potential explanations include a lack of political will, lack of resources 
(perhaps the state development agency was busier with seemingly more pressing tasks), 
lack of enforceability (no real “teeth” in the law), or simply that it was not financially 
feasible to slow development that brings in taxes (and proportionally more taxes when 
considering coastal development), 
 
Question 2: What are the factors that explain this variation? 
I used a multipronged approach to ascertain what drives variation in hazard 
mitigation element quality. My research examines correlations between demographic 
factors related to social vulnerability to natural hazards and plan quality. Because there is 
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little existing research in this arena, I conducted formative interviews with planners in 
four Florida counties, both to capture their ideas and to elicit information that would help 
in designing questions for a broader survey. Following this, I surveyed planners and other 
people involved with hazard mitigation and disaster related topics, nationwide, to find out 
what they think drives hazard mitigation element quality.  
My research examined what drives variation in plan quality by looking for 
correlations between hazard mitigation element quality and factors typically related to 
social vulnerability (race, ethnicity, age, income, education, size of community, 
population density, population density change, and population in renter occupied 
housing). Typically, Vulnerability Theory holds that minority groups, those with less 
education, the elderly, and dense populations, are more vulnerable to natural hazards than 
more “advantaged” groups. The correlations between demographic factors and plan 
quality were mixed, and individually were not aligned with expectations typically 
associated with Vulnerability Theory.  
Several demographic variables were correlated with hazard mitigation element 
quality. Population was positively correlated with hazard mitigation element quality (Ρ = 
0.597, p = 0.000). This is not surprising, as larger counties likely are able to increase the 
size of their planning staff and gain broader expertise and more resources. Supporting this 
notion, population was positively intercorrelated with all other variables that positively 
correlated with hazard mitigation element quality. Both the percent of population with a 
high school diploma or higher (Ρ = 0.341, p = 0.045) and the percent with a bachelor’s 
degree or higher (Ρ = 0.477, p = 0.004) were positively correlated with plan quality, and 
as the education level increased, so did the degree of correlation. It may be tempting to 
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say that this could be the result of these populations having more wealth and thus 
resources to plan, as both measures had a moderate to strong, positive intercorrelations 
with median household income. However, median household income was not correlated 
with hazard mitigation element quality. Possibly more educated persons give more input 
into public policymaking processes, including planning, regardless of income. 
Population density was both positively and strongly correlated with hazard 
mitigation element quality (Ρ = 0.667, p = 0.000). This flows against typical concepts of 
Vulnerability Theory, which normally holds that as population density increases, the built 
environment overwhelms natural abilities to cope with hazards and increases disaster 
severity. However, in the context of Florida, it is possible that a) increased population  
and population density result in more attention from the state level to enforce planning 
rules on counties; b) increased population density brings more wealth to the community 
thus improving planning resources; and c) as population density increases more care 
simply has to be put into the planning process, especially planning to mitigate against 
hazards. 
While race was not correlated with hazard mitigation element quality, the percent 
of population that is Latino or Hispanic, was directly correlated with hazard mitigation 
element quality (Ρ = 0.497, p = 0.002). This does not comport with traditional theories of 
vulnerability, which hold that minority race and ethnicity are correlated with higher 
vulnerability. 
Percent of population in renter occupied housing was positively correlated with 
hazard mitigation element quality (Ρ = 0.439, p = 0.008). Typically, this is not an 
expectation that is consistent with Vulnerability Theory, which considers renters to be 
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less economically advantaged compared to homeowners and less represented in the 
political and policymaking process regarding land use. 
Several other demographic variables tested were not correlated with Hazard 
Mitigation Element quality. Median household income was not correlated in either 
direction with hazard mitigation element quality (Ρ = 0.96, p = 0.582). This is not 
consistent with traditional theories of Vulnerability, which hold that a higher degree of 
wealth facilitates better preparation for natural hazards. Population density increase was 
not correlated with Hazard Mitigation Element Quality (Ρ = -0.176, p = 0.313). 
Normally, an increasing population density would be expected to be correlated with 
increased vulnerability to natural hazards, so this may be an indicator that Florida’s 
planning system is effectively mitigating increasing population by balancing it with 
stronger planning. 
The percent of population aged 62 and over was not correlated with quality of 
hazard mitigation elements (Ρ = 0.256, p = 0.138). While typically higher age is 
associated with increased vulnerability, this was not the case, which may indicate that the 
state planning mandates are working to effectively reduce vulnerability regardless of 
demographics. The percent of population Non-White was not correlated with quality of 
hazard mitigation elements (Ρ = -0.42, p = 0.810). Similar to age above, this is evidence 
that planning for natural hazard mitigation in Florida is at least on a somewhat “even 
playing field” regardless of the social demographics that typically affect vulnerability. 
Overall, these results present a mixed outlook on Vulnerability theories. Aside 
from education, none of the variables indicating social vulnerability were individually 
correlated with quality of hazard mitigation elements in the direction and strength 
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expected (some variables correlated, and some did not, but of those that did, the 
relationship was in opposition to the expectations associated with theories of 
vulnerability). However, given the intercorrelations of the demographic variables with 
population size and density, the two correlations with the greatest correlation with hazard 
mitigation element quality, it seems likely that these two (population size and density) are 
the likely contributors to increased hazard mitigation element quality. This fact, and that 
that many of the variables that correlated with hazard mitigation element quality also 
correlate with urbanity, may indicate that more urban areas have higher quality hazard 
mitigation elements, are less vulnerable in this aspect. The association of higher urbanity 
with lower vulnerability would be expected under Vulnerability Theory. These mixed 
results warrant further investigation in future research. 
My research used surveys to explore plan quality issues with a larger audience. I 
conducted the survey electronically in 2011. The respondent set was seeded by inviting 
land use planners from all 67 Florida counties, as well as participants from a major 
conference focused on natural hazards. I asked these people to forward website-links to 
the survey to others who might be interested in participating.  
Overall, respondents favored increased information in the hazard mitigation 
element planning process (interviews of stakeholder, public meetings, and using formal 
modeling of hazards); limiting development in hazard zones; and using nature as a barrier 
to hazards. There was less support for options that might place a burden on the public, 
such as limiting infrastructure in hazard zones and requiring mitigation from new 
developments that would result in increased evacuation times. 
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Coordination with entities outside of the Planning Department also proved to be 
an important element to survey respondents. A strong 90% said that planning 
departments should coordinate hazard mitigation elements with local water management 
districts, and 96% said planning departments should coordinate with local emergency 
management departments. 
 
Lost Opportunities: Two Disconnects in the Process of Planning for Hazard Mitigation 
Combining the observations from the plan reviews, analysis of hazard history, 
interviews, and surveys, it is clear that there are two significant disconnects between 
normative ideals for how planning organizations should prepare hazard mitigation 
elements, and how this is actually done. On the basis of Vulnerability Theory, and 
normative ideas about how organizations “should” learn, there is an expectation that 
historical hazard strikes would inform the process of hazard mitigation planning. 
However, the analysis revealed no correlation and there was no mechanism established 
for such learning in planning documents. This has heavy implications for planning 
organizations because it is one of several “lost opportunities” to improve Hazard 
Mitigation Elements identified in my research. As noted above, hazard strikes are an 
excellent opportunity to learn – they show a reality that scientific models may not. The 
fact that planning organizations are not fully employing the information gained in hazard 
strikes indicates that these organizations may be missing important opportunities, despite 
planners in surveys often favoring methods to bring more information into the planning 
process. However, given common organizational behavior to operate in silos, this is not 
surprising. 
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Another important disconnect to note is that, while planners said in interviews and 
surveys that planning departments should coordinate with other governments and 
agencies, and seek public input, evidence of special efforts to do this was lacking based 
on the evidence from plan reviews. The lack of coordination also represents a significant 
“lost opportunity” because the people who have experienced a hazard, on the ground, 
first hand, often have information and knowledge individually and collectively, that could 
improve the hazard mitigation element of the CP. As mentioned above, the disconnect 
between planners and the public may be because, both for the public and planners, hazard 
mitigation is just one small part of the process of comprehensive planning, and it appears 
to become lost in the fray of larger issues. 
One potential hypothesis explaining both of these disconnects is simply that, in 
the context of a state requiring a hazard mitigation element, local governments are often 
just “checking the box” and meeting minimum state requirements. When governments 
consider the cost of “risk” in terms of how much a disaster might cost versus how much 
cost could be averted through stronger comprehensive planning for hazard mitigation, 
going above and beyond the level of a basic plan is simply not worth it to them. This 
would be consistent with the results of plan reviews conducted for my research, which 
showed a variety of scores, but still did not find any plans scoring exceptionally high (the 
highest score was 25 out of a possible 48). Possibly, the cost of implementing stronger 
hazard mitigation elements (more planner time focused on hazard mitigation instead of 
other concerns, and possibly, more development restrictions) is too high for 
administrators and politicians to consider worthwhile. 
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If governments want to increase the focus on hazard mitigation in the 
comprehensive planning process, they might consider dedicating more resources 
exclusively to comprehensive planning for hazard mitigation, empowering planners 
charged with hazard mitigation to work directly with the public and other agencies and 
departments (and requiring them to use that empowerment to better the process), and 
working with political leaders to help raise this issue on the agenda of the public in their 
constituencies. 
 
Moral Hazard 
Earlier, I introduced the issue of moral hazard. Particularly in the case of hazards 
and disasters, moral hazard occurs when government, at any level, pays to repair 
properties damaged in the same manner (known as “repeated losses”) over and over 
again. For example, if a particular home floods on a regular basis, and a unit of 
government either subsidizes repairs or subsidizes the insurance used to make those 
repairs, moral hazard exists. 
In Florida, there is clear evidence that moral hazard exists, given the unsound 
rates charged by the state windstorm insurer (which survives because it is backed by bond 
sales and has authority to levy special assessments on policy holders), combined with the 
lack of learning from historical hazards and compounded by poor state-level willingness 
to enforce mitigation measures in county CPs. Exacerbating the issue, if the federal 
government is going to make a policy of assisting homeowners in repetitive loss areas 
following disasters, moral hazard is worsened if there is not sufficient action to prevent 
reoccurrence of disasters. 
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In the case of Florida, I found no correlation between hazard mitigation element 
quality in CPs and hazard history at the county level. Such a correlation (or an overall 
high quality of hazard mitigation elements in every county) was expected in order to 
compensate for repetitive losses. Areas with a higher incidence of hazards should show 
more attention to preventing future losses. This was not the case. Further, planning 
documents almost never required any form of historical hazard analysis. Meanwhile, the 
state windstorm insurer, originally conceived to be an insurer of last resort, is not 
charging actuarially sound rates to cover potential losses. Florida is essentially putting 
taxpayers at risk for a large insurance payout in the event of an expensive disaster, but 
not doing all it can to reduce risk to the hazards that may cause such a disaster. 
Going beyond the state level, when the federal government steps in to “bail out” 
repetitive loss properties, moral hazard is compounded. If the state government is not 
taking sufficient hazard mitigation efforts, and then the federal government steps in after 
a disaster, as was the case following Hurricane Sandy, moral hazard is compounded. For 
the traditional system of handling hazards and disasters to work, under which hazards and 
disasters are first a local, then state, then federal responsibility, reconsideration of 
mitigation at the local and state level needs to be considered.  
 
Implications for the Theories of Vulnerability and Neo-Institutionalism 
Theory is important in research because it gives researchers a lens through which 
to conceptualize information. The theories of Vulnerability and Neo-Institutionalism 
ground my research. Research findings provide important implications for both. 
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Vulnerability 
Vulnerability Theory essentially contends that certain factors make some people 
and communities more prone to the effects of natural hazards than others. Typically, 
Vulnerability Theory views people with minority traits (e.g., lower socioeconomic status, 
minority race, extreme age, etc.) as more vulnerable to the effects of hazards than the 
majority. This is because a) some minority traits (such as low income) lessen abilities to 
cope with hazards, even on an individual basis; b) some minority traits (such as race) 
often correlate directly with others mentioned in (a) (e.g., minority race is often 
associated with lower income, and in less developed countries, housing discrimination); 
and c) minority groups may be less well served in mitigation, response, recovery, and 
preparedness due to prejudices, low economic power, and low social and political power. 
The fact that plan quality was not correlated with hazard history is inconsistent 
with some aspects of the theory of vulnerability. In this review of plan quality, I found no 
evidence that counties with more hazard experience (including factoring in strength of 
hazards) had better hazard mitigation elements, or vice versa. Certainly, this is not a 
refutation of the concept of vulnerability, but it does reflect that in the Florida context, 
the notion that prior hazards teach those who experience them is not necessarily 
applicable. It also should be considered that planning organizations may not be motivated 
to learn from hazards because the state and federal government essentially subsidizes risk 
taking. While the state subsidizes insurance in hurricane prone areas, the federal 
government often steps in with aid after disasters. This may reduce planning 
organizations’ incentive to “deal with” hazards, because of the low consequence to the 
citizenry in the event of a disaster. Essentially, hazards may not bear a high enough cost 
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to gain the attention of local governments, especially when compared to many other land 
use issues that have more salient and routine economic effects. This warrants further 
exploration. 
Most of the significant correlations between demographic factors and hazard 
mitigation element quality do not comport with Vulnerability Theory, when taken 
individually. Three explanations may explain this apparent disconnect. First, much of the 
research on vulnerability has been conducted on either individuals, families, or 
communities in comparison to larger groups (e.g., indigenous persons living in non-
indigenous communities, minority populations compared to majority groups, etc.). In this 
dissertation, I studied entire counties, each of which, when compared to each other, has a 
broad population spectrum – this may “wash out” the effects of minority groups in each 
county. Second, much of the existing vulnerability research is conducted in situations in 
which the differences between socioeconomic classes is more profound than these 
differences are in coastal Florida. As a caution, it must be noted that this is a very small 
sample (35 counties) and that my research examines the county level, which in and of 
itself is too large of a level for detailed hazard analysis. Third, many of the variables that 
correlated moderately with hazard mitigation element quality also correlate with urbanity. 
Often, urban areas have access to programs to plan and prepare for natural hazards, and 
they may get more attention in hazard mitigation activities due to large population 
concentrations. It is possible that these variables, when taken together, represent urbanity, 
and reflect that more urban areas actually do have stronger hazard mitigation elements. 
This should be further investigate in future research. 
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Survey results reflected broad support for employing the concept of vulnerability 
in land use planning for hazard mitigation, with 82% of respondents supporting the use of 
vulnerability. Further, when asked an open-ended question about improving hazard 
mitigation elements in low-income and minority areas, respondents showed a consistent 
understanding of addressing the needs of vulnerable populations. For example, in free-
text responses, 20 respondents cited a need for increased public education and outreach; 
16 stated there should be an increased focus on including these populations [minority and 
low income] in the hazard mitigation process; and 12 stated that offering financial 
incentives to improve structures was important.  
While respondents expressed support for incorporating the concept of 
vulnerability, they presented mixed thoughts on the actual principles of Vulnerability 
Theory when asked less directly. For example, only 49% agreed with the notion that 
wealthier communities are more likely to have better hazard mitigation elements. 
Similarly, only 40% said that communities with higher minority populations would be 
more likely to have lower quality hazard mitigation plans. However, they did agree with 
one aspect of Vulnerability Theory – that prior hazard experience is correlated with 
increased resilience. The majority (86%) said that communities that had experienced a 
disaster were more likely to have stronger hazard mitigation elements.  
Finally, this raises important questions of just how far government should go to 
protect people when they increase their vulnerability by choice (and at a deeper level, 
when vulnerability is the result of a “choice” versus factors that unwittingly push people 
into vulnerable situations). If people choose to increase their vulnerability, should 
government try to adjust for it? Or should government let the private market sort this out 
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through higher insurance rates and costs to build homes to standards that can withstand 
hazards in dangerous areas? Possibly by requiring safe land use and buildings, which may 
make living in vulnerable geographies more expensive, government may be helping the 
“invisible hand” along to compensate for that increased vulnerability by essentially 
pricing out those who cannot afford the cost of safely living in these areas, or do not 
place enough priority on living in these areas to expend the resources required. 
Ultimately, a line must be drawn at which governments stop trying to compensate for 
vulnerability and allow people to take on the cost of their decision-making – however, 
where to draw that line has not yet been determined. 
 
Neo-Institutionalism 
Neo-Institutionalism is the theory used to conceptualize planning organizations 
and the environments in which they operate. It holds that institutions are built from the 
rules and human-created constraints that affect the behavior of the actors in the 
institutions. Neo-Institutionalism posits that institutions are, at their core, routines that are 
born from a need to cope with uncertainty. This is an ideal explanation for how the 
planning institution operates – a great deal of technical and social information goes into 
the creation of a comprehensive plan, and planning organizations establish methods to 
collect, sort, analyze, and assimilate that information. These methods may or may not 
encourage open information gathering from and collaboration with the public, other 
departments, and other governments. 
Institutions affect action and interaction by controlling information and how 
people can use it. This is very important in the context of comprehensive planning, 
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because it is a public policymaking process that is managed by technical experts – 
planners are responsible for incorporating public input with their technical knowledge, 
but both as the owners of the process and “experts” have a controlling stake in the 
process. Both the institutions planners are a part of, and those they create, can have an 
implication for the quality of hazard mitigation elements. If planners create highly 
bounded institutions stymieing creativity and public input, plans may be of less quality 
than if intuitions are open to new ideas and to learning about public knowledge of 
hazards and public needs. 
Results of this study support the notion that each planning department operates as 
its own institution with its own norms and practices, despite prescriptive mandates in 
state law and administrative code, and state-level enforcement mechanisms. Many of the 
state mandates for hazard mitigation elements did not show up universally in hazard 
mitigation elements, and many elements were of poor quality (which would not be the 
case if state laws were followed). This reflects that while the state takes a top-down 
approach to instituting quality, this does not necessarily carry down to the ground level 
where policies are implemented.  
Results shed some interesting light on planning organizations as institutions. 
While one might expect planning institutions to lean toward technocratic solutions to 
routinize the science of planning, this was not borne out by the results of my survey. For 
example, while 82% of respondents said that planners should interview key hazard 
mitigation stakeholders, 85% said the planning process should mandate public meetings, 
and 85% said there should be required consultation with special districts and local 
governments in the county, only 69% said that the SLOSH or another model should be 
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used. The first three items (interviews of stakeholders, public meetings, and consultation 
with special districts) are rather traditional planning elements that are staples of the 
profession. Using hazard modeling, however, is a newer, and still developing concept. 
While this certainly warrants more investigation, this favoritism toward “traditional” 
methods and lower regard for more cutting edge methods, provides some evidence that 
institutional boundaries based in tradition are boxing in planners, at least somewhat. 
Other factors could be at play here, and future research should investigate this further, 
along with the interplay between the normative value planners express of gathering 
public input, but the reality that they do little in this area for the hazard mitigation 
element. 
There, also were differences in how much planners favored limiting versus 
prohibiting development in hazard zones. While 86% of respondents favor limiting 
development in hazard zones, only 58% favored completely prohibiting development in 
hazard zones. Similarly, only 48% favored not building additional infrastructure in 
hazard zones. Again, these drastic differences may be indicators that institutions do 
operate within learned boundaries. While the options of prohibiting development in 
hazard zones and forbidding new infrastructure in these zones are some of the strongest 
ways to prevent disasters and increase overall resilience, they clearly are unpopular, as 
hazard zones are often attractive places to live and tremendous tax generators (especially 
in the case of multi-story buildings). This may provide evidence that political concerns, 
learned through years of agencies working under leadership of elected bodies, have put 
boundaries on making the most correct technical decisions. That said, other explanations 
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are possible (e.g., planners may believe that structural mitigation can compensate for the 
dangers of building in these areas). 
Finally, the finding that prior hazard experience does not improve plan quality has 
implications for theories of institutions, and particularly institutional learning. Florida is 
routinely struck by significant hazards, and even minor ones, that cause damage. This 
lack of correlation between hazard history and hazard mitigation element quality suggests 
that planning organizations are not learning organizations. This is a critical finding 
because each hazard event provides an opportunity to learn from reality, rather than 
models based on limited information. It appears, however, that planning organizations are 
not using this information.  
 
Merging What Professionals Say with What Governments Do 
Overall, it appears, based on the Florida example, that what practitioners express 
normatively (“should do”) as goals for hazard mitigation planning as a part of 
comprehensive planning is not realized in government actions. In fact, even legally 
mandated hazard mitigation components embodied in state law and administrative code 
were often not included in hazard mitigation elements; no matter what even the state 
government says, mandates did not always translate to actions at the local level. Hazard 
mitigation elements across Florida are not of uniform quality, and many are of low 
quality. The public is not substantially involved in hazard mitigation planning in 
comprehensive planning, and government makes little effort to encourage such 
involvement. In a similar vein, professionals and researchers say social vulnerability 
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exists, but they do not acknowledge its potential effects on hazard mitigation elements in 
CPs. 
This raises an important question: “How can normative standards that the 
planning community sets for hazard mitigation elements in CPs be realized in 
government actions?” While an answer is beyond the scope of this dissertation, ideas to 
further a solution are presented here. Based solely on the Florida example, it appears that 
to realize these normative goals, governments need to better recognize the importance of 
comprehensive planning for hazard mitigation. For example, state and local governments 
could give support to planners charged with this duty in Planning Departments to act on 
the same level that their corresponding Emergency Management departments do, 
especially in the matter of public interaction. Armed with this support these planners 
would have the responsibility to reach out directly to the people they serve, hopefully 
incorporate more mitigation into the public lexicon. State and local government can fund 
the planners charged with hazard mitigation elements better, and help them focus more 
on these duties as a core role, and these planners can take up this challenge and do a 
better job of outreach and public involvement. Second, state agencies charged with 
reviewing hazard mitigation elements could be given a distinct identity and mission that 
places responsibility on them to provide both technical advice to counties and 
enforcement of relevant regulations. 
 
Ideas for Practice 
The finding that hazard mitigation element quality varies, despite Florida having 
strong, prescriptive mandates in state law and administrative code, presents challenges at 
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both the state and local level. From a state perspective, there are clearly opportunities to 
improve local hazard mitigation elements by using best practices employed in some 
counties and requiring and/or encouraging, and facilitating, their use in all coastal 
counties. For counties, even without state intervention, this provides an opportunity to 
look to their peers and find ways to improve their hazard mitigation planning. 
Some targeted solutions, and implementation options for states and counties, 
appear in Table 28, below. These suggestions align with the needs of coastal counties in 
hurricane and flood prone geographic areas. 
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Finding Potential Activities 
Higher Education Levels were 
correlated with higher plan quality. 
1. Prepare materials for local use that explain hazard mitigation and opportunities for involvement in clear, 
understandable terms. Materials should be of multi-cultural appeal, and also should be available in the major 
languages spoken in the state. 
2. Engage people with less than a bachelor’s degree through industry-specific outreach, especially through 
employers and associations. For example, use hotel and restaurant associations to reach out to hospitality 
industry workers. This is a good opportunity for planners to use guest speaking as a tool to connect. 
3. Explain hazards, and the potential for mitigation, in clear terms understandable to most people. Connect 
potential actions of the population being communicated with to benefits. 
Planning departments tend to leave 
the bulk of hazard related 
communication to Emergency 
Management departments. 
1. Craft unified messages that the Planning and Emergency Management Departments can focus on in public 
interaction. 
2. Separate hazard mitigation communication responsibilities related to comprehensive planning and give 
ownership to the Planning Department. The Planning Department should educate the public about hazards and 
vulnerabilities in the community, and elicit input from the public to support planning for hazard mitigation. 
 
Nature is not used as a hazard 
barrier to a great extent. 
1. Conduct statewide historical studies of coastal areas and floodplains to ascertain how much protection appears 
to be correlated with natural areas in hazards specific to the states. Provide detailed data to counties. 
2. Mandate that new construction in the Coastal High Hazard Area and flood zones must fully fund mitigation 
projects that ensure that these developments do not adversely affect the ability of the area to weather hazards.  
3. Study options to entirely prohibit new development in the Coastal High Hazard Area and flood zones. If 
appropriate, apply these measures. 
4. Use natural features for mixed use. For example, floodplains can be turned into recreational areas that are 
allowed to flood as needed. This will help garner public support over the option of just making these areas “off-
limits.” 
5. Work with other departments to use the power of nature in their projects. For example, selecting trees 
appropriate to storm-prone tropical climates over deciduous trees. 
Most counties use the minimum 
state required Coastal High Hazard 
Area to determine which areas face 
increased vulnerability. 
1. Change the CHHA to apply to all areas expected to be inundated in a Category 2 Hurricane instead of only a 
Category 1.  
2. Even if the state does not take the recommended action, apply CHHA restrictions to all areas that are expected 
to be inundated in a Category 2 storm instead of just the state required Category 1 storm. 
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Finding Potential Activities 
Coordination among county 
departments is often ad hoc rather 
than built on constant relationships. 
1. Clearly delineate responsibilities between the Planning and Emergency Management Departments – giving each 
appropriate roles and consultation in the mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery phases. 
2. Increase the role of Planning Departments in communicating with the public. While the Planning Department 
and Emergency Management Department should work to create a unified message to prevent public confusion, 
the Planning Department should drive discussions around mitigation and should be constantly working to elicit 
public input. 
Coordination with planning 
councils and water management 
districts is often ad hoc, and is 
sometimes filtered through 
administrators above Planning 
departments who may not be 
familiar with hazard mitigation 
planning in comprehensive plans. 
1. Communicate to water management districts and regional planning councils that part of their role is to 
coordinate planning activities among municipalities in their districts. 
2. Require that, at minimum, local water management districts and regional planning councils review local hazard 
mitigation elements prior to submission for state level review.  
3. Elicit the assistance of water management districts and regional planning councils throughout the process of 
planning for hazard mitigation. 
4. Work through water management districts and regional planning councils to coordinate with other 
municipalities. 
There is no statistically significant 
correlation between prior hazard 
incidence and hazard mitigation 
element quality. This suggests that 
planning organizations are not 
learning from hazard history. 
1. Catch up with knowledge lost by analyzing prior hazard strikes and damages and applying that information to 
the hazard mitigation element in the next planning cycle. 
2. Incorporate analysis using satellite photos, ground observations, and damage estimates into the plan revision 
cycle following natural hazards. 
3. After a hazard, convene groups with professional experts (e.g., engineers, environmental scientists, etc.), 
government employees involved in the Disaster Management cycle, and citizens to determine how the hazard 
mitigation element could have done better, and how it should be modified for the future. This should begin 
immediately following a hazard to approve and apply modifications to the hazard mitigation element before 
rebuilding (Recovery) begins, thus driving mitigation forward for the next hazard. 
Table 28:  suggested actions for governments to improve hazard mitigation elements 
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Additionally, based on the feedback from survey respondents, hazard mitigation 
elements in land use plans could benefit from several improvements. Interviews of key 
stakeholders in hazard mitigation can be used to procure more information about 
community goals, hazards, conditions on the ground in communities, and potential 
resiliency. To better inform planning, formal models should be used to determine 
potential effects of hazards, especially in the face of changing sea levels. 
While the economic consequences may be initially difficult, planners should 
consider the prohibition of development in the highest hazard zones. Allowing these 
areas to remain barriers against hazards (e.g., mangrove forests, or open parks that can 
absorb flood runoff in hazard situations) could prove very useful and keep people out of 
harm’s way. When local governments allow development in hazard zones, they should 
consider requiring mitigation offsets to fund mitigation projects that will reduce hazards 
and aid in evacuation if applicable to the particular area. This will have the added element 
of bringing a degree of economic decision making to the calculus people must undergo 
when deciding to live in a hazard-prone area. 
 
Limitations 
While my research provides great insight into hazard mitigation planning as a part 
of comprehensive planning in Florida coastal counties, it is limited by several factors of 
note. Most prominently, while the state government requires all Florida coastal 
communities to have hazard mitigation elements in their CPs, my research only examined 
the county level. Possibly, planning behaviors are different at the municipal level, where 
government may be closer to the people. Further, my research is limited to Florida – 
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including other states in the sample may affect how the geography, politics, laws, and 
rules of Florida may influence the research. Finally, my research is limited to hurricanes 
and floods. While including other disasters might confound some of the results, doing so 
also might provide important perspective. 
The number of counties studied is also inherently limiting. With only 35 counties 
in the research universe, any statistical analysis must be carefully considered and should 
not be generalized (in a purely statistical sense) to other states. 
Conducting the study at the county level is a limitation. Typically, vulnerability is 
studied at the individual, family, social group, or community level. County level analysis 
may “wash out” vulnerability as communities of varying levels of vulnerability are 
combined into larger counties with more homogenous populations. A finer-grained 
examination at the sub-county level might reveal that individual communities of varying 
levels of vulnerability are more tightly correlated to hazard mitigation element quality. 
Further, because municipalities tend to form around more dense populations than the 
rural, less populated unincorporated parts of counties, there may be a difference in how 
the two government types approach hazard mitigation element planning. Possibly, 
because county governments tend to be responsible for rural areas that have lower 
population density than typical sub-county municipalities, the county governments are 
not as concerned with natural hazards and are more focused on other topics (such as land 
use planning) than are the more densely populated sub-county municipalities. 
The hazard history index developed bears a limitation in that it measures history, 
but not consequence of hazards. The actual damages resulting from hazard strikes may 
have more of a bearing than the strikes themselves on institutional learning. While it is 
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difficult to get reliable estimates of hurricane damages, it would be useful to incorporate 
such into a measure of prior hazard effects. 
Finally, both the number of interviews and percent of survey respondents should 
be noted as potentially reducing the ability to generalize the findings of my research. 
There were only four interviews with county planning leaders. While the interview 
design helped shape the research, this number is still small. Also notably, several 
potential interviewees turned down interview requests, and thus self-selection could have 
biased interview results. In regard to the surveys, while the sheer number of respondents 
is acceptable (n = 128), the response rate of 16.27% is low. Also, when analyzing 
respondents by employer/group, some groups had much higher response rates than 
others, introducing the possibility that self-selection may have played a role in the 
findings. 
 
Future Directions 
While my research answers the question of whether or not hazard mitigation 
element quality varies in a state with a strong prescriptive mandate for such elements, the 
question of what drives this variation, while partially answered, requires further 
exploration.  
The biggest question left unanswered here is what effect public participation has 
on the quality of hazard mitigation elements of CPs. Certainly, practitioners have 
indicated that such input is important, but in reality, it appears that both the input itself 
and efforts to get that input are largely lacking. Further research should examine hazard 
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mitigation elements in correlation with public participation in their design. Results of this 
would greatly inform policymaking activities of planning departments. 
While some demographic factors appeared to correlate with hazard mitigation 
element quality, demographic factors could not explain all of the variation in hazard 
mitigation element quality. Also, it is notable that the quality of hazard mitigation 
elements generally hovered around the same level – my research found more uniformity 
in quality than expected. Possibly, strict and prescriptive state mandates establish a 
“floor” on quality that is unaffected by demographic variables of the population. My 
research also did not investigate potential interactions between the insurance industry, 
insurance rates, and future risk of hazards in correlation with plan quality. Thus, future 
research should examine plans in states with varying levels of requirements for hazard 
mitigation elements in CPs, and include comparison to demographic variables, insurance 
rate information, measures of insurance industry involvement in the hazard market, and 
future risk from hazards, to better ascertain where the drivers of plan quality variation lie. 
 
Conclusion: The Role of the Public in Planning for Hazard Mitigation 
At the beginning of this dissertation, I noted that comprehensive planning is an 
iterative method of policymaking. Especially in Florida, where public meetings and 
opportunities for input are legally required, and the state monitors both the planning 
process and the output, comprehensive planning provides the opportunity for public input 
to come together with technocratic skill to build strong policies. 
Despite the possibilities of the planning process, it appears that the public largely 
is not directly involved with comprehensive planning related to hazard mitigation. 
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Interviewees said that the public simply is not especially interested in this process, and 
planning documents generally do not require encouraging public input into the hazard 
mitigation element. Yet, when surveyed, planners said that public input into hazard 
mitigation element planning is important. Overall, it appears that while planners say 
public input is important, efforts to go above and beyond to solicit it, and public interest 
in providing the input, are lacking. 
A distinct possibility is that, especially in a state that requires hazard mitigation 
elements with specific components, there is a base level of plan quality – and that when 
the reality of the planning process happens, planners simply meet the requirement. 
Instead of “spinning their wheels” trying to garner public input into hazard mitigation 
elements that the public has little interest in, and likely little technical knowledge to 
contribute, planners may be directing their energy to areas where the public has more 
interest and can provide critical input. Both the merits of public input (especially given 
the tradeoff between higher insurance rates in instances of lower mitigation, and vice 
versa) into the hazard mitigation element, and the perceptions of planners surrounding 
this input, deserve greater consideration in future research. 
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APPENDICES 
Interviews of County Comprehensive Planning Department Managers 
 
In order to inform the development of a survey instrument, I interviewed several 
planning leaders in local government. The major objective of the interviews was to 
assimilate impressions of what drives quality of hazard mitigation elements from 
planning leaders in practice. Their input was used to drive design of the fourth and final 
phase of data collection, a survey of land use planners and people involved with land use 
planning (see next chapter). 
Table 29, below, shows the breakdown of the counties represented in interviews; 
note that all counties are coastal, Florida counties. 
Region of Florida 2010 Population Hazard Index Plan Quality 
North-Gulf 500k-1m 0.1394 25 
North-Gulf 100k-500k 0.2644 23 
South-Atlantic 1m-2m 0.7212 11 
South-Atlantic 2m + 0.8701 17 
Table 29: Summary of land use planning officials interviewed 
Below, each question and a summary of responses appears. 
 
Question 1: Thinking specifically of Comprehensive Plan elements related to natural 
hazards, what guides and/or mandates the elements that appear in the 
Comprehensive Plan? 
Three interviewees reported that Chapter 163 of Florida Statutes (the Growth 
Management Act) and Florida Administrative Code 9J5 (the Florida administrative rule 
governing local comprehensive plans), govern this. One interviewee also noted that 
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Florida Administrative Code 9J11 covers topics relevant to hazard mitigation planning. 
Overall, interviewees were well aware of the legal basis for planning regulations, and in 
conversation, tended to focus on the administrative rule rather than the law requiring 
hazard mitigation in CPs. 
Certainly in our county the mandates are in 9J5. 
Chapter 163 has all the statutes and codes regarding comprehensive planning… there are several 
rulings about the section, such as 9J5. The statutes basically require certain elements in the 
Comprehensive Plan, and one is the Coastal Management Element. 
Chapter 163 of the Growth Management Act does [require the Hazard Mitigation Element], as 
well as 9J5, which is the rule that sets the minimum requirements for preparing local government 
comprehensive plans. 
The mandates, of course, our hazard part is basically under our Coastal Management Element, 
there's a section there about hazard planning, but overall, that's as far as mitigation. That kind of 
dovetails with a lot of other environmental issues. …the county constituents actually voted to tax 
themselves; a part of that goes specifically for environmentally sensitive land, which is all these 
coastal properties mainly. Several thousand acres have been acquired over the years because of 
stewardship. 
Table 30: Select responses to Question 1 
 
Question 2: In what ways would you say your county’s hazard mitigation element 
exceeds Florida’s requirements? 
One county reported expanding its coastal high hazard area (CHHA) beyond the 
state mandated Category 1 inundation zone to the Category 2 inundation zone. Note that  
Florida statutes and administrative codes delineate a specific Coastal High Hazard Area 
(CHHA), which consists of the coastal area that the government expects will flood in a 
Category 1 hurricane or above. Per Florida statute, local governments on the coast are 
required to plan for hazard mitigation in this geographic area. If a county increases its 
CHHA to an area covered by storm categories higher than the state minimum of a 
Category 1, it is expanding the geographic area in which it must apply stricter standards 
for coastal development. This expansion protects additional land areas in the event of a 
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storm, but may also come with additional costs from meeting stringent coastal 
requirements, and economic loss due to development restrictions.  
One interviewee, in a county with a plan that was rated very highly in hazard 
mitigation element ratings conducted prior to the interview, reported that his county had 
several special programs that exceed state requirements for the Coastal Management 
Element. In particular, this county reported that its plan is tightly woven with many 
environmental conservation issues that arose in the 1970s, when residents of the county 
became sufficiently concerned with the environmental state of their county that they 
voted in a referendum to pay a tax to purchase environmentally sensitive land. In fact, the 
series of meetings in the 1970s in which residents became aware that the county faced a 
potential problem with too much development still carries an informal name, which the 
interviewee used in the discussion -  this indicates the importance of this decision and 
how it is ingrained within the culture of the Planning Department, as well as longstanding 
political support for hazard mitigation activities. Some of this money has been used to 
purchase repetitive loss properties (properties which have been affected by a hazard and 
incurred property losses several times) and turn them into a watershed.  
Interviewees also reported other specific areas in which their county’s plans 
exceed state standards, including addressing transportation issues, especially improving 
roadway links critical to evacuation; policies to regulate the construction of any new 
mobile home parks in the CHHA; maps of sites suitable for post-disaster relief staging 
and debris collection; and prohibiting new development in the CHHA or requiring more 
stringent review standards for new development. 
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I don't know if it exceeds, but it has a couple of components, I think, that help guide the county in 
determining how to continue to develop coastal management areas, areas to avoid, and what kind 
of issues we're going to address along the way when we're doing that.  
 
We have policies dealing with things like making sure that evacuation routes are not susceptible 
to blockage by trees in tropical storm force winds. We have policies that say what kinds of plants 
and trees can go along certain roadways. We have a policy in here about educating the public 
about disaster preparedness. We have policies in here to always map areas suitable for post-
disaster relief staging. 
…in protection from hurricanes, we've gone to the extent of taking the Category 1 SLOSH extent, 
SLOSH model, mapping that out, and using that as a Coastal High Hazard area designation. In 
doing so, we've put controls on the allowable density you can have in those areas as a review 
requirement for new construction as well as new plans... we've directly taken that hazard in terms 
of storm surge and converted it into a regulatory line on our zoning plans. It extends from our 
Comprehensive Plan policies into our actual land development policies. 
We do acquire properties for stormwater management purposes. We've taken flood-prone 
properties and put them into public hands, these are properties that typically had flooding records, 
the had been part of the repetitive loss properties, and we've taken those off the books and 
incorporated those properties into the water management area to provide more storage for our 
creeks. 
There are several areas which we could say we might exceed the requirements. The first one is 
that there is a Coastal High Hazard Area in Florida, and there is a definition of a Coastal High 
Hazard Area that it should be a Hurricane 1 inundation zone… in our county our Coastal High 
Hazard Area is determined by the Hurricane [Category] 1 and Hurricane [Category] 2 inundation 
zone.  
 
…we have a prohibition on increasing densities in Coastal High Hazard Areas. Some counties 
allow for mitigation and things like that; we basically prohibit increasing densities in coastal 
areas. 
Table 31: Select responses to Question 2 
 
Question 3: Are there any ways in which you would say your county’s hazard mitigation 
element could use improvements in terms of Florida’s requirements? 
Several respondents reported that their hazard mitigation elements could 
incorporate more mitigation measures, but there was a concern that doing so would create 
an appearance of safety in the CHHA and might encourage greater levels of development. 
Other ideas mentioned include lowering density in the CHHA, prohibiting new mobile 
home developments in the CHHA, and addressing climate change and sea level rise. 
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Question 4: What do you see as the important functions of the 
hazard mitigation element of the CDMP? 
Interviewees reported a variety of functions for the hazard mitigation elements of 
CPs. Some saw broad possibilities, such as serving as guidelines for policy 
implementation (especially in guiding development), versus policies in and of 
themselves. Others cited highly specific functions including addressing pre-disaster 
mitigation, and directing people away from high risk areas. 
A theme that was highlighted slightly here, and showed up in several other 
interviews, is that the CP is not just a policy document, but an implementation guide. 
Interviewees often noted the importance of turning the CP into more than a policy 
document, and using it to communicate information to actually help implement policies. 
One example of this is using maps to make policy more concrete and actionable. 
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What kind of measures are you planning for pre-disaster mitigation? It's important to include 
post-disaster; how do you mobilize? How do you ensure the population is directed away from 
high-risk areas, and having a plan for moving people out before a storm and back after a storm. 
How to decide whether to rebuild or not to rebuild? But then you run into property rights. 
I think the primary issue is the fact that those hazards are identified and that policies are 
developed that translate into some type of development control or regulation that attempts to 
mitigate for those issues. 
A function of the Comprehensive Plan is to enable implementation of those policies. They [the 
policies] enable the activities of the Emergency Management Division. The Hazard Mitigation 
Plan is to provide that guidance for local government to implement emergency management 
measures. 
Here in Florida it's extremely important because we have competing priorities. You like to have 
the growth because you like to see the economy grow here, but at the same time, what attracted 
people here in the first place might be negatively affected. It's important to find that balance, 
because it's just too easy to say, 'We could just simply fill in a wetland area, we could fill in a 
floodplain area.' That's the balance act we need to play here… 
Table 32: Select responses to Question 4 
 
Question 5: What are some critical elements of a hazard mitigation element that help to 
achieve those functions [see Question 4]? 
Interviewees came back with a variety of responses to this question, but there was 
little consensus among them. Some respondents talked about outputs and outcomes, 
including balancing economic development and growth, and encouraging individuals and 
businesses to take responsibility for their own mitigation. Others talked about planning 
processes, including analyzing potential disaster effects, analyzing the capacity of 
infrastructure to withstand a storm strike, and mapping hazards, infrastructure, and land 
use zones. Most likely, achieving hazard mitigation functions are better supported by plan 
processes that help to enhance the element itself, rather than by the actual outputs. 
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You have the mapping  function, which translates Into your zoning maps. You have your building 
code, which is regulated by the state, which the state building code does have windload 
requirements for construction in different areas of the county. We also, in terms of hazard 
mitigation... are doing a project with the Water Management District with improving our Flood 
Insurance Rate Map system and making that digital... It's all based on new LIDAR data, I think 
it's probably 20 times more accurate a map of flooding than we had before. 
The drive on trying to put the onus not so much on the government, we're here to help you, but to 
impress on people their own responsibility to protect their property, to build their homes, to be 
more resilient. 
Table 33: Select responses to Question 5 
 
Question 6: In your department and county, what are you doing to create and maintain a 
high quality hazard mitigation element? 
Most respondents took this question as an opportunity to discuss the culture 
around and process of creating a quality hazard mitigation element. Some respondents 
cited communication and collaboration with municipalities, other government 
departments, local environmental groups, and regional planning councils as important 
paths to a high quality hazard mitigation element. For example, one interviewee 
answered: 
One of the things we do well that we want to continue is our relationship in 
working with our departments and our jurisdictions. We do have some very 
interested focus groups, some citizens groups, we bounce some things off of to 
get their perspective. 
One interviewee said that better plans can be created by creating plans within the local 
government than by hiring outsiders to write the plan – this may be true given that local 
planners likely have intimate knowledge of their communities that outside planners may 
not have. 
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Instead of addressing planning processes, some interviewees listed specific plan 
elements they believe are important to hazard mitigation. Elements listed include an 
emergency management plan (separate from the hazard mitigation element in the 
comprehensive plan), implementing a local mitigation strategy (again, separate from the 
CP), having a post-disaster plan, and having specific plans for local hazards (i.e., dike 
failure). 
 
Question 7: What sources of information are used to build the hazard mitigation element? 
Comprehensive plans, and hazard mitigation elements, are policy documents, 
which must be built on solid information about the communities for which they are 
written. Interviewees listed several sources of information that inform their plans. For 
some, information came from coordination with other departments and organizations 
including their local emergency management department, the Sherriff’s Office, Fire 
Rescue departments, other local governments (both neighboring and within the county), 
and civic associations. Other interviewees cited references and scientific information 
including models (example: SLOSH), LIDAR [Light Detection And Ranging - 
topographical] data, Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs), and Forest Service wild fire 
data. 
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…we're using data from the LIDAR project, we're using data from the Forest Service on wildfire 
hazards, we work with the Sherriff's Office on his data. 
We work in complete coordination with the Emergency Management Division. The Emergency 
Management Division is the public safety department of the county, so that includes coordination 
with the Sherriff's Department, Fire Rescue, civic associations, etc. So basically the data and 
analysis that is used to prepare and maintain the coastal mitigation and hazard mitigation part of it 
is collected through the Emergency Management Department. 
The county has put money toward updating LIDAR data, which is contributing toward an updated 
SLOSH model. The county also contributed to modernizing its Flood Insurance Rate Maps. 
Table 34: Select responses to Question 7 
 
Question 8: What do you think are the hallmarks of a quality hazard mitigation element? 
While Florida sets minimum standards for hazard mitigation elements in state 
statute and administrative codes, planners proffered many ideas for going beyond these 
minimums to create stronger hazard mitigation elements. From a planning perspective, 
interviewees suggested addressing hazards beyond hurricanes and floods hazards (e.g., 
terrorism, sea level rise, and fire); strong linkages between emergency response plans and 
land use plans (e.g., coordination between the evacuation plan and land use plans); and a 
holistic planning process that results in implementable plans that are realistic. From a 
programmatic perspective, interviewees recommended increased public information and 
outreach; hardening infrastructure; encouraging people to take responsibility and harden 
their homes and businesses against hazards; and coordinating with other departments. 
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It needs to address all aspects of all hazards, not just natural hazards…  
 
It needs to provide guidance on how to deal with emergencies. In the case of hurricanes, of 
course, it is important to provide for the evacuation of areas that are impacted by the disasters. 
I would put at the top of my list coordination with other agencies, requirements for information, 
and operational effectiveness; because when you do the best type of plan of action, you want it to 
be implementable… It needs to have very practical actionable... things that can be utilized. 
I think the way we approach it holistic. I think the public information and outreach is important, 
we have such a turnover in population and new people coming in, that they need to know this 
information when they're trying to purchase property. Outreach - not just in hurricane season... 
but year-round. We have to be more far reaching as far as the possible effects of sea rise in this 
area. What happens if all of the sudden everything is  a meter higher? What's the impact? 
To encourage business owners and homeowners to harden their own homes and businesses to the 
extent that they can economically. To educate, I think education is an important component in an 
element. 
Table 35: Select responses to Question 8 
 
Question 9: How does your department coordinate with other departments and other 
governments to create a quality hazard mitigation element? 
Hazards and disasters go beyond the functions of any one department and cross 
political boundaries. This question provided interviewees an opportunity to discuss how 
they coordinate across functions and boundaries to create the highest quality hazard 
mitigation elements. Some interviewees reported using new and creative methods of 
communication including Facebook and Twitter, and Sharepoint™ to share draft 
documents. Other reported more traditional methods such as keeping a list of 
stakeholders and coordinating with them; participating in councils bringing together 
regional planning departments and other affected agencies from multiple local 
governments; sending drafts through other departments and municipalities; and 
involvement with the Local Mitigation Strategy Committee. 
Well, the main feature that we use right now is the Local Mitigation Strategy Committee. That 
committee meets quarterly, at least, usually. We have representatives from cities on that, as well 
as some of the constitutional officers, some of the groups that are involved. We'll have full 
meetings on an as needed basis if we have something we need to coordinate with. 
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We strive to communicate with as much people as possible. We engage in online networking 
programs - Facebook and Twitter - we are just starting very timidly to use them. We have an 
extensive list of stakeholders and contacts. 
It's primarily with the Department of Emergency Management… we attend their meetings, which 
are ongoing. 
It's just really kind of keeping in touch. If we have meetings, they definitely are invited. If we 
have drafts, we run them by various people that may have an interest. We try to inform them 
[municipalities] as best we can, particularly through websites and SharePoint. 
Table 36: Select responses to Question 9 
 
Question 10: Is your county represented on the water management district? Is your 
department represented at all or nearly all of its meetings? Does the person responsible 
for the hazard mitigation element attend its meetings? How does the water management 
district affect your hazard mitigation element? 
Water Management Districts (WMDs) in Florida manage watersheds that go 
beyond the political boundary of any one county. They provide important methods of 
regional coordination to align water policies and address water issues. When asked about 
their coordination with WMDs, interviewees said that, typically, one county official 
represents the county to the WMD in an administrative capacity (not as a voting board 
member), and this person is part of the county executive office and not the Planning 
department. If an issue relevant to the CP will be taken up at the WMD board, a 
representative from the Planning Department may attend a given meeting, but the 
Planning Department typically does not routinely send a representative to every meeting 
(one county did report sending a representative to every meeting). 
In terms of coordination in the planning process, planning departments may send 
drafts of relevant items to the local WMD for review, but coordination is typically not 
any higher than that level. One county did report a much higher level of communication, 
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however, and said that its staff was in constant communication with the local WMD. As 
an indirect form of coordination, the WMD has authority to review certain projects and 
issue permits for them. This drives a level of communication between planning 
departments and the WMD. 
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Question 11: Please describe coordination between your department and the Emergency 
Management Department and how you share information. 
This question provided interviewees the opportunity to discuss their department’s 
relationship with their county’s Emergency Management Department. This part of the 
conversation explored how counties connect the Mitigation and Response functions of 
the Disaster Management Cycle. According to interviewees, planning departments tend to 
seek out the input and review of emergency management departments in making policies 
related to hazard mitigation. Conversely, emergency management departments tend to be 
consumers of Planning Department information, such as zoning densities, which are used 
to facilitate response planning. Planners also said that coordination tends to be ad hoc and 
focused on specific issues rather than ongoing and constant. Finally, two interviewees 
noted that their department is represented at the county Emergency Operations Center 
when it is activated. 
That [coordination between the Planning and Emergency Management Department] is primarily 
done above my department. 
We are pretty close. Most recently, for instance, we have been working with them in updating the 
Coastal High Hazard Area.  
We coordinate with them on the policies we add to the Comprehensive Plan. If there is any other 
general policy with regards to hazard mitigation, we seek their input. Is there anything that needs 
to be updated? Is there anything here that we need to include that we've overlooked in the past? 
Are there new issues in hazard mitigation that need to be addressed that haven't been addressed in 
the past? Basically on an as-needed basis. 
 
We review their Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan when it's updated." 
Table 37: Select responses to Question 11 
 
Question 12: How interested is the public in providing input related to the hazard 
mitigation element? What public groups take a strong interest in this? When are public 
meetings regarding the hazard mitigation element typically held? How does your 
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department work to educate the public about hazard mitigation to foster quality 
participation? 
This series of questions was aimed at assessing the level of public involvement in 
the hazard mitigation element and how planning departments elicit public involvement. 
Overall, respondents reported that the public is not very interested in providing input 
about hazard mitigation, unless there recently has been a hazard strike or disaster that 
captures public attention. While individuals tend to show little interest in hazard 
mitigation in comprehensive planning, civic organizations such as environmental, 
watchdog, health care, building, and disaster response groups tend to be the groups most 
interested in giving input regarding hazard mitigation. 
Respondents reported that the value of public input is that it brings people’s 
personal experiences and perceptions to the table. People participating in the process can 
help the Planning Department to know how people mitigate against hazards. Despite this 
value of public participation, half the respondents said that they hold public meetings on 
the Hazard Mitigation Element in the daytime, and the other two respondents reported 
holding these meetings in the evenings. Respondents also reported that activities to 
educate the public are typically left to the Emergency Management Department, although 
two respondents reported working with this department on outreach (but the Emergency 
Management Department had primary responsibility). 
Overall, while there was recognition of the value of public input, planning 
departments do not seem to fully embrace this input. With meetings held in the evenings, 
the public may not be able to attend (or only certain groups that can make time in the day 
may be represented). Furthermore, by leaving public interaction to response oriented 
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emergency management departments, planning departments may be losing prime 
opportunities to engage with the public about mitigation. 
We do the outreach regarding focus groups. Our public participation has been through the focus 
groups, like our environmental group and also though, we tried to do some other outreach with 
other associations, other agencies, municipalities. We have our Intergovernmental Coordination 
Element which is what we follow to try to provide information, to solicit information from the 
outside.  
 
When we were doing out Local Mitigation Strategy, we held focus groups and invited non-profit 
groups, civic groups to these meetings. We held them mid-county, north-county, south county. 
Our participation was disappointing in a way. We do a whole lot of other outreach and solicit 
comments. I can't say we get a whole lot of comments. Sometimes I question the amount of 
money we put into outreach compared to the benefit we get from it. Unless it happens to hit 
somebody in their own pocketbook at that particular point in time, getting participation is tough, 
no matter who you try to solicit it from, particularly from the public at large, and they won't come 
busting the door down unless the floodwaters are up to the doors of their house, then they come. 
 
We've held, as far as our, we held the meetings in the evening. For the Local Mitigation Strategy 
itself it was during the day. But when we have public focus groups, they are in the evening. 
 
If we didn’t have that [public] input, we'd never at least have tried to address that particular 
situation.  
They are very interested. There are certain groups that are more interested than others. One of 
those is called 1,000 Friends of Florida, they are not really an environmental group, but more a 
watchdog. There are also groups of private property owners interested in hazard mitigation. 
 
Those meetings [public meetings] only happen when we are doing amendments, for changes to 
the elements there are no meetings. Depending on the situation and the topic, we hold those 
meetings during the day. We very rarely hold meetings in the evening.  
"We seek input from the public either via the internet or workshops in which we go through every 
element of plans including this one, or at least topical areas. Probably the Department of 
Emergency Management is out there more than we are. Sometimes this element [Hazard 
Mitigation] gets lost among...  
 
I don't think we do much personally, this department. In preparing the element there was that 
public input either directly or indirectly by this department, there hasn't been so much the last 15 
years because it's already been in place. We probably should do more than what we do in the 
EAR…  
 
When we go to the workshops and meet with the public in general on these issues, we do not get 
much of a response." 
"We normally, when we adjust our Comprehensive Plan, will hold a public hearing at the 
Planning Board, their job is to review it and take input from the public and they send it off to the 
County Commission. The County Commission then takes input and votes on it at a public 
hearing... The other things is that our Local Mitigation Strategy Committee is a public meeting 
and we advertise that. 
Table 38: Select responses to Question 12 
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Conclusion: No One Way to Plan for Hazard Mitigation 
Overall, interviewees expressed similar opinions on many issues, but also showed 
some variety in their responses. Certainly, because there were only four interviewees, 
broad trends should not be inferred from this, but the interviews do shed light into the 
inner-workings of planning departments. 
Consistently, interviewees indicated that the CP is a way of translating policies 
into actionable items, and that the hazard mitigation element needs to be built in this 
perspective. They said that the purpose of the hazard mitigation element of a land use 
plan is to identify hazards and then develop policies in response that translate into 
development controls and/or regulations. Several interviewees also noted the importance 
of expressing these policies in plans through maps that can bring policies, features, and 
hazards to life. This indicates an important focus on framing planning as a policymaking 
and implementation tool – one which can involve the public intimately, which can be 
very useful to bring local knowledge to hazard mitigation. 
Based on the interviews, there is a fairly low level of coordination between 
Comprehensive planning departments and Water Management Districts, the public, other 
governments, and departments within their own government. Given the potential for 
better addressing disasters through the Disaster Management Cycle (Mitigation  
Preparedness  Response  Recovery) and regional coordination, this is an area for 
potential improvement.  
In terms of relationships with the public, it appears that planning departments and 
the public are missing opportunities by not holding meetings at times accessible to the 
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working public. Holding hearings in the daytime makes it hard for working-class 
members of the public, to come and contribute to the process of planning for hazard 
mitigation. Conversely, interviewees may not have much reason to take time in the 
evenings to hold these hearings, because they also report that the public, overall, has little 
interest in the Hazard Mitigation Element, unless there has been a recent hazard or 
disaster. What stood out the most in the interviews was that planning departments 
generally are not involved with communicating with the public about hazards and 
disasters, rather, this is often left to emergency management departments. This is likely a 
lost opportunity for increased public education about hazard mitigation, and for attracting 
public participation in building Hazard Mitigation elements. Given that the public may 
have a great deal of knowledge about local problems that arise during natural hazards, 
and may have creative mitigation strategies, this is a valuable interaction that both sides 
are missing out on.  
 Overall, routine coordination with other departments and governments was 
lacking. Given that natural disasters tend to involve multiple government functions, and 
occur across political boundaries, this is a telling finding. In one case, however, a county 
reported that the area has a regional coordinating body focusing on environmental issues, 
which brings multiple governments together on a regular basis, and includes multiple 
departments from each participant. This model of a regional coordinating body could be a 
solution to improve intergovernmental coordination for hazard mitigation. 
Finally, coordination with Water Management Districts (WMDs) was varied, but 
typically reported at low levels, despite the fact that these organizations provide direct 
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potential to address the multi-jurisdictional nature of flooding. Typically, interviewees 
reported that their departments attend WMD meetings on an ad hoc basis. 
There was general confusion over mitigation-related terms. At least one 
interviewee intermingled the concepts of response and mitigation, as he noted that hazard 
mitigation elements in land use plans should address plans for evacuating people before a 
storm, moving them back after, and resuming normal operations. Another confused the 
concepts of recovery and mitigation, and spoke extensively about his county’s flood 
assistance program to help people recover from floods when I asked him about plan 
features exceeding county requirements, instead of discussing hazard mitigation. Yet 
another peppered his information about mitigation with comments about recovery 
programs being run by the sheriff’s office. 
Overall, the interviews reflect that there are certain normative values involved 
with comprehensive planning for hazard mitigation that are not being met in the actual 
planning process. In particular eliciting public input, working with other government 
agencies, and working with other governments and inter-governmental agencies, seemed 
to be lacking, while planners reported that these were important features. 
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Survey Questions and Sources for Each 
The survey questions and topics covered are listed Table 39, below.  Each 
question or topic may have several sources indicated, as each source checked provides 
significant support for asking a particular question. Those marked “Interviews” come 
from interviews of planners, those marked “Literature” are drawn from the literature 
reviewed, and those marked “Practice” were selected based on their value in practice for 
planning for hazard-mitigation in comprehensive plans. 
Question Interviews Literature Practice 
Planners interview key hazard mitigation stakeholders  X X 
The plan uses Sea, Lake and Overland Surges from 
Hurricanes (SLOSH) or an alternative formal model X X  
Development limited in hazard zones X X  
Development prohibited in hazard zones  X  
No additions or improvements to public infrastructure in 
hazard zones  X  
Mitigation required from developments that increase 
evacuation times   X 
Nature used as a barrier against natural hazards (e.g. 
mangrove protection to maintain coastline)  X X 
The planning department is mandated to hold public 
meetings throughout the planning process X X X 
Required consultation with special districts and local 
governments in county (e.g. school boards, municipalities, 
etcetera)   X 
Building codes employed in hazard zones  X  
Generally speaking, Comprehensive Plans should 
incorporate the concept of vulnerability   X 
Planners need education in… Environmental Sciences   X 
Planners need education in… Natural Sciences   X 
Importance of planners having experience in… 
Environmental Conservation and Resources  X  
Importance of planners having experience in… Natural 
Sciences  X  
Importance of planners having experience in… Experienced 
a disaster firsthand  X X 
Planner attendance of at least one conference annually, 
focusing on hazards/disasters, the environment, planning, 
public administration, or a related topic   X 
Coordination between planning departments and local water 
management districts X X  
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Question Interviews Literature Practice 
Coordination between planning departments and local 
emergency management departments X X  
Communities with a wealthier population base are more 
likely to have higher quality hazard mitigation elements in 
Comprehensive Plans  X  
Communities with a higher percentage of minority residents 
are more likely to have lower quality of hazard mitigation 
elements in Comprehensive Plans  X  
Communities that have experienced disasters are more likely 
to have higher quality hazard mitigation elements in 
Comprehensive Plans  X  
Hazard mitigation elements in Comprehensive Plans will be 
improved if elected officials are actively involved with 
writing these elements   X 
Hazard mitigation elements in Comprehensive Plans will be 
improved if elected officials are engaged in oversight of 
implementing new hazard mitigation measures   X 
Communities should benchmark their hazard mitigation 
elements in Comprehensive Plans against communities of 
similar size and/or hazard exposure   X 
Communities should benchmark their hazard mitigation 
elements in Comprehensive Plans against a model hazard 
mitigation element   X 
County planning departments have the time and resources to 
benchmark their plans   X 
Community participation throughout the planning process X X  
If the state windstorm insurer, Citizens, charged market rates 
for its product, hazard mitigation elements in Comprehensive 
Plans would be improved   X 
Table 39: Survey questions and topics and sources 
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Regression of Demographic and Hazard History Variables 
Against Hazard Mitigation Element Quality 
To better understand how the demographic and hazard history related variables 
involved may correlate with plan quality, I conducted regression analysis. Instead of 
using only the variables found to be significant in the correlation analysis, I included all 
variables in the first regression model to see how well regression models comport with 
the findings from the analysis of correlation using Spearman’s Rho. Recall that Storm 
Exposure is a measure of exposure to hurricanes for each county, factoring in number of 
storms, strength, and years elapsed since each, over the last 30 years. Notably, with only 
35 cases, regression testing is a dubious exercise, and results should not be extrapolated. 
  
183 
 
Model Including All Variables 
The first regression test included all variables. It had moderate predictive power 
for plan quality, with an r2 of 0.612. Table 40, below, presents these results. 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B 
Std. 
Error 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound
Percent of Population over 25 with a High 
School Diploma 
.099 .281 .352 .728 -.482 .680
Percent of Population over 25 with a 
Bachelor's Degree or Higher 
.115 .206 .558 .582 -.312 .542
Median Household Income -8.458E-5 .000 -.436 .667 .000 .000
Population Density per Square Mile .004 .002 2.142 .043 .000 .007
Population Density Change from 2000 to 
2010 
-1.241 4.225 -.294 .772 -9.982 7.499
Percent of Population Age 62 and Up 28.722 14.652 1.960 .062 -1.588 59.031
Percent of Population Non-White -3.009 10.341 -.291 .774 -
24.402 
18.383
Percent of Population Hispanic or Latino -1.276 16.525 -.077 .939 -
35.460 
32.908
Percent of Population in Renter Occupied 
Housing Units 
13.664 18.945 .721 .478 -
25.526 
52.854
Storm Exposure -.090 1.647 -.054 .957 -3.497 3.318
Table 40: Regression on plan quality - full model 
The regression indicates that the only variable having a statistically significant 
correlation with hazard mitigation element quality is Population Density per Square Mile. 
While this initially appears to be discordant with findings above that other demographic 
variables correlate with hazard mitigation element quality, this is likely the result of using 
the non-parametric Spearman’s Rho test for the main analysis. Spearman’s Rho was used 
because it is better suited for analysis with a small number of cases than is regression 
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testing. Because only Population Density per Square Mile was found to be a statistically 
significant predictor of hazard mitigation element quality, analysis was stopped at this 
point. 
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